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Abstract 
The jus in bello proportionality rule establishes an upper boundary on how much 
collateral damage combatants can cause whilst striking a lawful target and its 
associated rule on precautions in attack compels them to take all feasible 
measures to properly understand the situation on the ground and to mitigate 
civilian harm. Proportionality and precautions in attack have been codified in 
API for over forty years, but in that time, it has been difficult to hold troops and 
their leaders accountable for breaches of these rules. In this study, I examine 
several reasons for why these rules have been difficult to apply ex post by 
considering the strategic motivations of state officials and prosecutors. 
Specifically, I propose a game-theoretic model which describes the decisions 
that state officials and prosecutors have historically made, and I explore what 
changes to this model would prompt these actors to behave differently. The 
model was developed using insights gained from legal case studies, archival 
research and a series of interviews with relevant actors. It suggests, inter alia, 
that to induce state officials to support a stricter liability standard for unlawful 
attacks, they must either ascribe much more value to legitimacy than to the 
success of future military operations, or they must perceive the success of 
future military operations to be unaffected by the possibility of losing criminal or 
civil adjudication. State officials may perceive losing a civil case based on state 
liability as being less likely to affect the success of future military operations 
compared with criminal liability against individual troops. Therefore, state 
officials may be inclined to support a stricter civil liability standard, if they 
believed it would help the state to secure greater legitimacy.  
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
Balance is an intrinsic feature of the international law of armed conflict (LOAC).1 
From classical times to today, one can trace the trajectory of a debate between 
the proponents of restraint in warfare2 and those who adopt the logic of 
kriegsraison.3 In the modern era, states have categorically rejected kriegsraison 
in favour of an equilibrium between the competing requirements of humanity 
and military necessity in warfare.4 However, there exists an uneasy tension 
between these two demands throughout the entire corpus of LOAC.5 Nowhere 
is this more apparent than with the jus in bello proportionality rule, which 
requires combatants to abandon any attacks which are expected to cause 
excessive collateral damage against civilians and civilian objects compared with 
the anticipated military advantage of the attack.6 The effectiveness of 
proportionality as a legal rule depends upon how textual ambiguities in the law 
are resolved in practice. In the abstract, the proportionality rule appeals to a 
                                            
 
1
In this text, I use the term ‘law of armed conflict’ (LOAC). Other texts in this field may use ‘international 
humanitarian law’ (IHL) or ‘laws of war’ (LOW) to describe essentially the same corpus of law. Solis 
provides a more complete breakdown of the three names for this common set of laws: Gary Solis, The Law 
of Armed Conflict (Cambridge UP 2010), 18-24. I chose to use LOAC because it accurately describes 
when the law applies, but remains agnostic as to the law’s intent.  
2
 Long before the proportionality rule was codified in Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions of 
1949 (API), Just War Theory/Tradition (JWT) still influenced the conduct of hostilities in the West. The 
most cited contemporary account of proportionality in JWT can be found in Michael Walzer, Just and 
Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations (2nd edn, Basic Books 1992),129-133, 151-
159.  
3
Cicero’s oft quoted phrase ‘Silent enim leges inter arma’ (‘laws are silent when arms are raised’) has been 
the rallying cry for those in favour of unrestricted warfare. Marcus T. Cicero, Oration for Titus Annius Milo 
in the Orations of Marcus Tullius Cicero, vol III (C.D. Yonge tr, Bell & Sons 1905). Later, in 19
th
 Century 
Prussia, military theorists including the famed strategist Carl von Clausewitz echoed this idea that there 
need not be any restraint in warfare: ‘Self-imposed restrictions, almost imperceptible and hardly worth 
mentioning, termed usages of International Law, accompany [war] without essentially impairing its power. 
Violence, that is to say, physical force (for there is no moral force without the conception of States and 
Law), is therefore the MEANS; the compulsory submission of the enemy to our will is the ultimate object.’ 
Carl Von Clausewitz, On War (J. J. Graham tr, 1874) 1. The doctrine of Kreigsraison which developed in 
this milieu held that military necessity must override the laws and customs of warfare. Solis presents a 
sobering account of an early twentieth century text which shows the seductive logic behind Kreigsraison: 
‘By steeping himself in military history an officer will be able to guard himself against excessive 
humanitarian notions, it will teach him that certain severities are indispensable to war, nay more, that the 
only true humanity very often lies in a ruthless application of them’. Solis, 265. 
4
 Michael Schmitt, ‘Military Necessity and Humanity in International Humanitarian Law: Preserving the 
Delicate Balance’ (2010) 50 Virginia Journal of Intl Law 796, 798. 
5
 Schmitt puts it well when he states that: ‘Every one of its [LOAC’s] rules constitutes a dialectical 
compromise between these two opposing forces’ ibid, 798. 
6
 Schmitt claims that: ‘The most conspicuous balancing appears in the principle of proportionality… Even 
minor collateral damage might bar an otherwise lawful attack if the military advantage that accrues to the 
attacker is slight, whereas a great deal of collateral damage might be justified if the corresponding military 
advantage is considerable.’ ibid, 804-805. 
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utilitarian logic that many would find intuitive; however, it is difficult to 
operationalise in such a way that protects non-combatants whilst also allowing 
attackers to plan and execute operations under the proverbial ‘fog of war’. 
There is no cold calculation that one can perform to ensure that an attacker has 
complied with the rule because the two values that are being weighed are 
essentially incommensurable7 (e.g. one cannot merely state that five civilian 
lives are worth killing an enemy commander). Furthermore, under the stresses 
of combat, information about the overall military advantage or collateral damage 
of an attack might be unreliable or non-existent. Nevertheless, to ensure that 
commanders base their decision to attack on the best information available to 
them, the jus in bello precautions rule stipulates that combatants must take all 
feasible precautions to understand the nature of a target and to use weapons 
and methods of attack that will cause the least amount of civilian harm. The 
application of these rules has historically been left to the good-faith judgement 
of those who plan and execute attacks, which may help to prevent collateral 
damage ex ante, but it has been difficult to achieve accountability for violations 
of these rules ex post.  
Despite being fundamental tenants of LOAC, the rules on proportionality 
and precautions in attack remain elusive concepts for courts to apply in a robust 
way. For this project, I have decided to focus on these two rules, because they 
are at the vanishing point8 of modern LOAC and international criminal law (ICL), 
particularly for major powers like the United States (US) and the United 
Kingdom (UK).  Other battlefield outrages, such as directly killing a small 
number of civilians or taking their property,9 can land the perpetrator in prison 
                                            
 
7
 William Fenrick, ‘The Rule of Proportionality and Protocol I in Conventional Warfare’ (1982) 98 Military 
Law Review 91, 102; Robert D Sloane, ‘Puzzles of Proportion and the "Reasonable Military Commander": 
Reflections on the Law, Ethics, and Geopolitics of Proportionality’ 6 Harv Nat'l Sec J 299, 307; Michael 
Schmitt, ‘The Principle of Discrimination in 21st Century Warfare’ (1999) 2 Yale Human Rights and 
Development Journal 143, 157. 
8
 The international legal scholar, Hersch Lauterpacht, was sceptical of the efficacy of international law, 
generally and the law of war, in particular, and famously stated: ‘In all these matters the lawyer must do his 
duty regardless of dialectical doubts – though with a feeling of humility springing from the knowledge that if 
international law is, in some ways, at the vanishing point of law, the law of war is, perhaps even more 
conspicuously, at the vanishing point of international law.’ Hersch  Lauterpacht, ‘The Problem of the 
Revision of the Law of War’ (1952) 29 Brit YB of Int'l L 360, 381-382. 
9
 See Ch 2 at note 319. 
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(either at the hands of the state’s military legal system10 or at an international 
court). However, the collateral damage caused during an airstrike or an artillery 
barrage is regularly dismissed as merely the unfortunate consequences of war, 
even when the civilian loss of life is extensive.11  
Civilians Caught in the Crosshairs 
The costs of war for civilians are set to become ever higher as more fighting 
takes place in cities. This has led International Committee of the Red Cross 
(ICRC) President Peter Maurer to warn that when combatants use high-
explosive weaponry in urban environments, the results are not merely 
unfortunate, but utterly catastrophic: 
For centuries, wars were predominantly fought across vast battlefields, pitting 
thousands of men, large army corps and heavy weaponry against each other in open 
fields. Cities could be besieged or sacked but fighting rarely took place on the streets. 
Today's armed conflicts look quite different: city centers and residential areas have 
become the battlefields of our time… In their urban operations, armed forces have to 
take into account the vulnerability of large numbers of people due to their dependence 
on urban services and the intricacy and interconnectedness of these essential services. 
They must avoid or minimize harm to civilians, including in their choice of means and 
methods of attack. In addition to the high risk of incidental civilian death, injury and 
disability, heavy explosive weapons tend to cause extensive damage to critical civilian 
infrastructure, triggering debilitating ‘domino effects’ on interconnected essential 
services such as health care, water and electricity supply systems.
12
 
The modern framework for the jus in bello principle of distinction and its rules on 
proportionality and precautions in attack were negotiated, in part, to avoid the 
sort of devastation that was wrought upon civilians during the Second World 
War.13 Nevertheless, civilians are still bearing much of the brunt of modern 
military operations. Even when governments are ostensibly committed to 
fighting according to international law, their troops seem unable to rout the 
enemy without simultaneously causing extensive civilian harm. In the most 
                                            
 
10
 Eugene Fidell, ‘U.S. Military Justice and "Operational Mishaps": A Primer’ (Just Security, 24 April 2017)  
accessed 4 July 2017. 
11
 ‘In the view of many soldiers, because collateral damage is considered inevitable, concern for collateral 
damage should not get in the way of force protection or accomplishing the mission. Lieutenant Colonel 
Nathan Sassaman lost respect for a commander who refused to use all artillery power available to him 
because the Colonel “feared the collateral damage that might result from such an action.” Sassaman 
reasoned: “Well, collateral damage is one of the costs of war. You try to minimize it, of course, but it’s 
going to happen. War is imprecise and unpredictable. It is, in a word, terrible. If you aren’t willing to accept 
collateral damage as a cost of doing battle, then you shouldn’t engage the military in the first place’ Neta 
Crawford, Accountability for Killing: Moral Responsibility for Collateral Damage in America's Post-9/11 
Wars (Oxford UP 2013), 5. 
12
 Peter Maurer, ‘War in Cities: What Is at Stake?’ (War in Cities, Geneva, 4 April 2017). 
13
 See Ch 2 at note 131. 
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recent example of such a Pyrrhic victory, the liberation of Mosul from Islamic 
State (IS) has left the city in ruins. During the final stages of the battle, between 
February and June 2017, military operations claimed the lives of roughly 5,800 
civilians.14 As US Army Major John Spencer noted, the only way to truly 
minimise civilian casualties would have been to fight room-to-room through the 
city: 
To be clear, Mosul was not a battle fought by the U.S. military. But the Iraqi forces who 
undertook this urban fight did so with U.S. advice, training and tools — including 
advanced surveillance technology and firepower — and their performance offers 
illustrative lessons about the limits of the methods and capabilities available for urban 
combat… For the U.S. military, there are basically two approaches to fighting in cities. 
The first can in part be traced to the 1972 failed rescue of the Israeli Olympians taken 
hostage in Munich. After that, specialized hostage rescue and close-quarter battle 
tactics were perfected by counterterrorism units and special operations forces and then 
passed to general purpose military forces. These “enter and clear a room” tactics are 
practiced religiously and are heavily dependent on actionable intelligence — in other 
words, knowing what target to attack.
15
  
However, given how deeply IS troops embedded themselves into the civilian 
population in Mosul, and given the limited toolkit available to the pro-Iraqi 
Government forces, he believed the city needed to be razed in order to win it 
back: 
The second approach is outright destruction. With roots traced to tactics like ancient 
siege warfare, U.S. forces will isolate all or part of a city and either control access to 
exhaust the supplies, support, or morale of its opponents until they surrender or move 
to clear every structure, building and room with maximum firepower, until all enemy 
personnel are found and killed. Often, this includes attempting to remove civilians so 
even more destruction can be employed, as U.S. forces did when they routed over a 
thousand insurgents in the 2004 Second Battle of Fallujah. But these approaches are 
on extreme ends of a spectrum with little in the middle: soldiers have few options 
between a five-ounce round and a five-hundred-pound bomb. They can’t see inside 
buildings, target specific individuals fortified within dense urban terrain, separate 
civilians from enemy combatants, or do anything other than destroy with weapons and 
techniques designed for fighting major armies on the plains of Eastern Europe or in 
some future war with peer militaries. The military has very few of what it calls nonlethal 
— or even less destructive but more effective — tools.
16
 
By not adopting the sort of tactics and weaponry needed to minimise collateral 
damage, the pro-Government forces, including those parts of the US military 
that have participated in the campaign, have left themselves open to 
                                            
 
14
 At Any Cost: The Civilian Catastrophe in West Mosul, Iraq (Amnesty International, 2017), 5, 24.  
15
 John Spencer, ‘Why America Is Destroying Iraqi Cities to Save Them’ (2017)  
<http://nationalinterest.org/feature/why-america-destroying-iraqi-cities-save-them-22024> accessed 5 
September 2017. 
16
 Ibid. 
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accusations that they fired indiscriminately, disproportionately, or without first 
exhausting all feasible precautions to spare the civilian population.17  
The Battle of Mosul joins a long list of recent campaigns in which human 
rights organisations (HROs) and inter-governmental organisations (IGOs) have 
criticised states over how they employ air power. For instance, recent US-led 
Coalition operations against IS in Syria, have provoked condemnation for both 
the high numbers of civilian deaths generally,18 and for particular high-casualty 
strikes.19 Moreover, it is not just the HROs that are concerned about collateral 
damage in contemporary military operations. Amid worries that the Trump 
Administration may have loosened the Obama-era policy restraints governing 
the use of force in situations where civilians could be hurt or killed, 30 former 
US flag officers and policy officials wrote an open letter to Defense Secretary 
James Mattis urging him to keep in place those policy restraints and their 
associated oversight mechanisms.20 To be sure, their concerns were more 
grounded in counterinsurgency strategy than humanitarianism, per se, but the 
document calls into question the tactical and strategic necessity of conducting 
operations in such a way as to produce large numbers of civilian casualties. In 
response, US military commanders and spokespeople argue, in an appeal to 
kriegsraison, that such collateral damage is necessary and that it is in the best 
                                            
 
17
 Amnesty International investigators documented 45 specific attacks in which they believed pro-
government forces had committed a violation of LOAC as it applies to targeting.  At Any Cost: The Civilian 
Catastrophe in West Mosul, Iraq, 27.  
18
 ‘Large numbers of civilian casualties from coalition actions have been reported in local outlets and by 
Syrian monitoring organizations since well before the official start of operations inside Raqqa itself. In the 
three months leading up to June, Airwars researchers estimated that more than 700 civilians were likely 
killed by coalition strikes as the Syrian Democratic Forces surrounded the city. Airwars currently assesses 
that more than 5,100 civilians have likely been killed in coalition actions in both Iraq and Syria since 2014.’ 
Samuel Oakford, ‘The U.S. Is in Denial About the Civilians It's Killing in Syria’ Foreign Policy (1 September 
2017) <http://foreignpolicy.com/2017/08/31/the-u-s-is-in-denial-about-the-civilians-its-killing-in-syria/amp/> 
. See also, Sarah Almukhtar, ‘U.S. Airstrikes on Isis Have Killed Hundreds, Maybe Thousands of Civilians’ 
New York Times (New York, 25 May 2017) 
<https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2017/05/25/world/middleeast/airstrikes-iraq-syria-civilian-
casualties.html> . 
19
 For example, Human Rights Watch claimed that US forces had failed to take all feasible precautions to 
properly identify a mosque in al-Jina before attacking it and killed 37 civilians Attack on the Omar Ibn Al-
Khatab Mosque: US Authorities’ Failure to Take Adequate Precautions (Human Rights Watch, 2017). 
Moreover, the New York Times and the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights reported that a US attack on 
a school in Mansoura killed more than 30. Anne Barnard, ‘U.S. Airstrike in Syria Is Said to Kill Dozens of 
Civilians’ New York Times (22 March 2017) <https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/22/world/middleeast/syria-
us-airstrike.html> ; ‘33 Civilian Victims Are Killed in a New Massacre Committed by the International 
Coalition’s Warplanes in Al-Raqqah’ (Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, 22 March 2017)  
<http://www.syriahr.com/en/?p=63281> accessed 5 September 2017. 
20
 Rand Beers et al., Principles to Guide U.S. Counterterrorism use of Force Policies (2017). 
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interests of the civilians living in cities like Raqqa for the Coalition to fight hard 
to end the conflict as quickly as possible, rather than taking greater care during 
targeting: ‘Any pause in operations will only give ISIS more time to build up their 
defences and thus put more civilians in harm’s way… What is more, it will 
further reinforce ISIS’s tactic of using civilians as human shields.’21 Even if the 
Trump Administration, generally, is comfortable with accepting large numbers of 
civilian casualties as a matter of course,22 Mattis’s rhetoric suggests that the 
Department of Defense (DoD) is sensitive to charges from outside organisations 
that the US is not taking collateral damage seriously:      
There has been no military in the world’s history that has paid more attention to limiting 
civilian casualties and the deaths of innocents on the battlefield than the coalition 
military… We’re not the perfect guys… We can make a mistake, and in this kind of 
warfare, tragedy will happen. But we are the good guys, and the innocent people on the 
battlefield know the difference.
23
 
Nevertheless, in this frame, extensive collateral damage is still seen as an 
acceptable, if unfortunate, part of warfare rather than an indication that there 
has been a breakdown in the state’s responsibility to ensure that its attacks are 
proportionate.   
To better understand why states can claim that civilian casualties are 
merely ‘the price of doing business’, Neta Crawford argued that it can be helpful 
to first tease apart the different ways that collateral damage can occur during 
military operations. Firstly, there is the truly unforeseen collateral damage which 
one cannot reliably predict or feasibly mitigate. However, such accidents are 
relatively rare and most collateral damage is foreseeable, if not directly 
intended.24 This includes the second way that collateral damage can occur, 
which is when the damage is foreseeable and intended, but is considered 
proportionate (or at least not excessive) when compared to the military 
advantage to be gained from launching the strike. This is the type of damage 
                                            
 
21
 Scrocca in Oakford. 
22
 ‘That’s why we will also expand authority for American armed forces to target the terrorists and criminal 
networks that sow violence and chaos throughout Afghanistan. These killers need to know they have 
nowhere to hide, that no place is beyond the reach of American might and American arms. Retribution will 
be fast and powerful, as we lift restrictions and expand authorities in the field. We’re already seeing 
dramatic results in the campaign to defeat ISIS, including the liberation of Mosul in Iraq.’ , ‘Full Transcript 
and Video: Trump’s Speech on Afghanistan’ The New York Times (21 August 2017) 
<https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/21/world/asia/trump-speech-afghanistan.html> . 
23
 Mattis in Oakford. 
24
 Crawford, 29. 
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that has historically been excused by doctrine of double effect in the Just War 
Tradition (JWT).25 Under its LOAC incarnation, the commander is justified in 
killing civilians and damaging civilian property if the anticipated military 
advantage to be gained from hitting the target is high enough. However, as 
mentioned earlier, it is not clear how commanders are meant to compare 
military advantage and collateral damage and, in practice, they are given a 
great deal of discretion to decide for themselves how to weigh those two values. 
Finally, some of the collateral damage that states claim is accidental or 
proportionate is actually the result of systemic organisational biases or practices 
which the state could change, but is either unwilling or unable to address.26 That 
is, some human or mechanical ‘errors’ in combat occur with such a frequency 
that the risk of certain operations or weapons causing unwanted civilian 
casualties can be known on the aggregate, even if the collateral damage 
caused during any individual operation looks accidental or proportionate when 
viewed in isolation.27 In this third type of collateral damage, what Eugene Fidell 
would call ‘operational offenses’,28 it is difficult to identify anyone within the 
organisation who intended to cause excessive civilian casualties, but the 
damage nevertheless occurred because of acts or omissions by multiple 
decision makers in the kill chain.29  
The first type of collateral damage is not a crime, because the criminal 
law principle of mens rea 30 would normally preclude responsibility for 
unforeseeable accidents: 
In order to satisfy rule of law standards, an offense must have a (subjective) mens rea 
requirement in order to alert [the perpetrator] to the fact that he is about to violate the 
law: some element of mens rea is needed in order to give fair warning, which would be 
                                            
 
25
 Walzer, 153. 
26
 Crawford, 7. 
27
 Ibid, 8.  
28
 Fidell categorises LOAC violations into ‘battlefield outrages’ and ‘operational offenses’ to describe the 
difference between those violations that arise out of malice and are usually mala in se and those: ‘acts or 
omissions that are committed in the course of an approved and by hypothesis approvable military mission. 
These are missions that, in some sense, have gone awry.’ Fidell.  
29
 Additionally, Rebecca Crootof argues that in the future, automation will likely add another layer of 
complexity to targeting that will make it even more difficult to identify a single person who is responsible for 
the sort of operational breakdowns that lead to unintended collateral damage. See generally, Rebecca 
Crootof, ‘Accountability for Autonomous Weapons’ (2016) 164 U Penn L R 1347. 
30
 Mens rea describes ‘criminal intent or recklessness… [and] is the second of two essential elements of 
every crime at common law, the other being the actus reus [criminal act]’. Bryan Garner (ed) Black's Law 
Dictionary (8 edn, West 2004), 1006.  
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absent if offences could be committed accidentally. The principle of autonomy may be 
interpreted as taking the point further, arguing that the incidence and degree of criminal 
liability should reflect the choices made by the individual.
31
 
For the second and third types of collateral damage, it is theoretically possible 
to hold either the state or its agents legally accountable for attacks where the 
commander knew the strike would cause excessive collateral damage but 
proceeded with it anyways, and for attacks where those in the kill chain failed to 
take all feasible precautions to verify the target or to minimise civilian collateral 
damage when they were setting up the strike. However, as I will discuss in 
greater detail in Chapters 2 and 3, there are a number of difficulties with 
prosecuting or litigating cases involving proportionality or precautions in attack. 
For instance, since an investigator cannot know what was in the mind of a 
suspect commander without privileged access to the attacking force’s facilities 
or classified information, it is extraordinarily difficult to prove that they had the 
requisite mens rea needed to support a conviction, even for a charge based on 
recklessness. Similarly, there have only been a few civil law cases where these 
rules were invoked as more than mere orbiter dicta, and none have ever found 
a state or its agents to be in violation of these rules despite there being no 
shortage of potential cases where shelling or airstrikes have caused extensive 
collateral damage.  
Although it has always been possible for civilians to be killed in the field, 
it is becoming more likely that they will be caught up in the fighting as the rate of 
urbanisation across the world increases and more battles take place in cities. 
Civilians will suffer in large numbers unless states adjust their weaponry and 
tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) to minimise collateral damage. This 
is not merely a moral appeal, but one that is required by the law of armed 
conflict and international criminal law rules on proportionality and precautions in 
attack. However, in the absence of a meaningful accountability regime to 
compel the state to adopt less harmful practices, there is no reason for state 
leaders or commanders to see even large numbers of civilian casualties as 
anything other than the unfortunate, but bearable, cost of war.  
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The Value of Accountability  
To be sure, ex post accountability mechanisms are not the only way to ensure 
compliance with the rules on proportionality and precautions in attack. Rather, 
they are part of a compliance architecture which also includes less instrumental 
ways of ensuring that combatants follow the law, as shown in Figure 1: 
 
Figure 1: Factors of compliance32 
Every major LOAC treaty made since the Geneva Conventions of 1949 includes 
an article that obligates states to disseminate the contents of the treaty as 
widely as possible.33 Indeed, as I will discuss at greater length in Chapter 2, the 
specific provisions stipulated by the proportionality and precautions rules have 
made their way into the military manuals of most states, even those that have 
not signed on to Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Convention of 1949 (API) 
or the Rome Statute. It has historically been assumed that educating the civilian 
population and military forces about the contents of LOAC would be bring about 
a significant change in the behaviour of troops in the field.34 However, insights 
from social psychology and empirical studies on LOAC compliance suggest 
that, while it is not difficult to teach combatants about the content of the law, it is 
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 Adapted from Fernando Nuñez-Mietz, ‘Lawyering Compliance with International Law: Legal Advisors in 
the "War on Terror"’ (2016) 1 European J of International Security 215, 217. Nuñez-Mietz did not see the 
courts as being a part of ‘instrumental’ compliance, but rather as an organisational check in the form of 
judicial review. However, I make a distinction between the cost-free notion of having a law or executive 
order struck down by the courts versus criminal sanctions or civil litigation against the state or its agents, 
which do impose instrumental costs to the state for non-compliance.   
33
 For example, see API Articles 83 and 87(2), and CCW Article 6. For a more comprehensive list, see 
Elizabeth Bates, ‘Towards Effective Military Training in International Humanitarian Law’ (2014) 96 
International Review of the Red Cross 795, 796. 
34
 Ibid, 796-797. 
Factors of compliance 
Instrumental 
International  
(e.g. reputation, sanctions, 
international courts) 
Domestic  
(e.g. domestic audience costs, 
domestic courts) 
Normative self-discipline  
(e.g. internalised norms) 
Organisational 
External  
(e.g. ordinary judicial review) 
Internal self-discipline 
(e.g. bureaucratic 'compliance 
fences') 
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difficult to get them to internalise it in a way that promotes normative self-
discipline. For example, as Elizabeth Bates reveals: 
The 2004 Roots of Behaviour in War Study surveyed former fighters in Bosnia-
Herzegovina, Colombia, the Republic of the Congo (Congo-Brazzaville) and Georgia for 
the ICRC, and found no positive correlation between moral disengagement and 
ignorance of the law: attitudes associated with a risk of violations were held by some 
fighters who had a good knowledge of the law. The research indicated that fighters’ 
willingness to disregard IHL is linked to moral disengagement, which has two 
dimensions: (i) the justification of violations by a fighter’s own group (which in turn 
correlates with group cohesion), and (ii) the dehumanizing of the enemy. The authors 
found that “[w]hat counts is esteem for their comrades, defence of their collective 
reputation and desire to contribute to the success of the group”. This creates a 
tendency to “abidicat[e] … responsibility … induced chiefly by group conformity and 
obedience to orders”.
35
 
Inculcating a respect for LOAC often runs counter to other goals that the state 
has for military training, which involve making combatants obedient to superiors, 
part of a cohesive fighting unit, and willing to aggressively engage the enemy.36 
Though states can take steps to integrate LOAC training with other drills and 
exercises, oftentimes commanders perceive LOAC training as competing with 
other operational priorities.37 Since the major LOAC treaties allow the states to 
interpret the dissemination requirements as they see fit, it is reasonable to 
assume that for many troops, this training requirement is seen as secondary to 
practicing their primary mission. Sanctions for LOAC violations signal the fact 
that compliance with the law is not merely a suggestion, but rather a moral 
imperative and accountability mechanisms can, therefore, bolster the 
effectiveness of other training-based measures aimed at helping troops 
internalise the norms that the law is meant to uphold.38   
                                            
 
35
 Ibid, 808. 
36
 Ibid, 797. 
37
 Ibid, 805-806. 
38
 ‘The power of sanctions to incur moral norms greatly adds to the preventive function that sanctions 
have. After all, people are motivated to see themselves as moral beings and act in ways that are 
consistent with this self-view (Aquino and Reed 2002; Blasi 1983, 1984). So, if a sanction creates the idea 
that it is immoral to engage in certain behavior, people will abstain from this behavior. Moreover, sanctions 
that succeed in conveying a moral norm may be more impervious to suboptimal enforcement. After all, it is 
usually infeasible and undesired to monitor people’s behavior for a 100 % [of the time]. However, people 
who feel bounded by moral norms are not influenced by such instrumental reasons (Kroneberg et al. 2010 
; Wenzel 2004 ). So, if a sanction evokes moral reasons to show the desired behavior, people are likely to 
adhere to the rules even when the chances that they will be caught if they do not, are small (Mulder and 
Nelissen 2010)‘ Laetitia Mulder, ‘When Sanctions Convey Moral Norms’ [2016] Eur J Law & Econ 1, 7. 
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 Another ex ante compliance measure enshrined in API is the 
requirement for states to provide commanders with legal advisors.39 When legal 
advisors are deeply embedded in the military decision-making process, their 
presence can keep the constraints of LOAC in the forefront of the commander’s 
mind. In this way, military legal advisors act as an institutional barrier which 
keeps commanders from committing LOAC violations even in the absence of an 
internalised predilection to follow the law or instrumental compliance 
mechanisms, such as criminal sanctions.40 In his study of how the 
‘lawyerisation’ of the US defence community created a ‘compliance fence’ 
around President George W. Bush’s War Council, Fernando Nuñez-Mietz 
claimed that after the administration’s harsh detainee interrogation program 
came to light, lawyers at multiple levels of government were able to use their 
legal advice to moderate the effects of the policy and eventually to return the 
US government to compliance with the law: 
Legal advisers, occupying different legal offices integrated with equally decentralised 
policy bureaus, were consulted before decisions were made and their approval was 
sought by policymakers at all times. Legal advice functioned as a required authorisation 
for action. So much so that the bulk of the interrogation programme was based on the 
legal advisers’ input, particularly on that issued from [the Department of Justice Office of 
Legal Counsel]. It is quite safe to conclude that the programme would have been 
different if the legal input had been different. In Goldsmith’s words: ‘The lawyers weren’t 
necessarily expert on al Qaeda, or Islamic fundamentalism, or intelligence, or 
international diplomacy, or even the requirements of national security. But the lawyers 
… seemed to “own” issues that had profound national security and political and 
diplomatic consequences. They [and, after October 2003, we] dominated discussions 
on detention, military commissions, interrogation, GTMO [Guantanamo Bay], and many 
other controversial terrorism policies.’
41
 
Even though Nuñez-Mietz argued that the presence of embedded legal advisors 
had a constraining effect on decision makers, he suggested that compliance 
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API Article 82 states that: ‘The High Contracting Parties at all times, and the Parties to the conflict in time 
of armed conflict, shall ensure that legal advisers are available, when necessary, to advise military 
commanders at the appropriate level on the application of the Conventions and this Protocol and on the 
appropriate instruction to be given to the armed forces on this subject.’ Protocol Additional to the Geneva 
Conventions of 12 August 1949 and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts 
of 8 June 1977.   
40
 Nuñez-Mietz, 216-217. C.f. Bates who, in responding to another scholar, posits: ‘Dickinson argues that 
the “commingling” of JAG [Judge Advocate General/US legal advisor] officers and soldiers is consistent 
with organizational theory and promotes compliance. This is despite the massacre at Haditha, where 
twenty-four civilians were killed by US Marines, and JAG officers did not report violations. Arguably, 
Dickinson’s optimism about the potential of the JAG Corps as agents of compliance does not engage 
sufficiently with the institutional failings revealed by the Haditha massacre’. Bates, 806. However, Nuñez-
Mietz does concede that the strength of the compliance fencing depends upon the quality of the legal 
advisors, themselves.  
41
 Nuñez-Mietz, 233. 
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fencing could work in concert with other, more instrumental ways of ensuring 
compliance with the law.42 It may be true that by lawyerising certain military 
functions, such as targeting, one should expect to see a greater degree of 
compliance with the rules on proportionality and precautions in attack on the 
aggregate, but without an accountability mechanism to undergird this system of 
self-discipline, the effectiveness of institutional ‘compliance fences’ depends 
upon the professional integrity of the legal advisors. In the absence of such a 
mechanism, an unscrupulous legal advisor may advise commanders that they 
could violate these rules with impunity, or worse, they may advise commanders 
to pass off more serious violations of LOAC, such as direct or indiscriminate 
attacks against the civilian population, as violations of these ‘fuzzier’ rules, 
thereby escaping legal sanctions for their actions. Ideally, other military legal 
advisors should move to correct errant ones, but if the entire corps of advisors 
is trained to see the proportionality rule as permitting excessive collateral 
damage (so long as it isn’t ‘clearly excessive’) or that merely taking a few 
precautions is enough to have ‘ticked the box’ for precautions in attack, then 
instrumental accountability measures could prove to be a necessary condition 
for compliance when the institutional safeguards prove insufficient to prevent 
unlawful attacks. Indeed, the empirical record supports the use of instrumental 
compliance, both generally in the criminal justice literature and specifically, in 
the case of international justice mechanisms. For instance, Hyeran Jo and Beth 
Simmons argue that the ICC regime imposes practical (e.g. jail time or travel 
restrictions) and social costs for committing violations of ICL43 and that these 
costs likely constrain the behaviour of government leaders either directly, or by 
mobilising domestic-level actors to hem in the criminal leader.44  In their study of 
the ICC regime’s influence on state behaviour, Jo and Simmons have shown 
that there is, indeed, a significant negative correlation between intentional 
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 Ibid, 237. 
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 ‘Recognizing this complementary relationship between formal prosecution and informal compliance 
pressures, we argue that the ICC’s influence may go well beyond the common assertion that the institution 
has no teeth. There are multiple mechanisms – legal and social, international and domestic – associated 
with the ICC’s authority that can potentially deter law violation in countries prone to civil violence.’ Hyeran 
Jo and Beth Simmons, ‘Can the International Criminal Court Deter Atrocity’ (2016) 70 International 
Organization 443, 444.  
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 Ibid, 444.  
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civilian killing by government actors and a state’s ratification of the Rome 
Statute, its adoption of domestic legislation based on the Rome Statute, or a 
prior ICC investigation of its state officials.45 Therefore, even when the 
enforcement mechanism is imperfect as it is with the ICC,46 compliance can still 
be induced by forcing decision makers to consider that there are costs to 
committing ICL violations. Moreover, they found that this effect was amplified 
when the court was able to engage with human rights groups at the sub-state 
level or enlist the support of other actors in the international community to 
pressure state actors by tying promises of aid to good behaviour on the 
battlefield.47 Jo and Simmons do note, however, that the strength of 
instrumental compliance is not dependent so much on the severity of the 
punishment as it is on the likelihood that the would-be criminal could be indicted 
or convicted for committing a crime.48  
 Finally, formal accountability mechanisms can also support the 
regulatory function of the law by providing commanders and their legal advisors 
with a body of case law to support their decision-making processes ex ante. 
The value of the evolutionary nature of the common law has been challenged 
recently on the grounds that it is not as economically efficient as early law and 
economics (L&E) theorists had suggested.49 However, regardless of whether 
precedents in case law are more or less socially optimal than statute-based law, 
the clarifying function of precedent can help to ‘pin down’ some of the 
vagueness in the law by forcing legal professionals to grapple with how to apply 
abstract law to concrete situations. This dearth of case law for violations of 
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 Ibid, 462. 
46
 ‘We are under no illusions that the International Criminal Court has positive impacts in all cases. These 
are average results, based on imperfectly measured exposures to prosecutorial and social risks and costs. 
Our theory as well as empirical analysis of prosecutorial deterrence is probabilistic, not deterministic. It is 
easy to point to conflicts that the ICC has not solved. The Bemba trial in relation to the situation in the 
Central African Republic did not stop violence by the Seleka faction, which reminds us that the ICC cannot 
solve deep-rooted social problems in a short period of time. However, the OTP prioritizes cases where 
violations are “grave” and these are precisely cases where violence is prone to recur. ICC situations are 
some of the most protracted cases of conflict in the world—a fact that makes the modest positive 
consequences we document all the more remarkable’. Ibid, 470. 
47
 Ibid, 469. 
48
 Ibid, 447.  
49
 See generally, Ben Depoorter and Paul Rubin, ‘Judge-Made Law and the Common Law Process’ in 
Francesco Parisi (ed), The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics, vol 3: Public Law and Legal 
Institutions (Oxford UP 2017). Interview with Former ICTY Official (18 Mar 2016). 
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proportionality and precautions in attack was cited by one International Criminal 
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) official as the reason why it has been 
so difficult to determine what manner of strikes actually run afoul of the rules 
(either ex ante or ex post) when compared with similarly vague standards in 
law: 
I mean you've got people involved in car accidents and stuff like that — negligence 
cases — all the time. Now, negligence is no more clear-cut a concept than 
proportionality, but what you got are thousands and thousands of car accident cases 
and courts saying: ‘oh yeah, I hit the left fender — that's negligent’ or ‘you just sort of 
scraped the backend or something — no that's fine’. You’ve got the relatively abstract 
concept clarified by a lot of decisions concerning particular-fact situations. Now, you 
don't have that where proportionality is involved or, at the very least, you don't have it in 
unclassified material.
50
 
Of course, states may have their own internal collateral damage assessment 
procedures and processes to learn from previous violations.51 However, the 
value of case law is that the adversarial nature of court proceedings52 takes into 
account, not only the military’s assessment of an incident, but also that of the 
victims of a strike. Therefore, the lessons learned from case law ought to 
provide a richer and more transparent set of case studies regarding what 
conduct could be considered unlawful in a given situation than internal 
organisational processes alone. 
Even if formal sanctions did fail to deter future atrocities, an effective 
accountability mechanism for violations of the rules on proportionality and 
precautions in attack would also serve the cause of justice for the victims of 
errant attacks. Much ink has been spilled over whether peace or justice should 
take priority in end-of-conflict reconciliation efforts, and without diving too deeply 
into that debate, recent evidence from conflicts in which the ICC has intervened 
suggest that this might be a false dichotomy. Rather, it seems to be possible to 
achieve accountability for LOAC violations in tandem with other political 
initiatives aimed at ending a conflict or rebuilding civil society post bellum.53 
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 Interview with Former ICTY Official. 
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 For example, see Appendix E, 4(d)(2)(j) of JP 2-01.1, which states that the Command Battle Damage 
Assessment Cell must conduct preliminary collateral damage inquiries after a potential LOAC violation and 
should recommend changes to current operations, if needed. US Joint Tactics, Techniques, and 
Procedures for Intelligence Support to Targeting (JP 2-011, 2003). 
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 Admittedly, I am focusing on a unique feature of common law jurisdictions here which may not have as 
much utility in states that use continental law.      
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Indeed, there is value in granting civilians redress for disproportionate or sloppy 
strikes either during or after a conflict, even if the accountability regime fails to 
deter future violations. If the victims of unlawful attacks believe that their 
grievances have been dealt with in satisfactory manner, there is less chance 
they will feel compelled to seek vengeance for such incidents by other means.54 
Furthermore, there is less opportunity for unlawful attacks to become rallying 
points for opposition propaganda and attackers will have more credibility when 
they claim that the collateral damage from other strikes was necessary or 
accidental.55  
When applied consistently, a robust accountability regime can also 
encourage support for the rule of law more generally.56 Jane Stromseth 
cautions, though, that the impact of an accountability regime on support for the 
rule of law is moderated by whether the particular mechanism used is seen by 
relevant audiences as just, and by whether the mechanism is properly 
resourced.57 Her findings echoed an earlier point made by Robert Cryer, who 
claimed the inverse: that selectivity in an accountability regime can erode faith 
in the rule of law.58 The selective application of the law can come about in two 
ways. Firstly, representatives of powerful countries can lobby for certain 
violations of LOAC to carry criminal sanctions and for other violations to not be 
punished. Moreover, the structure of an accountability regime, such as the rules 
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 Jane Stromseth, ‘Pursuing Accountability for Atrocitiees after Conflict: What Impact on Building the Rule 
of Law?’ (2007) 38 Geo J Intl L 251, 263. 
55
 Insurgencies and Countering Insurgencies (US Army Field Manual 3-24, 2014), Ch 13, 15. 
56
 ‘Accountability proceedings – particularly trials but also truth commissions – aim to demonstrate that 
atrocities are unacceptable, condemned, and not to be repeated. They aim to substantiate concretely, and 
to demonstrate, a norm of accountability. If the proceedings that lead to conviction for major offenses – or 
the reconciliation rituals for lesser offenses – are widely viewed as fair and legitimate, they are more likely 
to demonstrate credibly that previous patterns of impunity have been rejected, that law can be fair, and 
that political position or economic clout does not immunize a person form accountability.’ Stromseth, 263.  
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 Ibid, 320. 
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 Robert Cryer, Prosecuting International Crimes: Selectivity and the International Criminal Law Regime 
(Cambridge UP 2005), 191. Furthermore, Cherif Bassiouni recognised that the selective enforcement of 
LOAC between state and not-state actors could erode legitimacy for the state during non-international 
armed conflict: ‘The underpinnings of enforcement are the likely expectations of prosecution, the relatively 
swift adjudication, the knowledge of a significant penalty in case of guilt, the equal application of law and 
its consistent (as opposed to occasional) application… This means that enforcement should be applied in 
the same way to state actors and to non-state actors and also applied to all perpetrators. Without these 
characters, enforcement becomes selective and loses much of its legitimacy. In fact, it becomes counter-
productive if it is used only against non-state actors. Consistency is related to the issue of legitimacy, but is 
also necessary as a norm-reinforcing mechanism.’ C. Bassiouni, ‘The New Wars and the Crisis of 
Compliance with the Law of Armed Conflict by Non-State Actors’ (2008) 98 J of Crim L & Criminology 711, 
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of evidence or court procedures, can create a secondary level of selectivity by 
influencing which violations are ultimately investigated, tried and punished.59 
Charges of hypocrisy will undermine the legitimacy of enforcement mechanisms 
for LOAC violations writ-large if such mechanisms are seen to only apply to the 
vanquished foes of Western-style democracies and not their own troops.60 If the 
violation is meant to be dealt with at the domestic level, then the state’s failure 
to apply the law to its own forces can lead both the victims of errant strikes and 
elements of the state’s own civil society to lose faith in that state’s commitment 
to justice. If the violation is meant to be dealt with at the international level, then 
the failure of international institutions to address all violations of international 
criminal law allows critics to claim that international justice is merely a neo-
colonial project that powerful Western states inflict upon weaker ones to 
exercise control over their internal affairs.61 Therefore, selective enforcement of 
the law can blur the boundary between law and politics62 and it invites critics to 
challenge the purported universality of the principles which the law is meant to 
uphold. Furthermore, when only certain types of violations or certain classes of 
criminals become the subject of an accountability regime, it also makes 
variations of the tu quoque defence63 more convincing, if not in court, then at 
least in the public discourse.64  Western powers, such as the US and the UK, 
rely heavily on the use of air power for their military operations and are, 
therefore, going to be more likely to run afoul of those provisions in the law 
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 Cryer, Prosecuting International Crimes: Selectivity and the International Criminal Law Regime, 191.  
60
 ‘Alfred Rubin makes the point pithily: “[u]nless the law can be seen to apply to George Bush (who 
ordered the invasion of Panama) as well as Saddam Hussein (who ordered the invasion of Kuwait) . . . it 
will seem hypocritical again.” In a similar key, Ian Brownlie has recently lamented: “political considerations, 
power and patronage will continue to determine who is tried for international crimes and who not.” What 
these critiques share is an ideal of legitimacy and the rule of law.’ ibid, 194. 
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 When discussing an attempt by Kenyan politicians to deflect pressure from the International Criminal 
Court away from those responsible for post-election violence in 2007, Geoffrey Lugano claimed that: 
‘Essentially, the Jubilee Alliance linked the ICC intervention to the re-emergence of the western domination 
of Africans (through targeting their leaders while ignoring other serious conflicts) and therefore the need for 
Kenyans to safeguard their sovereignty. In this regard, statements by western envoys were reframed as 
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Specifically, the statement from the US assistant secretary of state was problematic given that the USA is 
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ICC.’ Geoffrey Lugano, ‘Counter-Shaming the International Criminal Court's Intervention as Neocolonial: 
Lessons from Kenya’ (2017) 11 Intl J of Transitional Justice 9, 24. 
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pertaining to air and missile warfare, compared with less developed states or 
armed groups. By ensuring accountability for violations of the rules of 
proportionality and precautions in attack, sceptical audiences will see that the 
jus in bello applies equally to weak and powerful actors alike.   
Therefore, accountability for violations of the rules on proportionality and 
precautions in attack is desirable for four reasons. Firstly, it acts as an outer 
wall against misconduct when institutional ‘compliance fences’ break down. 
Secondly, the case law from criminal or civil adjudication supports the 
regulatory function of proportionality and precautions in attack by providing 
commanders and their legal advisors with concrete examples of behaviours and 
decisions that have crossed the line. Thirdly, it offers the victims of errant 
attacks a sense that justice has been served and gives them formal recognition 
of the harm that had been done to them, quenching the thirst for extra-judicial 
vengeance. Finally, it should increase support for the rule of law more generally, 
since the subject of the law will include both the sort of violations committed by 
weak actors as well as those committed by more powerful actors.  
Objective of Thesis 
Modern military operations have the potential to inflict catastrophic damage to 
civilian population, particularly in urban environments. Recognising this, the 
states have come to adopt a set of rules for targeting that have a basis in both 
conventional and customary LOAC, and a subset of these rules has also made 
its way into ICL. However, even though the black-letter text of the law suggests 
that combatants are prohibited from launching attacks that are disproportionate 
or recklessly lacking in precautions, and even though there are several layers of 
accountability mechanisms which could theoretically issue sanctions to those 
who violate the law, there have not yet been any criminal convictions, nor any 
successful civil suits against the state for violations of these rules. 
 The objective of this study is to uncover why it has been so difficult to 
achieve accountability for violations of the jus in bello rules on proportionality 
and precautions in attack. To understand why these rules have not been 
successfully adjudicated despite the large number of possible cases from which 
courts could choose, one must look at how the law was formed and how certain 
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features of a particular accountability mechanism allow cases to be dropped 
before they ever go to trial. Only by understanding this interaction will it be 
possible to then evaluate what manner of intervention might bring about more 
successful prosecutions or civil litigation.  
Relevant Literature and Methods 
To this end, I shall be engaging with two bodies of literature. The first part of this 
study will include a positivist/doctrinal65 analysis of the jus in bello rules on 
proportionality and precautions in attack. In it, I shall trace the development of 
the law to show how these rules are understood to function as a matter of lex 
lata. I shall then explore the arguments made by legal scholars and practitioners 
pertaining to why it seems so difficult to achieve accountability for these rules, 
both on the merits and procedurally. The second part of the study will examine 
the literature on international law from the strategic-choice perspective in 
international relations (IR). This perspective borrows heavily from the sort of 
rationalist modelling used in economics; specifically, practitioners working from 
this perspective use game theory to simplify the logic of a particular strategic 
interaction of interest. Therefore, this study will follow the sort of interdisciplinary 
approach and methodology commonly used in the field of law and international 
relations,66 with some overlap with the field of law and economics.67 
 On the face of it, an interdisciplinary approach to a topic seems to be a 
more thorough way to explore a given phenomenon than sticking to one 
approach. However, one must proceed carefully with such an enquiry since 
                                            
 
65
 ‘Legal positivism is related to broader theoretical perspectives of positivism which hold that human 
knowledge is based upon that which can be experienced through the senses or through empirical 
observation. Law is thus the observable phenomenon of legislation, custom, adjudication by courts and 
other legal institutions. Legal positivism is, therefore, suited to research questions concerning the 
description and explanation of law as it is, including the analysis of (complex) legal texts to determine their 
meaning… However, it is a prequel to, rather than a substitute for, the making of statements about what 
the law ought to be. So, for example, law and economics approaches tend to adopt a positivist approach to 
identifying the law, prior to critiquing it from the point of view of efficiency.’ Robert Cryer et al., Research 
Methodologies in Eu and International Law (Hart 2011), 38.  
66
 ‘Law and international relations (IR) or law and political science approaches to the study of EU or 
international law seek to bring together understandings of the EU or international order as a legal system 
and as a political system.’[emphasis in original] ibid, 78. 
67
 ‘There are two different strands to law and economics approaches. The first seeks to explain current law 
on the basis that it reflects economic thinking. This can be very controversial, as well as counterfactual, in 
particular where attempts are made to explain areas such as criminal law this way… The second type of 
law and economics approach seeks to make proposals for the improvement of the law to make it, in some 
way more efficient.’ ibid, 84. 
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each discipline has a particular historical development and epistemology. 
Therefore, before embarking upon on such a project, it is helpful to make 
explicit some of the implicit features of each discipline which may not be 
immediately apparent to practitioners of the other. As Gráinne de Búrca noted: 
To the political scientist, legal scholarship often appears to be arid, technical, 
atheoretical… full of unstated or unproven assumptions, lacking empirical support, and 
seemingly disinterested in the actual dynamics of political and social change. To the 
lawyer, political science scholarship often appears to be obsessed with methodology, 
jargonistic and — in particular when it engages with law — remarkably banal, in that 
pages are spent demonstrating a proposition which lawyers take to be axiomatic (such 
as ‘courts matter’ or ‘judges have some autonomy’).
68
 
Therefore, in order to avoid confusion, I believe it is necessary to describe up-
front how I intend to use each perspective to answer the main research 
question and why the methods I have used are appropriate for this enquiry.    
 To uncover what sort of accountability is possible for disproportionate or 
sloppy strikes, it is important to first establish how the law frames these actions. 
Although military and civilian leaders must obey a constellation of different legal 
requirements,69 there are two main bodies of law that describe what is expected 
of commanders and their troops when they plan and launch attacks. Firstly, 
LOAC describes a regulatory-focused70 set of rules that are meant to be binding 
upon states, but includes instructions for individual actors like commanders and 
mission planners. Although it can and has been invoked in civil and criminal 
adjudication, the primary role of LOAC is to guide the actions of combatants ex 
ante, rather than to hold them to account after the fact. The secondary body of 
law that I will examine for this project is ICL, which includes the more serious 
violations of LOAC and has been designed from the outset as a way to hold 
leaders accountable for committing atrocious acts. Both of these two bodies of 
law have also made their way into the domestic law of several states, either in 
whole or in part.71 To determine the state of the law in both instances, I will look 
at the text of the major LOAC and ICL treaties along with the relevant state 
practice and opinio juris for the customary versions of these rules. Finally, I will 
examine how international and domestic courts have applied these rules to 
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actual cases and I will discuss how these rules have been invoked by 
government departments and HROs outside of the courtroom. It is necessary to 
map out the contours of the legal universe in this way because if there is no 
plausible interpretation of the law that allows for sanctions based on violations 
of proportionality or precautions in attack, then the answer to the research 
question becomes quite simple: it is difficult to achieve accountability for these 
rules simply because the law does not allow for it.  
 If, on the other hand, the law does permit legal adjudication based on 
these rules, and the adjudication is either consistently dismissed or always 
resolved in favour of the state or individual who ordered an attack, then the 
tools of the social sciences are well-suited to explain the difference between 
how the law was designed to operate according to the positivist perspective and 
how it actually operates ‘on the ground’. Certainly, there is much to glean from 
the writings of legal scholars, which reveal how the law interacts with technical 
elements of court procedure, such as the Rule of Lenity, to prevent 
prosecutions. However, in this study I have also conducted some primary 
research on the extra-legal factors which may explain the gap between how the 
law should theoretically function as a matter of doctrine and how it actually 
functions in practice. Specifically, I propose a game theoretical model that takes 
into account the strategic motivations of state officials who have the authority to 
set policy on LOAC and prosecutors who have the authority to indict leaders for 
war crimes.  
 To determine the beliefs and motivations of these two groups of actors, I 
conducted a series of semi-structured interviews72 in the summer and autumn of 
2016.73 For my interviews of state officials, I chose to focus on members of the 
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 As a researcher who has conducted over a hundred interviews of business leaders, William Harvey 
cautions against making interviews with elite participants too structured: ‘It  is  generally  advised,  for  
example,  to  avoid  asking  elites  closed-ended  questions  because  they  do  not  like  to  be  confined  
to  a  restricted  set  of  answers: “Elites especially – but other highly educated people as well – do not like 
being put in the straightjacket of close-ended questions. They prefer to articulate their views, explaining 
why they think what they think”’. William Harvey, ‘Strategies for Conducting Elite Interviews’ (2011) 11 
Qualitative Research 431, 434. 
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 Jeffrey Frieden cautions that determining actors’ preferences through observation can be problematic if 
not done properly. The danger lies in using state official’s behaviour to explain their preferences and then 
using those preferences to then explain the very same behaviours that were used to uncover the 
preferences in the first place. This sort of tautological reasoning does not reveal anything interesting about 
   
 
 
29 
 
 
US and UK defence communities as these two states, in particular, employ air 
power on a large scale. Therefore, since these states would likely have some 
experience in dealing with issues regarding the application of proportionality 
and precautions in attack, their officials would have been briefed to negotiate for 
a different position at international LOAC conferences than officials from states 
which do not rely heavily on air power. Furthermore, defence communities are 
notoriously closed-off and difficult to access without prior connection or 
extensive coordination,74 so I did not attempt to interview state officials from 
states with which I did not already have a connection. Even within the US and 
UK defence communities, there are several gatekeepers who must be 
consulted before one can recruit participants for a study.75 From my previous 
career as a behavioural scientist working for the US Air Force, I knew that all 
research materials also needed to be approved by the participant’s public affairs 
office, so they could be screened for classified or other sensitive information. 
Whilst these hurdles are not insurmountable, the coordination needed to 
overcome them often takes months and could theoretically affect the candour of 
the participants, since they would know that the information provided would be 
subject to screening after the fact. I managed to avoid becoming entangled in 
these additional review processes by speaking with retired officials. However, 
not knowing what rules are in place in other jurisdictions, I was hesitant to 
interview defence officials in other countries, because I did not want to run afoul 
of similar review procedures. Though my model of state official and prosecutor 
interaction was based on the assumption that the term ‘state official’ referred to 
                                                                                                                                
 
the strategic interaction. Moreover, an actor’s behaviour in a strategic interaction is necessarily moderated 
by what other actors are doing. Therefore, it is difficult to tell if an individual behaved the way they did 
because they wanted to achieve the outcome that happened in reality, or if they were forced to settle for 
that outcome because they believed it was the best they could do for themselves, given the situation. 
Jeffry Frieden, ‘Actors and Preferences in International Relations’ in David Lake and Robert Powell (eds), 
Strategic Choice and International Relations (Princeton UP 1999), 57-61. In my study, I attempt to 
circumvent this problem by speaking with the actors directly, rather than trying to infer their position from 
public statements alone. Furthermore, I have done some archival research to uncover the confidential 
diplomatic conference preparation documents that state officials would have used to communicate their 
private position on LOAC issues to other members of their negotiating team. These techniques should help 
me to avoid the pitfalls of trying to infer the actor’s preferences from their historical behaviour.  
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 I had discovered this for myself whilst unsuccessfully trying to get a hold of a judgement for 
my literature review from a Polish court-martial relating to an attack on Nangar Khel in 
Afghanistan. 
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 In the UK, for instance, the Ministry of Defence Research Ethics Committee requires researchers to 
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a state official from a liberal democratic state, in Chapter 7, I consider how well 
the model’s conclusions hold up when the ‘state official’ is instead, a member of 
an illiberal regime. 
For the prosecutor’s perspective, I interviewed several officials from 
various international tribunals/courts (ICTs). Finally, to broaden the experience 
base of my subject pool, I decided to speak with two war crimes investigators, a 
military commander, and a military judge. Most of the participants were retired, 
which I believed would make them more likely to speak freely about their 
thoughts on the law and their experiences applying precautions or 
proportionality in their professional careers.  
Admittedly, linguistic barriers also affected my choice of interview 
participants. Though I speak some French, it would not have been to the level 
needed to engage with high-ranking officials either in government or the courts, 
so I was limited to speaking with participants who likewise spoke English. This 
heavy focus on how the rules on proportionality and precautions are understood 
within the Anglosphere certainly affects the generalisability of the study. 
However, for the purposes of building a strategic model of state official and 
prosecutor interaction, so long as this bias is made clear as a built-in 
assumption of the model, it should not affect the logic of the underlying strategic 
interaction, nor the model’s conclusions. 
Because of the elite nature of the participants,76 I was only able to 
interview 13 individuals. The participant backgrounds included the following: 
Background No. of Participants 
International Tribunal/Court Official (Prosecutor’s Office) 2 
International Tribunal Defence Counsel 1 
State Official 4 
International Court Official & State Official 1 
International Court Official & UN War Crimes Investigator 1 
Military Judge 1 
Commander (Flag Officer) 1 
HRO or UN War Crimes Investigator 2 
Figure 2: Breakdown of participant backgrounds 
                                            
 
76
 I consider my participants elites not necessarily because of their rank (although many of my participants 
have attained high-level positions in government or the judiciary), but because they have a level of 
expertise in the application of international law that is not widely shared by other government officials, 
investigators, or legal professionals.  
   
 
 
31 
 
 
With the exception of the participant’s general background information, the 
interviews were anonymised by default. A few participants asked to go ‘on the 
record’, so their names will be listed along with their background when cited.  
The interviews typically lasted between 45 minutes and an hour, though the 
longest lasted 90 minutes77 and included a mix of face-to-face and telephone 
interviews. I recorded and transcribed78 all of the interviews except for one 
where both the primary and backup recorders failed and I had to rely on my 
interview notes.79 I recruited the participants via LinkedIn or by email and chose 
them based either on their reputation for having experience with the 
proportionality rule, or by ‘snowballing’, a practice whereby one participant 
recommends who ought to be the next participant.80  
 The interviews were tailored to the background of the individual 
participant, but many of the questions covered the same broad themes, for 
example: 
 Would you say that the crime of disproportionate attack is difficult to 
prosecute? Why? 
 Is it easier to prosecute proportionality offenses in national or 
international courts? Why? 
 What do you think is the relationship between proportionality and 
precautions in attack? 
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 This timeframe is considered best practice for elite interviews as Harvey explains: ‘Ostrander (1993) 
found that her interviews typically lasted an hour and a half. Stephens (2007) also found that an average 
interview lasted the same amount of time, but the length varied significantly from one interview to another, 
from nearly three hours to less than one hour. My own experience is that interviews with elite subjects 
were significantly shorter and often around 45 minutes in length. Surprisingly, there was no significant 
difference in the length of my average  face-to-face  interview  and  my  average   telephone  interview... A 
large number of them also asked, when I was in the process of trying to gain access, how long the 
interview would take and at the time I judged that I would face a number of refusals to participate if I asked 
for more than one hour. Conti and O’Neil’s (2007: 71) experience of a government official beginning an 
interview by saying “What can I tell you in 45 minutes?” is from my experience a typical attitude that many 
elites adopt in terms of time. Thus, although interviewing elites will vary in length, it is important to strike 
the right optimistic/realistic balance in order to achieve the best quality data from the most feasible amount 
of time. In short, asking for too much time might lead to respondents refusing to participate, but asking for 
too little time might lead to serious limitations in the quality and quantity of data provided by respondents.’  
Harvey, 436. 
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 I transcribed the interviews myself since my ethics approval from the University of Exeter required that 
the participants be anonymised and their responses held in confidence unless they specified otherwise. 
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 This was Interview with Former US Policy Official & ICTR Official . 
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 As a testament to how small this community is, many of my participants recommended that I speak with 
the person who had recommended them (since the participants were anonymised, any particular 
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 Do you think that the proportionality rule is vague? Why/why not? If so, 
how might that affect prosecutorial strategy in a court case involving the 
rule? 
 Does the concept of a ‘reasonable military commander’81 help 
prosecutors, investigators and justices think about the right way to weigh 
military advantage and civilian casualties? Why/why not? 
Rather than asking about what their motivations were directly, I primed the 
participants to think about the political difficulties involving the rules on 
precautions and proportionality up front in my introductory statement. This 
proved to be quite helpful because it allowed the participant to discuss their 
beliefs and motivations more organically than I think they would have done had 
I asked more pointed questions about the economic utility of different courses of 
action. To be sure, if I felt that the participant was comfortable discussing their 
motivations, then I would ask follow-up questions to identify what they might be, 
but as a rule, I steered away from any line of questioning that could be seen as 
calling into question the participant’s professional ethics. Though most lawyers 
would admit that extra-legal factors play a role in the operation of the legal 
system in an abstract sense, many would take issue with the idea that such a 
base concept as economic utility might have played a role in their own decision-
making process as it relates to the law.82   
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 The ‘reasonable military commander’ test was developed by a committee set up by the ICTY to examine 
the legality of NATO’s bombing campaign during the Kosovo War. Attacks are presumed to be lawful if a 
reasonable commander, in the position of the accused, would have made the same decision to attack. See 
Ch 2 at note 227. 
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 This point was raised by my upgrade panel and the literature on legal ethics confirms that lawyers often 
experience a tension between what they feel is morally right and what is demanded of a legal professional. 
For example, W. Bradley Wendel remarks: ‘The central question for legal ethics is how a lawyer can justify 
doing an act that, if performed outside the context of a professional role, would call for moral 
condemnation.  Charles Fried famously started his defense of the lawyer’s role by asking, “Can a good 
lawyer be a good person?”… Until about the 1970’s, there were few systematic attempts to answer this 
question, at least until the publication of Richard Wasserstrom’s paper, Lawyers as Professionals: Some 
Moral Issues which set the terms of the debate for the next 30 years. Wasserstrom made role-
differentiated morality central to legal ethics. Professional roles create a kind of separate moral universe, 
he argued, in which a person occupying that role may, or must, put aside considerations that would 
otherwise be relevant if not decisive in practical deliberation.’ W. Bradley Wendel, ‘The Limits of Positivist 
Legal Ethics: A Brief History, a Critique and a Return to Foundations’ (2017) 30 Canadian J of L & 
Jurisprudence 443, 445. Though the sort of issues I discussed in my interviews with my participants would 
not be the same as those faced by, say, a defence attorney, they do share a similar tension between a 
person’s professional ethics and what is right from an institutional or state-centric point of view. For 
instance, it might be legally possible and in the interests of justice for the ICC Prosecutor to issue an 
indictment of a state leader for an air campaign that resulted in serious ICL violations. However, if the state 
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 In addition to these interviews, I also visited the US National Archives in 
College Park, MD and the UK National Archives in Kew to find any preparation 
documents that might have been used by these counties’ respective 
delegations to the 1974-78 Diplomatic Conference on the Reaffirmation and 
Development of International Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflicts 
(CDDH).83 These documents tended to be confidential and they listed the 
negotiating positions that the delegates should take and sometimes even 
explained why the delegates should argue for certain positions. I deemed that 
these preparation documents would yield an even more candid view of what 
state officials wanted out of the negotiations than even the traveaux documents 
or the commentaries for the conference since the statements made by state 
officials at the conference necessarily had to consider the positions of the other 
delegations. These preparatory documents, on the other hand, could lay out 
what the state’s goals were without alienating other negotiating partners or 
announcing something that, in the context of what other delegations had said, 
would be deemed unreasonable.  
To reach my conclusions about how the law functions on the ground and 
about what motivates state actors and prosecutors, I used a thematic analysis 
to uncover commonalities in what my participants said in the interview 
transcripts or what I had found in the archival material.84 I had a good idea of 
                                                                                                                                
 
leader is powerful enough to marginalise the court by choking off its funding or turning global public 
opinion against the court’s work, then the Prosecutor may chose not to issue an indictment. If she were 
asked to explain her decision, though, the Prosecutor would likely ground her choice in a point of law, 
rather than citing the institutional concerns. To suggest otherwise could not only come across as accusing 
her of lying, but it would be tantamount to accusing her of betraying her role as a prosecutor. Therefore, it 
is important to make sure that any line of questioning that veers into these sorts of issues is handled 
delicately and respects the participants’ lived experience and professional judgement. 
83
 Other scholars refer to this series of conferences by its French acronym, CDDH, which stands for 
conférence diplomatique sur la … droit … humanitaire. 
84
 Thematic analysis involves coding one’s data by theme and constantly re-evaluating the themes based 
on each new document that one analyses. If one finds certain codes reappearing across several 
documents, then those themes are given greater weight in the analysis. As Alan Bryman puts it: ‘An 
emphasis on repetition is probably one of the most common criteria for establishing that a pattern within 
the data warrants being considered a theme. Repetition may refer to recurrence within a data source (for 
example, an interview transcript or document) or, as is more often the case, across data sources (for 
example, a corpus of interview transcripts or documents). However, repetition per se is an insufficient 
criterion for something to warrant being labelled a theme. Most importantly, it must be relevant to the 
investigation’s research questions or research focus. In other words, simply because quite a large number 
of people who have been interviewed say much the same thing does not mean it warrants being 
considered a theme. The identification of a theme is a stage or two further on from coding data in terms of 
initial or open codes (Braun and Clarke 2006). It requires the researcher to reflect on the initial codes that 
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the broad themes that were in the data from having transcribed the interviews, 
but to formalise the process of coding, I used NVivo 10. The data from these 
coded statements were used throughout the thesis, but when combined with 
other secondary sources, they allowed me to describe the motivations of state 
officials and prosecutors more accurately than relying on the secondary sources 
alone. With these motivations, I was then able to construct a game theoretical 
model of the interaction between state actors and prosecutors and to 
understand the likely outcomes of counterfactual situations which might arise if 
the strategic environment were different.  
Structure 
In Chapter 2, I shall introduce the principle of distinction and then trace how the 
jus in bello rules on proportionality and precautions in attack have developed in 
both treaty-based and customary LOAC. I shall then describe how 
proportionality was criminalised in Additional Protocol I, the Rome Statute (RS), 
and in customary international law. Finally, I shall examine those judicial 
decisions where either proportionality or precautions in attack were specifically 
mentioned and a few cases where there were credible allegations of a violation 
of these rules, but no judicial action was taken to address them.  
 In Chapter 3, I shall present the major arguments from legal experts 
regarding why it is difficult to achieve accountability for the rules on 
proportionality and precautions in attack. The most commonly offered 
explanation is that the proportionality rule forces combatants to weigh up values 
which are essentially incommensurable. Since there is no straightforward way 
to relate military advantage to civilian life and property, it makes sense that 
courts would have difficulty holding someone to account for violating the rule. 
The only widely agreed-upon way for courts to consider if collateral damage is 
excessive is to ask whether a ‘reasonable military commander’ in the same 
position of the accused would think it to be so. However, invoking the opinion of 
a hypothetical ‘reasonable military commander’ merely substitutes one vague 
                                                                                                                                
 
have been generated and to gain a sense of the continuities and linkages between them.’ Alan Bryman, 
Social Research Methods (4th edn, Oxford UP 2012), 580. 
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concept for another and courts often defer to the subjective opinion of the 
military commander who is in the dock, rather than clarifying what behaviour 
would be considered reasonable or unreasonable. Moreover, customary 
international law admits recklessness as an acceptable mens rea for the crime 
of indiscriminate or disproportionate attack, but the Rome Statute definition of 
the crime requires direct intent and under the Statute, it is unclear how (or even 
if) a precautions violation would give rise to criminal sanctions. All of these 
issues make it difficult for a commander to ever be held liable for an alleged 
violation of these rules. Furthermore, the evidentiary challenges facing 
investigators or prosecutors are legion. Even if investigators could prove that 
the accused launched an attack and it caused extensive collateral damage, they 
would still need access to the operations centre or classified war logs to prove 
that the commander had the requisite intent needed to secure a conviction. 
Therefore, it is not surprising that no case of a precautions violation, let alone a 
proportionality violation has ever been successfully adjudicated.  
 Chapter 4 introduces the strategic-choice perspective in international 
relations and I offer this perspective as a complementary way to understand 
why there have been no successful prosecutions of the rules on proportionality 
or precautions in attack. As a rational-choice approach to understanding 
political phenomena, the perspective has the strength of simplifying complex 
interactions by focusing on only those variables which are necessary to 
understand an particular interaction under study. This leads to more 
parsimonious models of the world, but also involves a certain amount of 
abstraction about the phenomena that is under study which might limit its 
generalisability. Nevertheless, such models allow researchers to explore the 
logic of a particular strategic interaction in an explicit and rigorous manner. 
Insights from this perspective have already revealed the conditions under which 
state officials might intentionally write treaties with vague language in order to 
preserve their strategic flexibility. Furthermore, there is a small, but growing 
literature from the strategic-choice perspective that is concerned with how 
various state and non-state actors make decisions either according to 
international law, or in the shadow of it. Although this literature has tended to 
   
 
 
36 
 
 
emphasize reciprocity as the key to creating a self-enforcing LOAC regime, 
researchers are beginning to apply the tools of this perspective — game theory 
and empirical testing — to strategic interactions involving international courts as 
well. However, these other studies have tended to focus on how a court 
constrains or otherwise affects the behaviour of state actors, rather than the 
other way around and although there is a body of literature that describes how 
courts are affected by state actors, these studies have taken place at the 
domestic level and have not yet been shown to apply to international courts. 
This study could, therefore, contribute to the scholarship on strategic-choice 
modelling by showing that this same approach can also be used to model how 
state and court actors influence the decision-making process of one another at 
either the domestic or international level.   
 In Chapter 5, I examine the motivations of state officials and prosecutors 
in detail. For the purposes of my analysis, I define state officials narrowly as 
those government actors who come from states that employ air power regularly 
and have the ability to set state policy on matters pertaining to LOAC or ICL. 
Using the data gathered during my interviews and in my archival research, I 
argue that state officials have historically expressed a clear preference for 
commanders to not be held liable for collateral damage and have tended to 
argue for a weak accountability architecture for violations of the rules governing 
proportionality and precautions in attack. The preference for a weak liability 
regime for these rules (as compared to a strict one) is stable and has not 
changed much over the past 40 years, despite the usual political turnover in 
democratic systems of government. Furthermore, I define prosecutors as those 
judicial actors who have the discretion to bring war crimes cases to trial or to 
drop them. Although I have focused on the role of international prosecutors 
while building my model, the definition of ‘prosecutor’ could also include those 
working at the domestic-level as well.  For the prosecutor’s motivation, I claim 
that they are mainly concerned with whether they believe it is possible to obtain 
a conviction for a particular case. Prosecutors gain legitimacy for both their 
office and for the court when their cases end with convictions and they lose 
legitimacy when their cases end with acquittals. The historical record already 
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includes cases where prosecutors have used their discretion to avoid cases 
where the likelihood of prosecution is low because of extra-judicial factors. The 
most famous example was the ICTY prosecutor’s decision not to formally 
investigate or prosecute North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) troops for 
several airstrikes which had resulted in extensive collateral damage.  
 Once the motivations of the actors are known, it is then possible to start 
building a model of the interaction between state officials and prosecutors. In 
Chapter 6, I model this interaction as a three-level game of perfect information 
where the state official makes the first move. The game is an abstraction of the 
more complex set of interactions that occur between state officials and 
prosecutors in reality, but it is designed to demonstrate the strategic logic that is 
at play, rather than document every detail of the interaction. I begin by having 
the state official decide whether to lobby for a strong or weak liability regime for 
violations of proportionality and precautions in attack at international 
conferences (and in official state interpretations of customary international law). 
Then, the prosecutor, knowing which liability regime is in effect, can choose to 
indict or not indict a commander suspected of committing a violation of one of 
these rules. If the prosecutor chooses not to indict, then the game ends. If they 
do issue an indictment, the state official can decide to either cooperate with the 
prosecutor, or not to cooperate. Each path through the resultant decision tree 
produces a set of payoffs for the prosecutor and the state official. Once I have 
described the path through the decision tree that describes what has actually 
occurred in the historical examples I presented in previous Chapters, I shall also 
describe the payoffs for the counterfactual situations. Finally, I shall consider 
how the payoff structure would have to change to incentivise the actors to trace 
a new path through the decision tree.   
 Using the insights gained from following the logic of the model, in 
Chapter 7, I explore the viability of various proposals to encourage better 
accountability for proportionality and precautions in attack. On the one hand, 
merely adding more specificity to the law without changing the underlying 
strategic dynamics will not accomplish much and there is a danger that any 
greater specificity will be resolved in favour of the attacker, which would make it 
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more difficult to try cases involving these rules. Furthermore, it would deny 
human rights organisations a powerful tool to hold governments to account in 
the court of public opinion. Likewise, merely putting pressure on courts to try 
more cases will end up being counterproductive since it may encourage more 
prosecutions, but it will not increase the number of convictions if states do not 
also agree to a stricter liability regime for civilian casualties. If prosecutors keep 
bringing violations of proportionality or precautions to trial and the commanders 
are consistently acquitted, it does nothing to serve the interests of justice for the 
victims of errant attacks and it will decrease the public’s support for the 
prosecutor generally since it will appear as if they are unjustly targeting 
commanders for causing lawful collateral damage.  
Interestingly, the model predicts that state officials will generally be 
willing to cooperate with prosecutors if they believe that doing so will enhance 
their legitimacy.  Therefore, they might be receptive to a proposal by Aaron 
Fellmeth for states to create a transparency regime requiring them to share 
‘behind the scenes’ information about any attack which resulted in civilian 
collateral damage. Such a regime could be structured like the Organisation for 
the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, and could promote the mission of 
prosecutors by providing them with open-source information regarding the 
commander’s criminal intent. However, such a scheme would be utterly 
dependent on states being willing to adopt the regime in good faith.  
Another proposed solution that could actually alter the strategic dynamics 
of this game is to place a greater emphasis on achieving accountability for 
errant strikes by exposing the state to civil litigation based on the LOAC rules 
for proportionality and precautions in attack, rather than relying on the criminal 
provisions for accountability. The state should not perceive civil cases to be as 
much of a threat to the success of future military operations as criminal 
prosecutions, because commanders do not have to fear being held personally 
responsible for making the wrong call. Thus, there will not be the same chilling 
effect on the commander’s discretion as there would be under an individual 
criminal liability regime. Nevertheless, civil litigation should still deter violations, 
in general, since the state will be incentivised to update their tactics, techniques, 
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and procedures based on the results of the legal suits. Moreover, the victims 
and their families will still be able to achieve an official acknowledgement that a 
strike was wrong. Civil litigation may even take public pressure off the state to 
submit its troops to criminal prosecution for cases that lie on the margins of the 
criminal provision. Finally, human rights organisations could help to encourage 
prosecutions by challenging some of the assumptions held by state officials 
regarding the necessity of causing collateral damage. The reason that state 
officials are loathe to endorse a strict liability regime for the rules on 
proportionality and precautions in attack is, in part, because they believe it will 
affect the success of future military operations. If it can be reliably shown that 
the state can achieve its goals and maintain force protection without causing 
civilian casualties, then state officials may be more receptive to tightening up 
the liability regime for these rules.    
In Chapter 8, I summarise the main points of my argument and briefly 
consider the limitations of this approach. Having already analysed the 
implications of the model for the legal literature in Chapter 7, I devote part of 
Chapter 8 to a discussion of how my findings also contribute to the literature on 
the strategic choice perspective in international relations. Lastly, I consider the 
opportunities for future research in this field.   
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Chapter 2 
A Review of the Law of Proportionality and Precautions in Attack 
The content of the law on proportionality and precautions in attack has been 
shaped to some extent by the crucible of history. The same proscription — 
exposing civilians and civilian objects to more risk of destruction than is 
demanded by militarily necessary — has been expressed differently as it has 
developed from an ethical norm to a regulatory norm to a criminal norm. The 
wording of each iteration of the norm has affected the parameters of what 
strategic actions are available to actors who are making decisions either 
according to the law or in the shadow of it. Therefore, in order to assess how 
difficult it is to achieve accountability for violations of the rules on proportionality 
and precautions in attack, or indeed, the principle of distinction more generally, 
it will be helpful to first flesh out these rules as they have been defined in the 
law of armed conflict, in international criminal law, and through their application 
by the courts in case law. 
A Brief History of Distinction, Proportionality, and Precautions in Attack Prior to 
the Additional Protocols to the Geneva Conventions of 1949 
One of the touchstones for the modern conception of the law of armed conflict is 
the 1863 Lieber Code, which guided the conduct of Union Forces during the US 
Civil War. In Article 15 of the Code, soldiers were informed that ‘[m]ilitary 
necessity admits of all direct destruction of life or limb of armed enemies and 
other persons whose destruction is incidentally unavoidable in the armed 
contests of the war’.85 There was no call for a specific balancing test to 
determine what constituted ‘incidentally unavoidable’ loss of life nor was there a 
list of precautions to be taken to mitigate it, but Article 44 did compel troops to 
not engage in wanton violence under pain of death.86  Therefore, from these two 
rules, there is a clear requirement for troops to ensure that their actions have 
some grounding in military necessity. During and after the war, the Lieber Code 
would form the basis for thousands of war crimes trials against both sides of the 
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war.87 However, most of the trials dealt with the prosecution of spies and 
irregular fighters88 and even in a clear case of wanton destruction, the burning 
of Chambersburg, the Confederate generals who ordered and carried out the 
attack managed to escape prosecution.89   
Although the Lieber Code was written as a set of orders for US troops, it 
was later adopted by the armed forces of several other nations90 and the 
Russian Diplomat Friedrich Martins claimed that the Code had been the 
blueprint for The Hague Peace Conferences, which built a set of international 
regulations regarding the conduct of war.91 In Article 25 of the 1907 Hague 
Convention IV for land warfare, it was made clear that: ‘[t]he attack or 
bombardment, by whatever means of towns, villages, dwellings or buildings 
which are undefended is prohibited.’92 There was no corresponding appeal to 
military necessity. Similarly, in Article 1 of Hague Convention IX for littoral 
attack, the state parties agreed that: ‘the bombardment by naval forces of 
undefended ports towns, villages, dwellings or buildings is forbidden.’93 
However, in Article 2 of the same treaty, the state parties conceded that there 
are some towns which might require bombardment on the grounds of military 
necessity: 
The commander of a naval force may destroy... [towns which harbour military works or 
materiel that is important to enemy naval forces] with artillery, after a summons followed 
by a reasonable time of waiting, if all other means are impossible, and when the local 
authorities have not themselves destroyed them within the time fixed. He incurs no 
responsibility for any unavoidable damage which may be caused by a bombardment 
under such circumstances. If for military reasons immediate action is necessary, and no 
delay can be allowed the enemy, it is understood that the prohibition to bombard the 
undefended town holds good, as in the case given in paragraph l, and that the 
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commander shall take all due measures in order that the town may suffer as little harm 
as possible.
94
 [emphasis added]  
In the Proceedings of the Hague Peace Conferences, the state delegations 
explained that although the general prohibition against attacking undefended 
towns was adopted from Article 25 of the land warfare regulations, exceptions 
were needed because naval warfare, unlike land warfare, often necessitates 
bombardment from a distance: 
Indeed, whilst in land warfare the belligerent will have the opportunity of taking 
possession of an undefended place and, without having recourse to bombardment, of 
proceeding to any destruction there that may serve his military operations, the 
commander of naval forces will sometimes be obliged, under certain conditions, to 
destroy with artillery, if all other means are lacking, enemy structures serving military 
ends, when he has not at his disposal a sufficient landing force or when he is obliged to 
withdraw speedily…. 
95
 
The law on littoral attack, therefore, required some flexibility since it was difficult 
to bombard military objectives in a town without inflicting some collateral 
damage on civilians and civilian objects. However, in Article 2 the commander 
and the local authorities are given precautionary tasks that they needed take to 
mitigate the possibility of collateral damage. Firstly, the commander must give 
notice and some time to comply with his demands to destroy military works and 
the local authorities must then take it upon themselves to actually destroy them. 
In fact, in the draft version of Article 2, responsibility for any collateral damage 
was placed on the inhabitants of the town for failing to comply with the demands 
of the attacker. It was an amendment by the Belgian delegation that changed 
the wording of the Article to merely say that the commander would not need to 
accept responsibility for any unavoidable damage from the attack.96  Although 
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this change was uncontroversial, a far more polemic addition to the rule was the 
final sentence which allows commanders to circumvent their prerequisite duties 
in times of extreme military necessity.  
The ‘immediate action’ amendment added by the French delegation gave 
commanders some latitude in deciding if it is necessary to bombard military 
objects in an undefended town without notifying the local authorities or giving 
them time to destroy the military objects themselves. Representing the Belgian 
delegation, the jurist Jules van den Heuvel voiced concern over the French 
amendment, claiming that it fundamentally undermined the effectiveness of the 
Article:  
In effect it is equivalent to saying that whenever a commander of naval forces deems 
himself pressed by circumstances he may accord no delay; the words ‘imperious 
necessities’ make him the judge of the situation and ‘of immediate action’ permit him to 
dispense with any delay and even with any summons.
97
 
In response to this criticism, Ernest Mason Satow from the British Delegation 
appealed to the inherent honour of the military profession:  
[I]t certainly will not occur to any of the members of this assembly who are acquainted 
with the spirit animating naval officers that a commander can profit by the provision now 
under discussion to abuse the latitude left to him and thus ignore the superior 
considerations of humanity.
98
 
This statement was met with repeated applause99 — the tacit assumption being 
that military professionals will, of course, act reasonably if they are given some 
in extremis leeway to act in contravention of the rules.  
In the aftermath of the First World War, both military experts and jurists 
became aware of the destructive capacity of a new means of warfare: air 
power.100 As a way to regulate the conduct of air warfare, the 1922 Draft Hague 
Rules of Aerial Warfare sought to reconcile the competing requirements of 
military necessity and humanity in a way that is similar to how proportionality is 
envisaged today:  
Article 24(3). The bombardment of cities, towns, villages, dwellings, or buildings not in 
the immediate neighbourhood of the operations of land forces is prohibited. In cases 
                                            
 
97
 Ibid, 349. 
98
 Ibid, 350. 
99
 Ibid, 350. 
100
 Boothby, 21. 
   
 
 
44 
 
 
where the objectives specified in paragraph 2 are so situated, that they cannot be 
bombarded without the indiscriminate bombardment of the civilian population, the 
aircraft must abstain from bombardment. (4) In the immediate neighbourhood of the 
operations of land forces, the bombardment of cities, towns, and villages, dwellings or 
buildings is legitimate provided there exists a reasonable presumption that the military 
concentration is sufficiently important to justify such bombardment, having regard to the 
danger thus caused to the civilian population.
 101;102
  
Since the draft document that was never adopted by the states, The Hague Air 
Rules have never constituted international law, but they do show how 
concerned the international legal community was at this time with the 
consequences of aerial bombardment on the civilian population. The rules were 
doomed to failure as a treaty, because as Hays Parks argues, Article 24 placed 
a radically stronger responsibility for the attacker than had previous rules, which 
split responsibility for collateral damage between the attacker and the defender. 
Indeed, this disparity worried contemporary air power theorists, such as Hugh 
Trenchard who feared that it would invite defenders to comingle military 
objectives in civilian areas as a way to keep them safe from attack: 
As regards the question of legality, no authority would contend it is unlawful to bomb 
military objectives, wherever situated. . .  Such objectives may be situated in centres of 
population in which their destruction from the Air will result in casualties also to the 
neighbouring civilian population, in the same way as the long-range bombardment of a 
defended coastal town by a naval force results also in the incidental destruction of 
civilian life and property. The fact that air attack may have that result is no reason for 
regarding the bombing as illegitimate provided all reasonable care is taken to confine 
the scope of the bombing to the military objective. Otherwise a belligerent would be able 
to secure complete immunity for his war manufactures and depots merely by locating 
them in a large city, which would, in effect, become neutral territory-a position which the 
opposing belligerent would never accept.
103
 
The entire premise of civilian immunity from attack, let alone any discussion of 
proportionality became severely eroded during the inter-war years as air power 
theorists began to see not just military works in civilian areas, but rather the 
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civilian population itself as an important enemy centre of gravity. Reminiscent of 
earlier appeals to Kreigsraison, weakening civilian morale through aerial 
bombardment was seen as an acceptable strategy to win wars as quickly as 
possible.104 As a final attempt to regulate air warfare in the inter-war years, the 
League of Nations adopted a non-binding resolution in 1938 to ensure that 
bombardment from the air at the very least complied with the following rules: 
1. It is against international law to bomb civilians as such and to make deliberate 
attacks upon civilian populations. 2. Targets which are aimed at from the air must be 
legitimate military objectives and must be capable of identification. 3. Reasonable care 
must be taken in attacking those military objectives so that by carelessness a civilian 
population in the neighbourhood is not bombed.
105
 
Given the indiscriminate nature of the aerial campaigns during the Second 
World War and the utter devastation wrought by air power upon the civilian 
populations of cities such as Dresden, Tokyo, Hiroshima and Nagasaki (among 
others),106 the authors of the Air Rules and those who pushed for the League of 
Nations resolution were prescient in their concerns about disproportionate 
bombardments, but utterly powerless to do anything about them. 
Furthermore, the lack of any explicit references to discrimination or 
proportionality in attack at the Nuremberg or Tokyo Tribunals107 suggests that 
these principles were not viewed as opinio juris108 by the victors of the Second 
World War.109 Indeed, state practice during the war seemed to be in complete 
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contravention of them.110 However, Article 6(b) of the Nuremberg Charter111 did 
acknowledge that it was a crime to engage in the ‘wanton destruction of cities, 
towns or villages or devastation not justified by military necessity’112 and judges 
were able to expound upon the relationship between military necessity and the 
destruction of civilian life and property in the Nuremberg Military Tribunal (NMT) 
Hostages case (US v. List et al.): 
Military necessity … permits the destruction of life of armed enemies and other persons 
whose destruction is incidentally unavoidable by the armed conflicts of the war; it allows 
the capturing of armed enemies and others of peculiar danger, but does not permit the 
killing of innocent inhabitants for purposes of revenge or the satisfaction of a lust to kill. 
The destruction of property to be lawful must be imperatively demanded by the 
necessities of war. Destruction as an end in itself is a violation of international law. 
There must be some reasonable connection between the destruction of property and 
the overcoming of the enemy forces.
113
  
During that case, the tribunal reviewed the actions of General Lothar Rendulic, 
a German commander who ordered the destruction of civilian property and the 
forced evacuation of Finmark, Norway.114 To justify what had amounted to a 
scorched-earth policy, Rendulic argued that, in the wake of the German 
withdrawal from Finmark, the Soviets might have used the facilities and supplies 
left behind to bolster their advance into Norway. Hence, there was a reasonable 
connection between his actions and the military necessity of denying the enemy 
logistical support for an attack. However, the Soviets never advanced as far as 
he had feared, so in hindsight, the destruction appeared wanton. Recognising 
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the situation as Rendulic had seen it, the tribunal adopted what would later 
become known as the ‘Rendulic rule’115:  
We are not called upon to determine whether urgent military necessity for the 
devastation and destruction in the province of Finmark actually existed. We are 
concerned with the question whether the defendant at the time of its occurrence acted 
within the limits of honest judgment on the basis of the conditions prevailing at the 
time.
116
 
In using a decision-centric, rather than an effects-centric point of view to assess 
the military necessity of Rendulic’s campaign, the judges acquitted Rendulic of 
the charges pertaining to his conduct in Finmark (although he was given lengthy 
prison sentences for other crimes). This case, in particular, has left its mark on 
the development of the law pertaining to distinction, proportionality and attack 
precautions because it highlights the difficulty of determining whether an attack 
is lawful based solely on its outcome. Rather, the information reasonably known 
to the accused at the time of the attack and their mens rea are also needed to 
determine if the action was criminal.  
 Despite the suffering that was inflicted upon civilian populations by 
essentially unrestricted aerial warfare, distinction, proportionality, and 
precautions in attack were not mentioned in the 1949 Geneva Conventions. 
Article 50 had listed ‘wilful killing… and extensive destruction and appropriation 
of property, not justified by military necessity and carried out unlawfully and 
wantonly’ as a grave breach of the convention, but there was no mention of 
necessary precautions to be taken in attack or of the need for a specific 
balancing test to weigh military necessity against humanitarian concerns.117 
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Therefore, immediately following the war there likely was not a basis for these 
principles in custom, nor in treaty-based international law. 
By the mid-1950s, there was a growing consensus within the 
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) that more needed to be done 
to protect civilians during armed conflict. In 1956, at the Nineteenth International 
Conference of the Red Cross, the ICRC presented a series of draft rules which 
included two Articles directly pertaining to distinction, proportionality and 
precautions in attack: 
Article 8. The person responsible for ordering or launching an attack shall, first of all: 
(a) make sure that the objective, or objectives, to be attacked are military objectives 
within the meaning of the present rules, and are duly identified. When the military 
advantage to be gained leaves the choice open between several objectives, he is 
required to select the one, an attack on which involves least danger for the civilian 
population: (b) take into account the loss and destruction which the attack, even if 
carried out with the precautions prescribed under Article 9 is liable to inflict upon the 
civilian population. He is required to refrain from the attack if, after due consideration, it 
is apparent that the loss and destruction would be disproportionate to the military 
advantage anticipated: (c) whenever the circumstances allow, warn the civilian 
population in jeopardy, to enable it to take shelter. 
Article 9. All possible precautions shall be taken, both in the choice of the weapons and 
methods to be used, and in the carrying out of an attack, to ensure that no losses or 
damage are caused to the civilian population in the vicinity of the objective, or to its 
dwellings, or that such losses or damage are at least reduced to a minimum. In 
particular, in towns and other places with a large civilian population, which are not in the 
vicinity of military or naval operations, the attack shall be conducted with the greatest 
degree of precision. It must not cause losses or destruction beyond the immediate 
surroundings of the objective attacked. The person responsible for carrying out the 
attack must abandon or break off the operation if he perceives that the conditions set 
forth above cannot be respected.
118
 
If adopted, these draft rules would have represented a significant change in the 
law regulating the conduct of hostilities. Unlike the prohibition against ‘wanton 
destruction’ codified in the Nuremberg Charter, it was not enough for a 
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commander to refrain from engaging in actions which had no grounding in 
military necessity. Rather, these rules would have placed positive duties upon 
‘the person responsible for ordering or launching an attack’ which would be 
easily recognisable to a military legal advisor in an operations centre today: the 
attacker must obtain positive identification (PID) of an objective to determine its 
nature; they must make sure that any likely loss and destruction to the civilian 
population is not out of proportion to the military advantage anticipated and they 
must adhere to a series of other attack precautions to further mitigate the 
likelihood or extent of civilian loses or damage.  
The conference adopted a resolution encouraging the ICRC to submit 
these rules to the states for possible adoption into international law, but their 
appeals were largely ignored at the time. Nevertheless, many of the ideas 
contained in them were later taken up by states in the mid-1970s at the 
CDDH.119 Even if the ICRC’s draft rules had not become treaty law, the 
proportionality rule was gaining traction as state practice for the United 
States.120 For example, the 1956 US Army Field Manual on The Law of Land 
Warfare included a phrase that bears a striking similarity to the draft rules:121  
Those who plan or decide upon an attack, therefore, must take all reasonable steps to 
ensure not only that the objectives are identified as military objectives or defended 
places within the meaning of the preceding paragraph but also that these objectives 
may be attacked without probable losses in lives and damage to property 
disproportionate to the military advantage anticipated.
122
 
Moreover, after a long silence over the legality of the US nuclear strikes on 
Japan, the District Court of Tokyo took up a case in 1963, Ryuichi Shimoda et 
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al. v. The State, to assess whether damages were due to the survivors of the 
attacks from the Japanese Government.123 The judges in this case correctly 
chose to adopt only the relevant treaties and custom that were in effect during 
the Second World War and not the developments that had been made to the 
law since. Nevertheless, whereas the earlier Tokyo and Nuremberg Tribunals 
had largely ignored the principle of proportionality,124 the Tokyo District Court 
believed that a proportionality rule of sorts was in effect as a matter of custom if 
not in treaty: 
During the Second World War, it was sometimes found impossible to identify each 
individual military objective for attack in a place where munitions factories and military 
installations were concentrated in a comparatively small area, and where defence 
installations against air raids were very strong. In such a case, aerial bombardment of 
the whole area took place, and may be regarded as lawful even if it goes beyond the 
principle of military objectives, since the destruction of non-military objectives is small in 
proportion to the large military interests or necessity involved. However the doctrine of 
target-area bombardment cannot apply to the cases of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, since 
both cities clearly could not be said to be areas where such military objectives were 
concentrated.
125
 
Based in part on the fact that the strikes violated even the widest margins of the 
proportionality rule (such as it was at the time), the judges decided that the 
nuclear attacks were in contravention of international law. However, they still did 
not find Japan liable for waiving the rights of Japan or Japanese citizens to 
demand reparations from the US, so the outcome of the trial was likely cold 
comfort for the survivors of the attacks.126 
Whilst it would be a stretch to say that on the eve of the CDDH, 
distinction, proportionality, and precautions were considered customary 
international law, it must be said that the logic behind these rules had been 
thoroughly explored prior to the conference.127 Therefore, the representatives to 
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the CDDH were not creating new law from scratch, nor were they free to adopt 
radically different interpretations of the rules from what was currently in vogue at 
the time. Nevertheless, this conference was the first time that the states formally 
negotiated what language would be used to frame distinction, proportionality, 
and precautions in international law. The result of these negotiations — the 
1977 Additional Protocols (APs)128 to the Geneva Conventions of 1949 — has 
since influenced the language of subsequent treaties and the states’ military 
manuals.  
The Principle of Distinction 
In the ICRC’s estimation, the crowning achievement of the CDDH was the 
adoption of certain protections for the civilian population in the APs.129 
Traditionally, the Geneva Conventions protected the victims of hostilities and 
the Hague Conventions had regulated the conduct of hostilities,130 but the ICRC 
was concerned that Hague law had not been sufficiently updated to reflect 
lessons learned after the Second World War, particularly with respect to aerial 
bombardment:  
Although Geneva law had been developed in great detail in 1949, and adapted to the 
requirements of the time, the Hague law had not evolved to the same extent, while the 
techniques of warfare had developed enormously during the two World Wars. The 
written rules which could be invoked for protecting civilians against the dangers of 
hostilities dated back to 1907, when aerial bombardment did not yet exist. Such was the 
tragic absurdity of the situation.
131
  
The ICRC saw the development of the APs as ‘bringing together the two 
strands’ of IHL into one legal framework: the protection of victims on one the 
one hand and the conduct of hostilities on the other.132 In API, the principle of 
distinction is codified in Part IV, Section I, beginning with the Basic Rule: 
Article 48. In order to ensure respect for and protection of the civilian population and 
civilian objects, the Parties to the conflict shall at all times distinguish between the 
civilian population and combatants and between civilian objects and military objectives 
and accordingly shall direct their operations only against military objectives.
133
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The Basic Rule is the cornerstone of modern LOAC and has been recognised 
as having achieved customary status for both international armed conflict134 and 
non-international armed conflict (NIAC).135 The rest of Section I provides more 
detailed definitions of the terms used in the Basic Rule (e.g. what constitutes a 
civilian object) and offers practical guidance for how to comply with the principle 
of distinction. Many of these subsequent provisions have also achieved 
customary status, at least in international armed conflict.136  
The application of the principle in practice should not be difficult in 
situations where there is a clear difference between the civilian population and 
military objectives, but the framers of API recognised that when military 
objectives are located near civilians and civilian objects, commanders might be 
tempted to subject the civilian population to an unacceptable level of risk whilst 
prosecuting legitimate military targets. To address these concerns, Article 51 
prohibits not only direct attacks against the civilian population, but also those 
operations which amount to indiscriminate attacks and Article 57 requires 
attackers to take positive steps to mitigate the effects of their operations on the 
civilian population.137  
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The LOAC Rule on Proportionality in Attack 
A key test of whether an attack can be considered indiscriminate is the 
proportionality rule: given what a commander knows about a target and the 
likely effects of using a particular weapon (or weapons), is the collateral 
damage associated with the attack excessive in relation to the military 
advantage gained from striking the target? The modern conception of this rule is 
widely accepted138  to have been set forth in Article 51 of API:  
Article 51(4). Indiscriminate attacks are prohibited… (5) Among others, the following 
types of attacks are to be considered as indiscriminate… (b) an attack which may be 
expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian 
objects, or a combination thereof, which would be excessive in relation to the concrete 
and direct military advantage anticipated.
139
 
This phrasing of the proportionality rule was overwhelmingly adopted by the 95 
states participating in the CDDH, but not without ongoing debate or criticism. 
The ICRC commentary on Article 51 claims that some of the participants were 
wary of the imprecise language used in the construction of the rule.140 William 
Fenrick, writing five years after the signing of the APs noted several debates 
that occurred during the CDDH over the wording of API Article 51: 
 The article does little to explain if a ‘concrete and direct military 
advantage’ describes an advantage at the tactical, operational or 
strategic level of the armed conflict; 
 What constitutes ‘excessive’ loss of life or damage is subjective and 
difficult to distil into concrete instructions for a nation’s armed forces; and 
 The text does not adequately explain who should be held responsible for 
upholding the proportionality rule.141 
Furthermore, some participants at the conference felt as if the ambiguity of the 
proportionality rule might give carte blanche to commanders to justify any attack 
on the grounds that there was sufficient military necessity. For example, in a 
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statement given at the conference, the representative for Poland was 
concerned that:  
The rule of proportionality as expressed in the ICRC text would give military 
commanders the practically unlimited right to decide to launch an attack if they 
considered that there would be a military advantage. Civilian suffering and military 
advantage were two values that could not conceivably be compared.
142
 
Likewise, the representative for Romania was worried that by leaving the 
application of the proportionality rule to military commanders, Article 51 created 
a situation where the proverbial fox would be guarding the henhouse: 
[Proportionality] amounted to legal acceptance of the fact that one part of the civilian 
population was to be deliberately sacrificed to real or assumed military advantages and 
it gave military commanders the power to weigh their military advantage against the 
probable losses among the civilian population during an attack against the enemy. 
Military leaders would tend to consider military advantage to be more important than the 
incidental loss. The principle of proportionality was therefore a subjective principle 
which could give rise to serious violations.
143
 
In defence of Article 51, the ICRC commentary refuted the claim that the 
proportionality rule authorises any level of civilian destruction:  
The idea has also been put forward that even if they are very high, civilian losses and 
damages may be justified if the military advantage at stake is of great importance. This 
idea is contrary to the fundamental rules of the Protocol; in particular it conflicts with 
Article 48 (Basic rule) and with paragraphs 1 and 2 of the present Article 51. The 
Protocol does not provide any justification for attacks which cause extensive civilian 
losses and damages. Incidental losses and damages should never be extensive. 
[emphasis added]
144
 
The gap between those actions that are considered excessive and those that 
are extensive could be quite wide and even the ICRC’s commentary 
acknowledges that there may a problem with the application of the rule in cases 
where the relative values of civilian losses and military advantage are not clear. 
However, the commentary cautions that ‘[i]n such situations, the interests of the 
civilian population should prevail’.145  
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The treaty basis for the proportionality rule is not only applicable during 
international armed conflict, but it also can apply during non-international armed 
conflict. Although there is no corresponding proportionality requirement in APII 
(which governs NIAC), one can find a nearly identical version of the rule in the 
1996 Protocol II to the 1980 Certain Conventional Weapons Convention (CCW), 
which is applicable during NIAC: 
Article 3(8) The indiscriminate use of weapons to which this Article applies is prohibited. 
Indiscriminate use is any placement of such weapons … 3(8)(c): which may be 
expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian 
objects, or a combination thereof, which would be excessive in relation to the concrete 
and direct military advantage anticipated.
146 
  
Just as in API, the ICRC Customary International Humanitarian Law (CIHL) 
Study frames the customary proportionality rule as a subset of the principle of 
distinction (i.e. disproportionate attacks are considered to be indiscriminate 
attacks) and its authors classify the prohibition against disproportionate strikes 
as a separate rule from the requirement for decision makers to take precautions 
in their methods and means of attack. Rule 14 most directly relates to 
proportionality and it essentially mirrors the definition of the rule found in API 
51(5)(b):   
Launching an attack which may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, 
injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which would be 
excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated, is 
prohibited.
147
  
As with the CIHL Study, the 2009 Harvard Humanitarian Policy and Conflict 
Research Program (HPCR) Manual on International Law Applicable to Air and 
Missile Warfare does not itself constitute international law. However, it does 
represent well-researched, contemporary thinking about the state of customary 
LOAC by both jurists and military professionals.148 Its version of Rule 14 is more 
succinct, but as with the ICRC CHIL study, it is also based on API 51(5)(b): ‘An 
attack that may be expected to cause collateral damage which would be 
excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated is 
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prohibited’.149 Across different states’ military handbooks, there is variation in 
the level of explanation given for the rule; some manuals are better at 
articulating the principle for a lay audience.150 Furthermore, just as there was 
some debate at the CDDH over which level of the conflict military advantage 
ought to be assessed, there is predictably a divergence in the states’ military 
manuals on whether the principle should take into account: ‘concrete and direct’ 
151;152  tactical advantage or operational advantage that affects the ‘attack as a 
whole’153;154  when balancing against predicted collateral damage. 
Nevertheless, since there is evidence for the principle in one sense or another 
in the military handbooks of at least 37 states from every inhabited continent 
including non-participants to API, such as the US,155 it is safe to assume that 
the general rule is accepted state practice in international armed conflict, even if 
there is some ongoing debate over its application.  
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Moreover, the ICRC CIHL study claims that the rule also applies as a 
matter of custom during non-international armed conflicts156 and this view is 
also held by the Group of Experts in the commentary to the HPCR Manual.157 
Besides the fact that the signatories of the CCW clearly regard this as opinio 
juris, the rule as it applies to NIAC has been incorporated into the domestic law 
of several states and violations of the proportionality rule tend to be condemned 
by the states in both international and non-international armed conflicts. 
Furthermore, the ICTY has applied API Article 51 to NIAC in its jurisprudence158  
The LOAC Rule on Precautions in Attack 
Whereas API Article 51(5)(b) set forth the negative requirement for combatants 
to refrain from launching disproportionate attacks, Article 57 laid out practical, 
positive measures to which combatants must adhere to ensure that their attacks 
are proportionate: 
Article 57(2)(a). [T]hose who plan or decide upon an attack shall: i) do everything 
feasible to verify that the objectives to be attacked are neither civilians nor civilian 
objects and are not subject to special protection but are military objectives within the 
meaning of paragraph 2 of Article 52 and that it is not prohibited by the provisions of this 
Protocol to attack them; ii) take all feasible precautions in the choice of means and 
methods of attack with a view to avoiding, and in any event to minimizing, incidental 
loss of civilian life, injury to civilians and damage to civilian objects; iii) refrain from 
deciding to launch any attack which may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian 
life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which would 
be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated.
159
  
The attack precautions enumerated in API Article 57 on the one hand include 
actions that need to be taken before planners perform the proportionality 
assessment, such as verifying the target’s military nature, but on the other 
hand, they also include actions to be taken after the assessment to further 
minimise the likelihood of civilian damage, such as issuing warnings to the 
civilian population.160  
The use of the phrase: ‘those who plan or decide upon an attack’ shows 
that the majority of the High Contracting Parties intended for precautions to be 
taken by all levels in the chain of command — from staff officers down to 
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tactical-level commanders.161 However, this position has proved to be 
controversial since there were concerns from some states that the same 
standard of precaution could not be feasibly taken at every level of command162 
and even a member of the ICRC at the CDDH conceded that individual soldiers 
or small unit commanders could not be expected to perform proportionality 
calculations in the heat of battle.163 In practise, the military handbooks of the 
states are divided on who bears responsibility for ensuring proportionality in 
attack. Some countries place the responsibility for taking precautions in attack 
on “those who plan or decide upon an attack”164 (as stated in API), others 
mention the commander specifically or discuss the principle in a text dedicated 
for commanders165,166 and yet others use passive voice or vague language 
(such as ‘one should…’) to show that precautions must be taken without 
weighing in on who must uphold the requirement.167 These distinctions can 
seem quite trivial, but what is meant by a commander, planner or decision 
maker affects how a state assigns responsibility for ensuring that the 
proportionality rule is practised in the field and it affects what level of training is 
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given to each level of command.168 Furthermore, it highlights the fact that 
oftentimes targeting is an activity that is distributed across multiple layers of 
command and it is sometimes difficult to identify one person who bears ultimate 
responsibility for the collateral damage caused during an attack. 
 In addition to clarifying who bears responsibility for upholding the 
proportionality rule, the practical measures given in API Article 57(2)(a) 
establish minimal procedures that must be taken for an attack to be considered 
legal. Before a commander can accurately perform a proportionality calculation 
for an attack, that person must have enough information about the situation to 
answer the following questions: 
 Is the target a legitimate military objective169 and what is the 
concentration of civilians or civilian objects nearby?170 
 What is the military advantage that might be gained from attacking the 
target?171 
 What means are available to prosecute the target?172 and 
 What are the likely effects of employing those means? 173  
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The answers to the second and third question may be immediately available to 
the commander, but the answer to the first and fourth will likely require 
additional investigation. Article 57(2)(a) imposes upon the commander a duty to 
employ all feasible measures to find the answers to these questions before 
planning or deciding upon an attack. Furthermore, when attackers are unsure of 
the civilian or military character of a target, API Articles 50(1) & 52(3) require 
them to assume that it is civilian.174 
The corresponding customary law for precautions in attack applies in 
both international armed conflict and NIAC175 and was described in the ICRC 
CIHL study in Rules 15-21. Of particular importance is Rule 18, which sets forth 
the requirement to gather sufficient intelligence before a strike: 
Rule 18. Each party to the conflict must do everything feasible to assess whether the 
attack may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, 
damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which would be excessive in 
relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated.
176
 
Furthermore, Rules 30-32 of the HPCR Manual describe precautions in attack 
along similar lines. Rule 32(c) specifically articulates the precautions needed to 
properly conduct the proportionality assessment.  
Rule 32. Constant care [to spare the civilian population, civilians and civilian objects] 
includes in particular the following precautions: … (c) Doing everything feasible to 
determine whether the collateral damage to be expected from the attack will be 
excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated.
 177
  
[emphasis added]  
Like API Article 57, the obligation set forth here hinges on the word ‘feasible’. 
The use of this word rather than ‘reasonable’ was intentional as the Rapporteur 
of the CDDH Working Group explained: 
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Certain words [in draft Article 50 (which later became 57) AP I] created problems, 
particularly the choice between “feasible” and “reasonable” … The Rapporteur 
understands “feasible”, which was the term chosen by the Working Group, to mean that 
which is practicable, or practically possible. ‘Reasonable’ struck many representatives 
as too subjective a term.
178
 
Despite the best intentions of the Working Group to limit subjectivity in the 
interpretation of API Article 57, the use of the word ‘feasible’ as opposed to 
‘reasonable’ has done little to reign in the debate about what level of precaution 
is necessary in attack. In the French version of API Article 57, originally the 
conference chose to translate ‘feasible’ as ‘possible’. However, ‘possible’ has a 
different shade of meaning than what was intended by ‘feasible’ in the English 
version of the document, so the conference agreed on the phrase ‘tout ce qui 
pratiquement possible’ (‘all that is practically possible’).179 This phrase has since 
been adopted by a number of states in clarifying their understanding of what is 
a feasible precaution. For example, upon ratifying API, Canada stated that: ‘the 
word “feasible” means that which is practicable or practically possible, taking 
into account all circumstances ruling at the time, including humanitarian and 
military considerations’.180;181 The UK attempted to more directly invoke military 
necessity in a reservation made upon signing API: ‘“feasible” means that which 
is practicable or practically possible, taking into account all circumstances at the 
time including those relevant to the success of military operations’182  [emphasis 
added]. However, the ICRC cautioned that this understanding of feasibility could 
lead decision makers to believe that humanitarian concerns are to be 
subordinated to military necessity, so upon ratifying the protocol, the UK 
changed the wording of its statement to the one used by Canada et al. In 1996, 
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this common understanding of feasibility was then used to formulate the 
precaution rule of CCW Protocol II: 
Article 3(10) All feasible precautions shall be taken to protect civilians from the effects of 
weapons to which this Article applies. Feasible precautions are those precautions which 
are practicable or practically possible taking into account all circumstances ruling at the 
time, including humanitarian and military considerations. [emphasis added]
183
 
Even though reasonableness is not mentioned directly in API Articles 51 or 57, 
Fenrick postulated that the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties might 
assuage the worries of those who believe that the language of API might be 
tortured into an ‘anything goes’ interpretation of the rules on proportionality and 
precautions in attack:  
Article 31(1) of the Vienna Convention specifies: ‘A treaty shall be interpreted in good 
faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in 
their context and in the light of its object and purpose.’ It is considered that the primary 
purpose of Protocol I is contained in this provision of the preamble: ‘Believing it 
necessary nevertheless to reaffirm and develop the provisions protecting the victims of 
armed conflicts and to supplement measures intended to reinforce their application.’ 
This purpose is not furthered by the interpretation of specific rules in a way which 
provides ideal abstract protections for victims but is completely unworkable in the harsh 
reality of combat.
184
 
Therefore, even if reasonableness is not specifically mentioned in API, it should 
be assumed to be a built-in part of the application of any treaty.  By defining the 
appropriate level of precaution as what is ‘practically possible’ and by 
specifically mentioning the competing principles of humanity and military 
necessity, the states have tacitly endorsed the need for decision makers to 
strike a reasonable balance between the two rather than exhausting all possible 
courses of action to avoid civilian losses, or giving carte blanche to 
commanders to justify any deviation of the rule on the grounds of military 
practicality.185 Furthermore, this interpretation of feasibility is also consistent 
with statements made by the states about the limitations of combat decision 
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making. The UK, for instance, made the following declaration clarifying its 
position on all of API Part IV, Section 1: 
Military commanders and others responsible for planning, deciding upon, or executing 
attacks necessarily have to reach decisions on the basis of their assessment of the 
information from all sources which is reasonably available to them at the relevant 
time.
186
 
Recalling the logic of the Rendulic rule, such statements confirm that 
commanders are not expected to be omniscient, nor must they do everything 
possible to avoid civilian losses, but they are expected to make a good faith 
effort to recognise the relevant humanitarian and military considerations and to 
apply their craft reasonably.187 Moreover, the US has recently stated that it does 
not view the ‘feasible precautions’ as being different in meaning from 
‘reasonable precautions’.188 Therefore, a ‘reasonable military commander’ test 
could be an appropriate way to assess if a commander correctly fulfilled their 
duty to take precautions in attack. 
 Although in the literature the LOAC rule on taking precautions in attack is 
often relegated to a subsidiary role underneath proportionality, some 
commentators claim it is of equal, if not more importance than proportionality. 
For instance, Geoff Corn writes:  
Precautionary measures, if properly implemented as a priority in the planning of attacks 
and other military operations involving combat power, can play a vital part in civilian risk 
mitigation during all hostilities, and hold promise to enhance the ability of armed forces 
to ensure they give full humanitarian effect to other core LOAC principles. Civilian risk 
mitigation begins with implementation of the distinction obligation, AP I’s ‘Basic Rule.’ 
With commitment to the distinction obligation as a requisite foundation, civilian risk 
mitigation then turns on implementing feasible precautionary measures, and, once 
implemented, refraining from any attack expected to cause indiscriminate effects or 
otherwise violate the ‘proportionality’ principle. While proportionality considerations 
certainly play an important humanitarian role in the targeting planning and execution 
process, precautionary measures bridge the conceptual borderline between distinction 
and proportionality. In practice, implementing feasible precautions as a second step in 
the targeting legality assessment will often mitigate the complexity of the proportionality 
assessment as a final step in this assessment by ensuring that all measures are taken 
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so that attacks are only conducted when the risk to civilians are minimized and hence, 
the proportionality balance will tip decisively in favor of the “concrete and direct military 
advantage anticipated” to be gained from the attack. 
189
 
Unfortunately, as I shall explore in the next section, even though there is a clear 
basis for proportionality violations in international criminal law, the rule on taking 
feasible precautions in attack has not been codified directly in ICL. Despite its 
importance in bridging distinction and proportionality, offenses relating to 
precautions in attack tend to be reframed as criminal mental elements (e.g. 
recklessness), rather than crimes in their own right.  
The Rules of Proportionality and Precautions in International Criminal Law 
The grave breaches regime established by the Geneva Conventions of 1949 
was an attempt to compel states to criminalise gross violations of the 
conventions in their own domestic laws.190  Likewise, when API was adopted in 
1977, it singled out certain actions as grave breaches of the treaty, including 
launching disproportionate attacks: 
Article 85(3). [T]he following acts shall be regarded as grave breaches of this Protocol, 
when committed wilfully, in violation of the relevant provisions of this Protocol, and 
causing death or serious injury to body or health … (b) launching an indiscriminate 
attack affecting the civilian population or civilian objects in the knowledge that such 
attack will cause excessive loss of life, injury to civilians or damage to civilian objects, 
as defined in Article 57, paragraph 2 a) iii).
191
  
Again, in keeping with the logic of Article 57, the proportionality rule acts as a 
test of whether an attack could be considered indiscriminate.  
Although the grave breaches regime was intended to provide a way for 
states to try war crimes suspects in their own domestic jurisdictions, they have 
also been incorporated into statutes regulating international courts as well. In 
1993, UN Security Council Resolution 808 authorised the ICTY to try those 
suspected of committing grave breaches of the 1949 Geneva Conventions192 
and the 1998 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC) authorised 
the ICC to try both grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions of 1949, and 
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some of the grave breaches of API in modified form. This included directly 
targeting civilians as well as clearly intentional violations of the proportionality 
rule:  
Article 8(2). For the purpose of this Statute, ‘war crimes’ means: … (b) Other serious 
violations of the laws and customs applicable in international armed conflict, within the 
established framework of international law, namely, any of the following acts:  
i. Intentionally directing attacks against the civilian population as such or against 
individual civilians not taking direct part in hostilities; 
ii. Intentionally directing attacks against civilian objects, that is, objects which are 
not military objectives …  
iv. Intentionally launching an attack in the knowledge that such attack will cause 
incidental loss of life or injury to civilians or damage to civilian objects or 
widespread, long-term and severe damage to the natural environment which 
would be clearly excessive in relation to the concrete and direct overall military 
advantage anticipated.
193
 
The ICC definition of a disproportionate attack largely reiterates the one found 
in API, but there are some important differences in the wording of these two 
treaties, the most obvious being the addition of environmental considerations 
into the proportionality calculus.194 However, a few subtle words considerably 
constrain the scope of this attempt to criminalise disproportionate attacks: 
‘intentionally,’ ‘clearly,’ and ‘overall’.  
Rather than the standard used in API for a violation of indiscriminate or 
disproportionate attack, which might include reckless conduct on the part of a 
planner/commander,195 RS Article 8(2)(b)(iv) requires that the person launching 
the attack have knowledge of its disproportionate nature ex ante and 
nevertheless to intend196 to proceed with it.197;198  It may be helpful at this point 
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to look at the subjective mental element of RS Article 8(2)(b)(iv) as put forth in 
the ICC Elements of Crimes (EOC), which expands upon the mens rea required 
to convict someone of disproportionate attack:  
Element 3: The perpetrator knew that the attack would cause incidental death or injury 
to civilians or damage to civilian objects or widespread, long-term and severe damage 
to the natural environment and that such death, injury or damage would be of such an 
extent as to be clearly excessive in relation to the concrete and direct overall military 
advantage anticipated.
199
 
Furthermore, in footnote 37 of this particular element, the Rome Statute 
Preparatory Commission (PrepCom) clarified that: ‘this knowledge element 
requires that the perpetrator make the value judgement as described therein’,200 
effectively guarding against any attempt to prosecute a commander for ordinary 
negligence under this article.201 Indeed, the ICC would probably not find a 
commander guilty for merely ordering a disproportionate strike based on 
incomplete or incorrect information because RS Article 32(1) admits mistakes of 
fact as a defence as long as one can show that the particular mistake negates 
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the mens rea of the perpetrator.202 Furthermore, in those cases that are difficult 
or lie at the margins of what would be considered reasonable conduct on the 
part of a military commander, the Court will give the accused the benefit of the 
doubt.203  Héctor Olásolo argues that this is significant because it effectively 
raises the threshold of criminal intent required by RS Article 8(2)(b)(iv) version 
of the proportionality rule vis-à-vis the one articulated in API Article 85(3)(b).204  
According to Kevin Heller and Jessica Lawrence, the strict mens rea 
requirement for RS Article 8(2)(b)(iv) is problematic because it makes it nearly 
impossible for the Court to find a perpetrator in violation of the proportionality 
rule. By their reasoning, a cavalier commander could avoid prosecution simply 
by inflating the anticipated military advantage of the target or by devaluing the 
amount of expected collateral damage, either before the attack or in an ex-post 
justification of it. The Court would then have to accept the commander’s 
subjective assessment of the situation and would therefore conclude that he 
was unaware of the disproportionate nature of the attack.205  However, ICRC 
legal advisor Knut Dörmann revealed that many delegations to the PrepCom 
saw the second sentence of footnote 37 as an implicit endorsement of the fact 
that a commander’s value judgement must be open to objective judicial 
scrutiny206 since it stipulates that: ‘an evaluation of [the perpetrator’s] value 
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judgement must be based on the requisite information available to the 
perpetrator at the time’ [emphasis added].207 Moreover, he clarifies that the use 
of the ‘reasonable military commander’ standard was never in question during 
the PrepCom and it remains uncontroversial: 
In principle, there was no disagreement as to the standard for the adoption of the 
proportionality rule, which should be that of a ‘reasonable military commander’ insofar 
as the decision to launch an attack is made at a certain level within the chain of 
command. Furthermore, the use of this standard would avoid controversies in the 
application of the proportionality rule because the great majority of reasonable military 
commanders would agree on the fact that the incidental civilian damage expected from 
an attack is, or is not, manifestly excessive. Moreover, if there is an issue on which 
military legal writers, professors of international humanitarian law, non-governmental 
organizations (such as Human Rights Watch) and the ICRC agree, it is that the 
standard of the reasonable military commander is the most suitable for the application 
of the proportionality rule.
208
  
Nevertheless, the mens rea element could be viewed as problematic because it 
does not seem to address reckless or negligent conduct on the part of the 
commander. By this reckoning, an unscrupulous commander might circumvent 
prosecution under Article 8(2)(b)(iv) by failing to take the precautions in attack 
prescribed by API Article 57(2)(a) (e.g. positively identifying civilian objects). In 
doing so, the commander could merely claim that they did not have sufficient 
intelligence about the number of civilians that were present near a target, and 
therefore, was unaware of the disproportionate nature of the attack.209 However, 
Michael Newton refutes this hypothetical defence on two counts. Firstly, the 
EOC are not binding upon the Court, so a judge still has some discretion to 
widen the mens rea beyond the one specified by the EOC.210 Secondly, the 
crimes listed in RS Article 8 cannot be taken out of context from the larger 
corpus of customary LOAC from whence they were derived, including the 
positive requirement to take all feasible precautions in attack: 
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For the purposes of the war crime in Article 8(2)(b)(iv) of intentionally directing an attack 
in the knowledge that it would likely inflict disproportionate damage, the most relevant 
permissive duties incumbent on those who order military strikes require them to “do 
everything feasible to verify that the objectives to be attacked are neither civilians nor 
civilian objects…” Jurists and prosecutors absolutely must realize that the evaluation of 
the actus reus under Article 8(2)(b)(iv) cannot be made in isolation from these collateral 
duties of the commander, notwithstanding the fact that they are nowhere specifically 
referenced in the Rome Statute… The vital point is that the parallel duties incumbent on 
the commander are to be drawn from the larger jus in bello and need not be restated 
within the contours of Article 8 itself.
211
  
Dörmann would likely concur with this assessment, arguing that a perpetrator 
who wilfully blinds him or herself through a refusal to take necessary 
precautions has accepted that the results of the proportionality calculation will 
not justify the attack. That commander can, therefore, be held responsible for 
their reckless behaviour: 
It was argued that by refusing to evaluate the relationship between the military 
advantage and the incidental damage or injury, he/she has made the value judgement 
required by this element. Therefore, if the court finds that the damage would be 
excessive, the perpetrator will be guilty… In any case, an unreasonable judgement or 
an allegation that no judgement was made, in a case of clearly excessive death, injury 
or damage, would simply not be credible. It is submitted that the court would then, and it 
would be entitled to do so, infer the mental element based on that lack of credibility.
212
 
Therefore, even though the ordinary meaning of the word ‘intentionally’ in Article 
8(2)(b)(iv) may seem to restrict the ICC’s ability to try cases of disproportionate 
attack to those that were committed with direct criminal intent, in theory, there is 
still enough latitude within the context of the entire body of law available to the 
ICC to handle cases of recklessness, although perhaps not enough to handle 
cases of ordinary negligence. At any rate, the increased liability for the crime of 
disproportionate attack in the Rome Statute seems to be more of a restriction 
on the ICC as an institution, rather than an accurate reflection of the crime in 
customary ICL, where recklessness is a possible type of liability for 
disproportionate attacks.213 As with the proportionality rule under LOAC, Didier 
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Pfirter’s commentary on the elements of RS Article 8(2)(b)(iv) indicates that the 
EOC also imply a reasonableness standard for the criminal norm.214 
The effect of the word ‘clearly’ on the meaning of RS Article 8(2)(b)(iv) is 
more ambiguous. Dörmann claims that the word is legally superfluous since it is 
cannot be found in any of the sources of law for the Rome Statute.215 However, 
other commentators believe that it is significant because, prima facie, it enables 
the court to focus on those attacks which are most egregious,216 rather than 
becoming overwhelmed by cases which lie on the margins of what would be 
considered criminal under API. For instance, William Boothby believes the 
inclusion of this word allows the ICC to evaluate the proportionality of a strike 
based upon the judgement of ‘all fair-minded people, including the well-known 
“man on the Clapham omnibus”’, rather than those cases where even a group 
of reasonable military commanders would have difficulty deciding if a strike was 
warranted.217 Furthermore, the International Criminal Tribunal’s Final Report on 
the NATO Bombing Campaign reinforces this interpretation of the word:  
Operational reality is recognized in the Statute of the International Criminal Court, an 
authoritative indicator of evolving customary international law on this point, where [in] 
Article 8(2)(b)(iv) the use of the word ‘clearly’ ensures that criminal responsibility would 
be entailed only in cases where the excessiveness was obvious.
218
 
Therefore, it would seem that the use of the word ‘clearly’ does indeed have 
legal significance.  
Even though there is a debate amongst states over how to handle 
expected military advantage as a matter of customary LOAC, the use of the 
word ‘overall’ in RS Article 8(2)(b)(iv) shows that the threshold for criminal 
conduct must take into account the military advantage of an entire attack, not 
just one element of it, consistent with the interpretation of API held by many 
states that military advantage should be assessed at the operational level219 
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and it does not allow perpetrators to justify their actions at the strategic level, 
based on jus ad bellum concerns.220  
Finally, although the ICTY has accepted some of the provisions of API, 
including those relating to proportionality, into its own jurisprudence, there is a 
glaring omission of any sort or proportionality rule during NIAC as part of the 
Rome Statute.221 However, this seems to be more of a limitation on the ICC as 
a forum for trying cases of disproportionate attack, than a reflection of the state 
of customary ICL generally. Nevertheless, its noted absence from the Rome 
Statute could make it easier for defence counsels in other legal fora (either 
international or domestic) to argue that the customary status of the criminal 
proportionality rule applicable during NIAC is unclear and that the Rule of Lenity 
ought to be invoked in the defendant’s favour.   
Customary and treaty-based LOAC have defined the limits of what can 
be considered reasonably proportionate conduct in wartime for the purposes of 
state responsibility while the Grave Breaches regime and the Rome Statute 
have created a framework that both domestic and international courts can use 
to repress breaches by holding individuals criminally responsible for their 
actions. However, whether or not there is actually accountability for violations of 
the proportionality rule depends upon how courts apply the law in practice.  
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advantage at the operational level, it would likely be more difficult for a prosecutor to break up the 
constituent parts of an attack in a hearing before the ICC per Article 8(2). 
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The Rules of Proportionality and Precautions in International Case Law  
The effectiveness of any attempt to criminalise violations of the proportionality 
rule ultimately depends on the ability for a trier of fact to determine if an attack 
was indeed disproportionate. Despite the utilitarian logic of the rule, those 
judging an attack ex post may have difficulty understanding how the 
commander weighed the incommensurable values of civilian life and property 
against military advantage under the pressures associated with the fog of war. 
To date no commander has ever been sentenced specifically for violating the 
proportionality rule, but several have been either charged or convicted of 
launching direct attacks against the civilian population or indiscriminate attacks. 
In these cases, judges have often articulated their positions on the 
proportionality rule in their decisions, since disproportionate attacks are 
considered to be one subset of indiscriminate attacks.   
The jurisprudence of the ICTY provides the largest source of case law on 
unlawful attacks to date. Even though the ICTY statute allowed the tribunal to 
try violations of the laws and customs of war, when such violations were not 
specifically enumerated, it was a challenge for the court to decide specifically 
which provisions applied, what the elements of the crimes would be, and what 
level of mens rea was required to convict a defendant of a particular crime. 
Many of these issues were resolved during pre-trial hearings between the Office 
of the Prosecutor (OTP) and the defence, but there was enough unresolved 
ambiguity in the law that the judges themselves would often offer clarification in 
their decisions.222 One of the first cases to weigh in on the in bello 
proportionality rule as formulated in API was the ICTY tribunal of Zoran 
Kupreškić et al. in 2000.223 Kupreškić had been the commander of a local unit of 
the Croatian Defence Council, which had attacked the town Ahmići as part of a 
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larger operation to push Muslim Bosnians out of the Lašva River Valley in 1993. 
During that case, the judges accepted that API Article 57 was considered 
customary LOAC and that the accused had a twofold duty to uphold the rules 
on proportionality and precautions in attack:  
In the case of attacks on military objectives causing damage to civilians, international 
law contains a general principle prescribing that reasonable care must be taken in 
attacking military objectives so that civilians are not needlessly injured through 
carelessness. This principle, already referred to by the United Kingdom in 1938 with 
regard to the Spanish Civil War, has always been applied in conjunction with the 
principle of proportionality, whereby any incidental (and unintentional) damage to 
civilians must not be out of proportion to the direct military advantage gained by the 
military attack. In addition, attacks, even when they are directed against legitimate 
military targets, are unlawful if conducted using indiscriminate means or methods of 
warfare, or in such a way as to cause indiscriminate damage to civilians. These 
principles have to some extent been spelled out in Articles 57 and 58 of the First 
Additional Protocol of 1977. Such provisions, it would seem, are now part of customary 
international law, not only because they specify and flesh out general pre-existing 
norms, but also because they do not appear to be contested by any State, including 
those which have not ratified the Protocol. Admittedly, even these two provisions leave 
a wide margin of discretion to belligerents by using language that might be regarded as 
leaving the last word to the attacking party.
224
 [emphasis added] 
However, since there was such scant case law on proportionality up to this 
point, the ICTY initially chose not to treat disproportionate attack as a separate 
crime from intentionally attacking civilians or civilian objects, often relegating 
discussions of proportionality to mere obiter dicta.225 Although the Trial 
Chamber in Kupreškić offered up a thorough analysis of the law on 
proportionality as it stood at the time, the grisly facts of the case caused the 
judges to focus on whether the accused had intentionally murdered the civilian 
residents of Ahmići outright, as a crime against humanity, rather than if he or his 
co-defendants had committed war crimes by ordering or launching 
indiscriminate or disproportionate strikes.226  
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While the ICTY is best known for its decisions on the conduct of civil and 
military figures from the Balkans, the Office of the Prosecutor was also called 
upon to examine the legality of NATO’s use of air power during the wars. In 
their 2000 report to the Office of the Prosecutor (OTP), the Committee 
Established to Review the NATO bombing Campaign were the first to explicitly 
mention the ‘reasonable military commander’ standard in a document coming 
from an international court: 
It is unlikely that a human rights lawyer and an experienced combat commander would 
assign the same relative values to military advantage and to injury to noncombatants. 
Further, it is unlikely that military commanders with different doctrinal backgrounds and 
differing degrees of combat experience or national military histories would always agree 
in close cases. It is suggested that the determination of relative values must be that of 
the ‘reasonable military commander’. Although there will be room for argument in close 
cases, there will be many cases where reasonable military commanders will agree that 
the injury to noncombatants or the damage to civilian objects was clearly 
disproportionate to the military advantage gained. 
227
 
With this standard in mind, the committee analysed both the bombing mission 
as a whole and also a few specific strikes which outside organisations such as 
Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch had suggested were in 
contravention of international law. While in some cases the civilian casualties 
were considered high, the Committee did not think there was enough evidence 
to open a formal war crimes investigation.228  
Echoing the ‘reasonable military commander’ standard from the OTP’s 
NATO Bombing Report, the Trial Chamber applied a similar approach to 
determine if Stanislav Galić should be held responsible for his role in the sniping 
and indiscriminate shelling of the civilian population of Sarajevo:  
In determining whether an attack was proportionate it is necessary to examine whether 
a reasonably well-informed person in the circumstances of the actual perpetrator, 
making reasonable use of the information available to him or her, could have expected 
excessive civilian casualties to result from the attack.
 229
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Thus the Galić decision cemented a reasonableness standard into the ICTY’s 
jurisprudence for determining the legality of targeting decisions, although that 
point was rendered moot by the fact that Galić was likely intentionally directing 
his attacks at the civilian population, rather than launching an excessive attack, 
per se.230 Furthermore, the case also clarified the ICTY’s position on the 
appropriate level at which proportionality ought to be assessed — although the 
topic is still contentious as a matter of customary LOAC,231 the Tribunal 
accepted that the rule could be applied at the tactical level, but that it should 
never be applied at a strategic level.232 Later, in the Blaškić (2000) and Strugar 
(2005) decisions, the Tribunal instead chose to look at the proportionality 
calculation from the operational level, examining the actions of the accused in 
reference to an entire attack, rather than a blow-by-blow analysis of each 
target.233 The Blaškić tribunal also provided some guidance on the level of 
mens rea that would be required to convict a perpetrator of disproportionate 
attack. In this case, the Prosecutor ‘maintained that the mens rea which 
characterises all the violations of Article 3 of the Statute [relevant to the unlawful 
attack charges]… is the intentionality of the acts or omissions, a concept 
containing both guilty intent and recklessness likenable to serious criminal 
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negligence’, so within the ICTY’s jurisprudence, recklessness ended up being 
an acceptable level of mens rea to secure a conviction.234  
 More recently, in the 2012 decision of Gotovina et al., the Tribunal had to 
determine, inter alia, whether the Croatian Armed Forces’ use of artillery against 
targets in urban areas during Operation Storm was a violation of the laws and 
customs of war.235 The prosecution claimed that the shellings which General 
Gotovina had ordered, were indiscriminate — or at least disproportionate — and 
therefore were used as a way to persecute civilian Serbs living in contested 
areas. The defence countered that there were a number of legal military 
objectives in the towns that the Croatian Armed Forces attacked. Their fires, 
though indirect, were aimed as best they could be at those military objectives or 
targets of opportunity that could be hit without causing excessive civilian harm. 
Despite showing the court the preparations that the Croatian Armed Forces took 
in collecting intelligence and drafting target lists, the Trial Chamber was 
unconvinced that they actually stuck to the military objectives on their lists. 
Interestingly, rather than relying on an explicit reasonable commander standard 
as the OTP Report or the Galić tribunal had, the Trail Chamber in this case 
instead relied on witness testimony and its own judgement to determine if a 
particular strike was proportionate.236 However, in constructing an effects-based 
approach to judge if the shells actually hit their intended targets, the court used 
a somewhat arbitrary standard. They claimed it was reasonable to assume that 
any shells which landed outside a 200-metre radius from their intended targets 
must have been the result of indiscriminate fire. By this standard, the court 
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found that Gotovina and his subordinates had fired indiscriminately into several 
towns during Operation Storm.  This finding formed the lynchpin for the court’s 
conviction of Gotovina and his co-defendants.  
This ruling did not sit well with military professionals such as Major 
General Walter Huffman, who criticised the 200-metre standard, believing it to 
be an invention by the court which emphasised the effects of a strike ex post 
without considering the commander’s intent. Instead, he claimed that the court 
must adhere to the Rendulic rule:   
The law does not require the commander always to be right; instead it requires a good 
faith judgment based on information available in the heat of battle. Civilian casualties, 
property destruction, and impact locations viewed in hindsight are not enough to prove 
a commander guilty of indiscriminate attacks. The results of an attack are but one factor 
from which intent at the time of attack may be inferred.
237
 
Indeed, the ICTY Appeals Chamber also found the 200-metre standard to be 
arbitrary and reversed the convictions of Gotovina and Markač.238 However, in 
his dissenting opinion, Judge Carmel Agius lambasted the majority for fixating 
on the erroneous 200-metre standard while ignoring other useful effects-based 
evidence from which one might infer criminal intent on the part of Gotovina: 
In my opinion, the Majority’s reasoning is defective, just as the Trial Chamber’s decision 
to adopt the 200 Metre Standard was defective. In the absence of the 200 Metre 
Standard, there remains evidence on the record from Witnesses Konings, Leslie and 
Rajčić regarding the accuracy of the weaponry used by the HV [Croatian Army] in 
shelling the Four Towns, and other evidence relating to the HV’s capability in controlling 
the margin of error for its weaponry. The Majority completely disregards this evidence 
and assumes that it loses all evidentiary value outside the context of the 200 Metre 
Standard. This is simply not the case. Short of a decision by the Majority to appoint its 
own artillery expert, the underlying evidence regarding margins of error stands, and 
cannot be ignored by the Majority, particularly when in relation to Knin, at least 900 
projectiles fell all over the town in just one and a half days and there are no findings of 
any resistance coming from the town. This underlying evidence, which itself has never 
been called into question, must therefore be taken into account by the Majority in 
determining whether a reasonable trier of fact could conclude that the attacks were 
unlawful, despite the error in the 200 Metre Standard.
239
 
This case lays bare the conflict between the way that different legal 
professionals approach issues such as indiscriminate fire and proportionality. At 
its core, the debate on the 200-metre standard is about whether judges have 
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the appropriate background to develop a meaningful way to assess the 
reasonableness of a strike, given that they are not experts in military affairs.       
 In the ICC’s case law, no violations of Article 8(2)(b)(iv) have been 
successfully brought to trial. However, the Office of the Prosecutor (OTP) has 
conducted preliminary examinations of a couple incidents in which it had been 
alleged that disproportionate attacks had taken place. After receiving numerous 
communiques claiming that Coalition forces had launched disproportionate 
attacks in Iraq during Operation Iraqi Freedom, the OTP responded to the 
allegations in a 2006 report. The report reiterated the applicable law regarding 
disproportionate attack, emphasizing that the ICC’s version of the 
proportionality rule is indeed stricter than the corresponding rule in API: ‘Article 
8(2)(b)(iv) draws on the principles in Article 51(5)(b) of the 1977 Additional 
Protocol I to the 1949 Geneva Conventions, but restricts the criminal prohibition 
to cases that are “clearly” excessive.’ [emphasis in original]240 Although a 
‘considerable number of civilians died or were injured during the military 
operations,’241 the OTP’s analysis of the situation focused on the precautions 
that the belligerents used to avoid collateral damage, rather than the ex post 
effects of each attack: 
Publicly available information from the UK states that: lists of potential targets were 
identified in advance; commanders had legal advice available to them at all times and 
were aware of the need to comply with international humanitarian law, including the 
principles of proportionality; detailed computer modeling was used in assessing targets; 
political, legal and military oversight was established for target approval; and real-time 
targeting information, including collateral damage assessment, was passed back to 
headquarters. This information was taken into consideration by the Office, in 
accordance with the standards of critical evaluation. The information was not 
contradicted by any other available information.
242
 
The OTP then claimed that, based on its analysis of the collateral damage 
caused during the war and of the Coalition’s precautionary measures, that the 
incident did not pass the ‘clearly excessive’ threshold required to bring the case 
under the jurisdiction of the Court.243 This report was significant for two reasons. 
Firstly, it shows that the word ‘clearly’ does indeed have a practical legal 
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significance as the OTP interprets Article 8(2)(b)(iv).244 Secondly, by reviewing 
how the Coalition’s leadership had taken the requisite precautionary measures 
during their operations, the OTP was able to infer that they did not have the 
requisite mens rea to commit the crime of disproportionate attack.  In 2014, the 
OTP re-opened a preliminary examination into the UK’s role in the Iraq conflict, 
but that examination focuses on the treatment of detainees, rather than 
allegations of disproportionate attack. Moreover, for the time being, the 
Prosecutor is not inclined to pursue the case until the UK’s Iraq Historic 
Allegations Team (IHAT) has completed its own inquiries.245 
 The other alleged disproportionate attack for which the OTP has 
conducted a preliminary examination occurred between North and South Korea 
in 2010. In that attack, North Korean forces fired shells onto the South Korean 
island of Yeonpyeong which hit both military and civilian objects and resulted in 
the death of two civilians and the injury of 52 others.246 The 2014 OTP report on 
the incident reinforced the fact that the ICC only considers ‘clearly excessive’ 
cases of disproportionate attack within its jurisdiction and that it takes a cautious 
approach to inferring criminal action based on an assessment of the facts ex 
post:  
The difficulties of calculating anticipated civilian losses and anticipated military 
advantage and the lack of a common unit of measurement with which to compare the 
two make this assessment difficult to apply, both in military decision making and in any 
ex post facto assessment of the legality of that action. Thus, the Rome Statute restricts 
the criminal prohibition to cases that are ‘clearly’ excessive. This is clear from the plain 
meaning, the meaning in context, as well as the intent of drafters, as confirmed in the 
relevant commentaries. (The term ‘clearly’ is designed to emphasize that a value 
judgment within a reasonable margin of appreciation should not be criminalized nor 
second guessed by the Court from hindsight.)
247
 
This statement shows that the word ‘clearly’ not only keeps the Court focused 
on the most egregious violations of Article 8(2)(b)(iv), as Boothby suggested, 
but like the ‘reasonable military commander’ standard adopted by the ICTY, the 
use of the word ‘clearly’ in the Rome Statute has caused the ICC OTP to refrain 
from substituting the discretion of the Court for that of a military decision maker 
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except in those cases where there would be broad agreement by military 
commanders that a strike were disproportionate: 
To conclude, while a reasonably well-informed person in the circumstances of the 
actual perpetrator, would have expected some degree of civilian casualties and damage 
to result from the attack given the relative proximity of military and civilian objects, the 
information available is insufficient to provide a reasonable basis to believe that the 
anticipated civilian impact would have been clearly excessive in relation to the 
anticipated military advantage of the attack, considering the size and population of the 
island, and the fact that military targets appeared to be the primary object of the 
attack.
248
 [emphasis in original] 
In the end, the OTP declared that the incident was not grave enough to warrant 
a formal investigation. 
The Rules of Proportionality and Precautions in Domestic Case Law 
The rules of proportionality and precautions in attack have been no less difficult 
to apply in domestic case law as they have been in international case law. 
Some of the most infamous cases have been those brought before Belgian 
courts in the early 2000s. These cases could proceed because of a 1993 law 
which granted Belgian courts universal jurisdiction for genocide, crimes against 
humanity, and war crimes, even if there was no connection to Belgium by 
ratione personae or ratione soli.249 On the eve of the 2003 Iraq War, seven 
Iraqis brought a case against high-ranking US officials, including the former 
president, George H. W. Bush, in connection with an airstrike during the First 
Gulf War against a bunker that had been converted into a civilian bomb shelter. 
The strike against the shelter in Ameriyya killed 403 people250  and at the time, 
it had been condemned by Human Rights Watch as a failure to take feasible 
precautions in attack: 
In public statements, U.S. military officials have repeatedly emphasized the basis for 
their judgment that the Ameriyya building was used for military-related activity and 
therefore a legitimate military target.  Gen. Kelly said on February 13: ‘We didn't know 
that the Iraqis had civilians in there.’… Gen. Kelly said on February 13 that ‘we did take 
all the precautions we could.’  He did not, however, spell out the specific nature of these 
precautions, in sharp contrast to the disclosure of information to support the contention 
that the building was used for military purposes.  This is particularly important in view of 
three factors:  the acknowledgement by the U.S. military that the building originally 
served as a civilian shelter, the contention that it only recently ‘became’ an active 
command-and-control bunker, and Iraq's repeated use of civilians to shield military 
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targets. The identification of an object as serving a military purpose is a necessary, but 
not sufficient, condition prior to making a decision to attack it.  First, in the case of any 
uncertainty that a civilian object is being used for military purposes, there is a 
presumption of civilian use in favor of such objects.
251
   
Nevertheless, the case was denounced by one of the co-indictees, Colin 
Powell, who warned that such ‘politically motivated’ charges could affect NATO 
leaders’ ability to attend functions at the alliance’s headquarters in Brussels.252 
Similarly, the Belgian foreign minister complained that the law was being 
exploited by ‘opportunists’ and that ‘Belgium must not impose itself as the moral 
conscience of the world.’253 Two weeks later, the Belgian Parliament amended 
the universal jurisdiction law such that its courts were able to dismiss the 
case.254 A month later, 17 Iraqis and two Jordanians filed a suit against Tommy 
Franks, the commander of Coalition Forces in the 2003 invasion of Iraq, for inter 
alia, allegedly ordering indiscriminate attacks, but it seemed to some 
commentators as though the case was brought more for its media impact than 
with the expectation of a serious prosecution of the alleged offenses.255 
Invoking the newly amended law, the Belgian Government decided to use its 
authority to transfer the case over to US jurisdiction.256 Even though this 
decision effectively dismissed the case,257 US officials suggested shortly 
afterwards that if Belgium did not repeal what they thought to be its overly 
permissive universal jurisdiction law, then they might consider relocating NATO 
headquarters.258 The Belgian cases have therefore revealed more about how 
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politically-charged allegations of unlawful attack can be, rather than contributing 
any solid analysis about the cases on the merits.   
As with international courts, a reasonableness standard has also been 
invoked by domestic courts to determine a commander’s liability for conducting 
unlawful attacks. Indeed, as a matter of customary international law, the states’ 
embrace of the ‘reasonable military commander’ standard to evaluate a 
commander’s application of the proportionality rule seems to be gaining 
traction.259 The Israeli High Court of Justice, in particular, has enthusiastically 
applied the standard in a number of high-profile cases that involved judicial 
review of military actions. For example, in the 2006 case, Public Committee 
Against Torture v. Government of Israel — which examined the Israeli 
Government’s policy of using targeted killings against suspected terrorist 
leaders — one of the issues the petitioners raised was that targeted strikes 
against terrorist suspects will oftentimes inflict excessive collateral damage 
upon the nearby civilian population. By this time, the High Court of Justice had 
developed a substantial case law260 which had invoked a ‘reasonable military 
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 If the inclusion of the ‘reasonable military commander’ standard in domestic courts provides evidence 
that states practice its use, its inclusion into the military handbooks could provide the complementary 
opinio juris to show that the ‘reasonable military commander’ is indeed a customary standard. For 
example, the US Air Force Legal manual states: ‘The final determination of whether a specific attack is 
proportional is the sole responsibility of the air commander. The responsible air commander may be any 
commander from the (Joint Force Air Component Commander) down to the individual flight or aircraft 
commander depending on circumstances— regardless, this decision may not be delegated. Targeteers, 
weaponeers, air planners and judge advocates should offer well-reasoned advice, but the decision always 
remains with the responsible commander. If the commander can clearly articulate in a reasonable manner 
what the military importance of the target is and why the anticipated civilian collateral injury and damage is 
outweighed by the military advantage to be gained, this will generally satisfy the “reasonable military 
commander” standard’. Air Force Operations and the Law, A Guide for Air and Space Forces in Boothby, 
181. Furthermore, the UK Joint Service LOAC manual states: ‘As with personnel, the attacker also has to 
distinguish between civilian objects and military targets. This obligation is dependent on the quality of the 
information available to the commander at the time he makes decisions. If he makes reasonable efforts to 
gather intelligence, reviews the intelligence available to him and concludes in good faith that he is 
attacking a legitimate military target, he does not automatically violate the principle of distinction if the 
target turns out to be of a different and civilian nature’. The Joint Service Manual of the Law of Armed 
Conflict (Joint Doctrine and Concepts Centre 2004), 24. 
260
 For instance, see the 2004 Beit Sourik Case for a discussion of the proportionality, not of an attack, but 
of the route for a security fence: ‘We, Justices of the Supreme Court, are not experts in military affairs. We 
shall not examine whether the military commander’s military opinion corresponds to ours – to the extent 
that we have an opinion regarding the military character of the route [of the fence]. So we act in all 
questions which are matters of professional expertise, and so we act in military affairs as well. All we can 
determine is whether a reasonable military commander would have set out the route as this military 
commander did… It is true, that “the security of the state” is not a “magic word” which makes judicial 
review disappear. Thus, we shall not be deterred from reviewing the decisions of the military commander… 
simply because of the important security considerations anchoring his decision. However, we shall not 
substitute the discretion of the commander with our own discretion. We shall check the legality of the 
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commander’ test. Therefore, the Court in this instance also deemed that it was 
right to give the commander the benefit of the doubt when reviewing the legality 
of an order:  
[T]he question is not what I would have decided in the given circumstances, but whether 
the decision that the military commander made is a decision that a reasonable military 
commander was entitled to make. In this regard special weight should be given to the 
military opinion of the person who has the responsibility for security…
261
       
Even so, the court was adamant that it should not shy away from determining 
the applicable law and from applying it to the facts of the case before them, 
since that is their duty in all other judicial matters.262 In the end, the court’s 
discretion in this case was rendered moot because the justices found that the 
policy of targeted killings was neither expressly legal nor was it prohibited 
according to LOAC or ICL. Thus, only particular attacks could be assessed for 
compliance with the law on a case-by-case basis.263  
However, even when looking at the lawfulness of individual strikes, the 
ambiguity of the provisions relating to proportionality and its associated attack 
precautions, combined with the added vagueness of its reasonableness 
standard makes it extremely difficult to achieve accountability in practice for any 
violation of these rules under Israeli law. For instance, there were no criminal 
indictments for violations of these provisions during Israel’s 2008 and 2014 
incursions into Gaza and there is only one criminal investigation that is still 
ongoing into an incident in 2014 when the IDF called in an airstrike on a café in 
Khan Younis, killing nine people. This investigation was opened ostensibly 
                                                                                                                                
 
discretion of the military commander and ensure that his decisions fall within the “zone of reasonableness.” 
[emphasis added].’ Beit Sourik Village Council V. The Government of Israel  (Israeli High Court of Justice), 
27.  The fence was also the subject of an ICJ ruling and eight more domestic cases: The Beit Sira Village 
Council et al. v. The Government of Israel, The Bidu Village Council v. The Government of Israel, Abd el 
Wahab Kandil et al. v. The Military Commander of the Judea and Samaria Area, Agraib v. The 
Government of Israel, Hadur et al. v. The Military Commander of the Judea and Samaria Area, Saker 
Ibrahim Abdalla v. The Military Commander of the Judea and Samaria Area, and Jamal v. The Military 
Commander discussed in Mara'abe V. The Prime Minister of Israel  (Israeli High Court of Justice), 25-26. 
261
 As President of the Court Ahron Barak speaking on behalf of the majority in Public Committee against 
Torture in Israel V. Government of Israel  (Israeli High Court of Justice), 512-513. 
262
 ‘The court is not permitted to shirk this authority.’ ibid, 512. 
263
 ‘It has therefore been decided that it cannot be determined ab initio that every targeted killing is 
prohibited under customary international law, just as it cannot be determined ab initio that every targeted 
killing is permitted under customary international law. The laws relating to targeted killings are determined 
in customary international law, and the legality of each individual attack needs to be decided in accordance 
with them.’ ibid, 519.  
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because those involved violated IDF targeting procedures,264 but, to date, there 
has been no update on the case from the Military Advocate General’s (MAG) 
office. This case follows a pattern of slowly conducted investigations for which 
HROs such as Amnesty International, YeshDin, and B’Tsalem have criticised 
the Israeli Government.265 In another high-profile case, the IDF was condemned 
for having fired upon a group of children playing on a beach near a Hamas-
operated naval compound. After opening a criminal investigation into the 
incident, the MAG described the factual circumstances prevailing at the time 
which caused the commander to believe that the silhouettes running around on 
the beach were legitimate targets: 
At the time that the decision was made, the attack was not, according to the 
assessment of the operational entities, expected to result in any collateral damage to 
civilians or to civilian property. Moreover, the attack was carried out while undertaking 
several precautionary measures, which aimed to prevent any harm to civilians. Such 
measures included, inter alia, the choice of a munition which was not expected to cause 
any harm to civilians, and the deployment of real time visual surveillance. The MAG 
found that the professional discretion exercised by all the commanders involved in the 
incident had not been unreasonable under the circumstances. However, it became clear 
after the fact that the identification of the figures as militants from Hamas's Naval 
Forces, was in error. Nonetheless, the tragic outcome of the incident does not affect the 
legality of the attack ex post facto.
266
 
Despite the MAG’s insistence that ordering the strike was reasonable under the 
circumstances, NGOs have criticised his report’s lack of detail,267 particularly 
because there was no discussion about why the commanders were unaware 
that the figures running around on the beach were children, if the IDF unit had 
been surveilling the beach properly.268  
Similarly, other domestic jurisdictions have had difficulty looking at the 
rules on precautions and proportionality as they relate to individual attacks. In 
2010, an investigation undertaken by the German Federal Public Prosecutor 
examined the proportionality of a single attack where then-Colonel Georg Klein, 
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'Protective Edge'- Update No. 4’ (IDF MAG Corps, 11 June 2015)  <http://www.law.idf.il/163-7353-
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commander of a provincial reconstruction team, ordered a strike against two 
stolen NATO fuel tankers in Kunduz Province, Afghanistan. Although it was 
night-time, there was a large crowd of people gathered near the tankers 
attempting to siphon off fuel from them and a human intelligence source 
identified the crowd as Taliban. Thinking there were few, if any, civilians in the 
area and fearing the tankers could be used in against German forces nearby, 
Klein ordered the tankers destroyed.  As a result of the attack, approximately 
140 individuals were killed (the United Nations Assistance Mission in 
Afghanistan believed that 25-33 of them were children).269 Nevertheless, from 
the Prosecutor’s perspective, the standard for criminal prosecution of unlawful 
attacks was too high, so the case was ultimately terminated before going to 
trial.270 In justifying her decision, the Prosecutor addressed the rules of 
proportionality and precautions separately, arguing that even if Klein had reason 
to believe there were civilians near the fuel tankers, the attack would still have 
been proportionate:  
Even if the killing of several dozen civilians would have had to be anticipated (which is 
assumed here for the sake of the argument), from a tactical-military perspective this 
would not have been out of proportion to the anticipated military advantages. The 
literature consistently points out that general criteria are not available for the 
assessment of specific proportionality because unlike legal goods, values and interests 
are juxtaposed which cannot be ‘balanced’… Therefore, considering the particular 
pressure at the moment when the decision had to be taken, an infringement is only to 
be assumed in cases of obvious excess where the commander ignored any 
considerations of proportionality and refrained from acting ‘honestly’, ‘reasonably’ and 
‘competently’… There is no such obvious disproportionality in the present case. Both 
the destruction of the fuel tankers and the destruction of high-level Taliban had a 
military importance which is not to be underestimated, not least because of the thereby 
considerably reduced risk of attacks by the Taliban against own troops and civilians. 
There is thus no excess.
271
 
This claim was not very convincing. The standard constructed by the Prosecutor 
here seems to conflate Klein’s subjective assessment of the military advantage 
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 Elisabeth Henn, ‘The Development of German Jurisprudence on Individual Compensation for Victims of 
Armed Conflicts:The Kunduz Case’ (2014) 12 National Prosecution of International Crimes Legislation and 
Cases 615, 624-625. 
270
 ‘Eine Strafbarkeit aufgrund sonstiger Tatbestände des Strafgesetzbuchs scheidet aus, da die 
konfliktsvölkerrechtliche Zulässigkeit des Vorgehens von Oberst Klein auch insoweit rechtfertigende 
Wirkung entfaltet.’ German Federal Prosecutor, Ermittlungsverfahren Gegen Oberst Klein Und 
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Crimes Code and Other Offenses] (3 BJs 6/10-4, 2010), 69. 
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Ibid, 66. Translation from: ‘Germany, Practice Relating to Rule 14. Proportionality in Attack’ (ICRC, 
2015)  <https://www.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v2_cou_de_rule14> accessed 7 July 2015. 
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to be gained from hitting the fuel tankers with that of a reasonable commander. 
To be sure, the Prosecutor’s report invoked the language of reasonableness 
and hinted that a commander could theoretically be criminally incompetent or 
dishonest about the facts of a particular case, but the standard for the incident 
to warrant further judicial scrutiny was for the commander to act unreasonably 
and for the damage to be ‘obviously’ excessive. Recalling an example used in 
the NATO Bombing Report, the Prosecutor described an obviously excessive 
incident as one where a commander orders the destruction of a whole town to 
kill one soldier.272 However, this is an extreme example that would preclude 
prosecution for other clearly excessive actions which ought to be covered either 
by customary or treaty-based ICL (and their equivalent codifications in German 
domestic law).    
Ultimately, it was unnecessary to examine Klein’s proportionality calculus 
because his mistake of fact — misidentifying the people gathered around the 
tankers as combatants — meant that he was unable to conduct a proportionality 
calculation in good faith anyway. So, rather than asking whether his 
proportionality assessment was reasonable, this case hinged on whether he 
reasonably complied with his duty to take all feasible precautions to determine 
what the relative values of military advantage and civilian loss might be. 
However, instead of comparing Klein’s precautions against that of a reasonable 
military commander, the Prosecutor again merely accepted Colonel Klein’s 
subjective claim that he took reasonable precautions on that night to ensure that 
the advantage gained from the attack outweighed the collateral civilian 
losses.273 A later civil proceeding in 2012 likewise found that Klein had complied 
with his duties under API Article 57(2)(a)(i), despite some evidence to the 
contrary.274 Klein’s mistake of fact may have negated the mens rea required for 
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 ‘Dies wäre etwa der Fall bei der Vernichtung einer kompletten Ortschaft mit Hunderten ziviler 
Einwohner um einen einzelnen gegnerischen Kämpfer zu treffen, nicht aber wenn es um die Ausschaltung 
einer in der Ortschaft befindlichen Artilleriestellung geht (Dinstein S. 122 f. m.w.N.). Vorliegend kommt eine 
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Second, if Taliban and civilians move in a similar way, there was no reason to conclude that the individuals 
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prosecution under international criminal law, but it should have been possible 
for the Prosecutor to recommend trying him for a lesser offense under German 
domestic law, such as manslaughter.275 To date, Germany has offered ex gratia 
payments to victims or their next of kin, but it has not been found liable for this 
incident and Klein was allowed to continue his career, being promoted to 
brigadier in 2012.276 
More recently, the rules on proportionality and precautions in attack were 
invoked, not in a criminal sense, but rather to determine at what point a state 
must withhold arms sales to another state when there is evidence that the 
weapons are being used to commit war crimes. Early in their 2015 campaign277 
against Houthi Rebels in support of the government headed by Mansour Hadi, 
the Saudi Arabian Armed Forces in coalition with other gulf states were accused 
of engaging in targeting practices which, if they were not outright unlawful,278 
                                                                                                                                
 
characteristics of those on site. In case of doubt, individuals must be presumed protected against direct 
attacks. This rule aims at a good faith assessment of all available information. The fact that the Colonel 
sought to avoid killing bystanders by choosing smaller bombs also indicates that even Colonel Klein had 
remaining doubts and thus should have tried to gather further information. Furthermore, it seems that a 
reasonably well-informed commander, knowing the region of his operation, could have expected that, due 
to the extreme economic poverty, Ramadan and the ambivalent relationship to the Taliban, villagers were 
either forced or willing to obtain petrol for private use. According to plausible testimonies this was the case. 
It is questionable, therefore, whether the Colonel observed the necessary precautions in determining 
whether or not there may be civilians at the location. The Court should have assessed the observance of 
the obligations under Articles 57(1), (2)(a)(ii), (a)(iii) and (2)(c) of Additional Protocol I.’ ibid, 632. 
Furthermore, Klein’s human intelligence source could not directly observe the target area, thus relying so 
heavily on that source was violation of applicable ROE at the time. Roger Boyes, ‘General Has to Quit 
after Video Reveals Airstrike Blunder That Killed Civilians.’ The Times (London, 27 Nov 2009), 47. 
275
 ‘His criminal liability could follow from the omission of precautionary measures. As has been shown, this 
violation of IHL did not lead to criminal liability under International Criminal Law. However, as the 
Explanatory Memorandum of the Völkerstrafgesetzbuch clearly states, this does not necessarily preclude 
criminal liability under ordinary criminal law. In fact, the Explanatory Memorandum gives the example of a 
pilot who violates the obligation to take precautionary measures laid down in Art 57.2 AP I. Although not 
punishable under International Criminal Law, such a pilot might well be liable for manslaughter under 
ordinary criminal law. The case of Colonel Klein is analogous to this. Constantin  von der Groeben, 
‘Criminal Responsibility of German Soldiers in Afghanistan: The Case of Colonel Klein’ 11 German Law 
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exhibited a degree of recklessness279 in planning or executing their attacks that 
suggested criminality.280 Arms vendors, such as the US and the UK have a 
financial and political interest in supplying the Saudi Arabian Government with 
military hardware and the technical support needed to use it.281 For example, in 
2010, a $60 billion agreement between Saudi Arabia and the US to support the 
Kingdom’s fight in Yemen had represented the single largest arms deal in US 
history282 until the Trump Administration’s $350 billion arms deal with Saudi 
Arabia in 2017.283 Though states284 and individuals285 could be held liable for 
providing material support for war crimes in Yemen, the US Senate rejected a 
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 ‘[Belkis Wille from Human Rights Watch] told me she would often spot some kind of military installation 
near a bombed civilian site, which may have been the intended target. On the evening of July 24, for 
example, the coalition bombed a housing compound for workers of the Mokha power plant, in the 
southwest corner of Yemen. Sixty-five people were killed, including ten children. At least forty-two more 
were wounded, several of them critically. Wille concluded that the intended target was a military air-
defense base, which had been empty for many years, according to unanimous local testimony. More to the 
point, the base was half a mile away, and easily distinguishable from the compound. “There may have 
been a lack of good military intelligence,” she told me. “But the end result was an incredibly high rate of 
sloppiness and recklessness.”’ Andrew Cockburn, ‘Acceptable Losses: Aiding and Abetting the Saudi 
Slaughter in Yemen’ Harper's Magazine (September 2016) 
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August 2016)  <https://www.justsecurity.org/32558/saudi-led-coalition-forces-committing-war-crimes-
yemen/> accessed 9 August 2017. 
281
 ‘As Des Roches reminded me, the U.S. government is the official vendor for weapons sales on behalf 
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 For instance, Article 6(3) of The Arms Trade Treaty states that ‘A  State  Party  shall  not  authorize  any  
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bill that would keep the State Department from allowing the sale of tanks and 
armoured vehicles to Saudi Arabia.286  
In the UK, the Campaign Against Arms Trade and other human rights 
organisations, brought a case before the High Court of Justice, claiming that the 
government’s continued material support for the Saudi-led Coalition constituted 
a violation of the Government’s own policy, which is based, inter alia, on the 
Arms Trade Treaty.287 This policy prohibits the transfer of arms to states which 
the UK Government believes are responsible for serious LOAC violations, 
including violations of the rules on proportionality and precautions in attack: 
The relevant principles of International Humanitarian Law are codified in the Four 
Geneva Conventions of 1949 and the Additional Protocols I and II of 1977 and in 
customary international law. They include the following: (1) Obligation to take all 
feasible precautions in attack; (2) Effective advance warning of attacks which may affect 
the civilian population; (3) Protection of objects indispensable to civilian population; (4) 
Prohibition on indiscriminate attacks; (5) Prohibition on disproportionate attacks; (6) 
Prohibition on attacks directed against civilian objects and/or civilian targets; (7) 
Obligation to investigate and prosecute; (8) Obligation to make reparation.
288
 
Therefore, in principle, if the Government had reason to believe that the Saudi-
led coalition were violating these rules, then they should refuse to transfer arms 
and withhold technical support from the Saudis until the Government can be 
certain that violations will be properly investigated and can be reasonably 
certain that the support will not be used to violate LOAC in the future. Though 
there was broad agreement between the claimants and the Government on the 
relevant law, the case hinged on whether the Secretary of State rationally 
believed that there would be a ‘clear risk’ that the exported equipment and 
assistance would be used in the commission of LOAC violations. He claimed 
that he did not believe there was such a risk, in spite of significant evidence to 
the contrary.289 The Government responded that it possesses a superior ability 
to assess the facts on the ground in Yemen than were the claimants,290 that it 
was in a better position to assess Saudi Arabia’s good-faith compliance with the 
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law than were the claimants,291 and that its current procedures were suitable for 
making a rational determination of whether it needed to suspend arms transfers 
to Saudi Arabia.292 After considering both the open-source information provided 
by the HRO claimants and the Government’s own open-source and classified 
material, the justices concluded that the decision to continue support to Saudi 
Arabia was rational and therefore the arms transfers could continue:  
In our judgment, however, the Secretary of State was reasonably able (i) to assess the 
gaps in his knowledge and ‘known-unknowns’ against what information and materials 
he did have and how critical or not the gaps were, (ii) to test and assess the reliability of 
the United Nations’ and NGO’s findings against the other sources of information at his 
disposal and (iii) to assess the significance of his knowledge (or lack of it) as to Saudi 
Arabian investigations into individual incidents. Moreover, these matters were factors in 
an overall assessment to be made by the Secretary of State in relation to Criterion 2c
293
 
in the light of the wide range of sophisticated first-hand and other evidence available to 
him. In these circumstances the Secretary of State’s decision not to suspend at any 
stage cannot be said to have been irrational or unlawful.
294
 
The decision did not sit well with the UK director of Human Rights Watch, David 
Mepham, who criticised the judgement for inaccurately describing the 
investigatory practices of the various human rights organisations which have 
been conducting operations in Yemen.295 Moreover, he believed that the Court 
was overly deferential towards the Government’s own assessment procedures 
and overly reliant upon classified information which the Government had 
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declined to make public.296 At the time of writing, the situation in Yemen has not 
improved and reports of new airstrikes against civilians prompted the Office of 
the Humanitarian Coordinator in Yemen to issue another statement urging the 
combatants to adhere to LOAC.297 
 The domestic case law which invokes the use of the jus in bello rules on 
proportionality and precautions in attack shows that even otherwise 
independent judiciaries will often defer to military and executive decision-
making processes when reviewing the legality of their actions. There have been 
no domestic criminal cases involving the legality of a commander’s decision to 
launch a disproportionate or sloppy attack (with Georg Klein’s case being 
thrown out before it reached the trial stage). Even when the suspect official is a 
foreign national rather than a citizen of the same state, the decision to press 
forward with a case has proven to be difficult because the proceedings can be 
influenced by extra-legal factors, such as when the US applied diplomatic 
pressure against Belgium for its universal jurisdiction cases against US officials. 
Furthermore, even in civil actions taken against the state, judges assume a 
wide margin of appreciation for the conduct of state officials, making it difficult 
for them to review the legality of either single strikes or policies which contribute 
to significant collateral damage. There is also an unwillingness on the part of 
judges to acknowledge that patterns of prima facie disproportionate strikes 
amount to LOAC violations, at least when it comes to reviewing state officials’ 
duty to comply with the law on arms trade.  
Non-Judicial Responses to Credible Allegations of Proportionality or 
Precautions Violations 
Just because the case law involving allegations of violations of proportionality or 
precautions in attack is sparse does not mean that few attacks warrant scrutiny. 
The number of reasonably credible violations far exceeds what can be covered 
in just a few paragraphs. Therefore, I will mention a few notable examples 
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which have come to light to show how non-judicial groups investigate these 
incidents and apply the law to the facts of each case.  
As Huffman noted above,298 one cannot infer that any particular attack is 
unlawful simply by looking at its effects, but when even the factual 
circumstances regarding a case are uncertain, it becomes nearly impossible to 
hold state actors accountable for disproportionate or reckless attacks. Just as 
battle damage assessments inform military leaders about what effect their 
attacks have had on the enemy, ex post civilian casualty reporting mechanisms 
are likewise indispensable for figuring out what effect their attacks have had on 
the civilian population — and if a LOAC violation had taken place.299 However, 
the issue of civilian casualty reporting vexed the British Government during its 
involvement in the Iraq War. The Ministry of Defence was apprehensive about 
giving the impression that the number of civilian casualties in such a campaign 
could ever be known, since that might invite more trouble for the UK down the 
road:  
The MOD’s position remained that it did not believe it was possible to establish an 
accurate methodology for estimating the total number of civilian casualties. Although 
incident reports could be analysed, there was a danger that: “… once we have adopted 
a methodology, Parliament and the public would in future expect us to apply this no 
matter what the intensity of the operation.”
300
  
Although under API (and customary LOAC), states have a legal duty to take all 
feasible precautions to spare the civilian population the probable effects of their 
attacks ex ante, there is no similar legal requirement for them to take feasible 
measures to record the effects of their attacks ex post.301 Without a robust 
methodology for collecting this information, how are investigators to know if an 
attack warrants further scrutiny? This lacuna has been noticed by HROs, such 
as the Oxford Research Group: 
The primary omission in international law is that no actual legal obligation exists in 
either framework [LOAC or HRL] for parties to a conflict to record the identity of dead or 
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missing civilians, as opposed to the rigorous process by which the details of combatants 
are recorded. This is surprising in that one of the primary obligations within international 
humanitarian law is to distinguish between civilian and combatant and to assess 
proportionality when civilian life is at risk. The loss of life of the civilian population must 
be in direct proportion to the military advantage expected. This balancing exercise can 
obviously have no credible function without any accurate recording of civilian 
casualties.
302
 
Indeed, during the Iraq War, human rights organisations, such as the Iraq Body 
Count303 and academic outfits, such as the Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of 
Public Health,304 took the lead on documenting both incident-level and theatre-
wide civilian casualty totals. Under General David Patraeus, US forces began 
collecting statistics on civilian casualties in 2006, although the motivation behind 
this effort was to enhance the US’s counterinsurgency operations, rather than to 
provide fodder for war crimes investigators.305 Even so, the UK never developed 
its own casualty reporting method, instead relying on figures provided to them 
by Iraqi Ministry of Health, which could be dismissed more easily than if the UK 
Government had taken ownership of the statistics itself. The failure of the UK 
Government to come up with its own civilian casualty figures formed one of the 
chief findings of the Chilcot Report:  
The Inquiry has considered the question of whether a Government should, in the future, 
do more to maintain a fuller understanding of the human cost of any conflict in which it 
is engaged. All military operations carry a risk of civilian casualties. The parties to a 
conflict have an obligation under International Humanitarian Law to limit its effects on 
civilians. In Iraq, the UK Government recognised that obligation in its Rules of 
Engagement, Targeting Directive and guidance on Battle Damage Assessment. The 
Government did not consider that it had a legal obligation to count civilian casualties. 
The Inquiry considers that a Government has a responsibility to make every reasonable 
effort to identify and understand the likely and actual effects of its military actions on 
civilians.
306
 [emphasis added] 
Therefore, one reason for the lack of case law involving violations of the rules 
on proportionality or precautions in attack is that, without a concurrent 
responsibility for states to assess the outcomes of their attacks, it is difficult to 
know which attacks warrant judicial scrutiny in the first place. In the absence of 
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effective state mechanisms to perform reliable collateral damage assessments, 
this investigatory burden often falls on the press and interested 
nongovernmental or intergovernmental organisations, leaving states to assume 
that their attacks are legal until they have been challenged by third parties.    
 As with allegations of disproportionate or reckless attacks that have been 
examined by prosecutors in an official capacity, events which are tried in the 
‘court of public opinion’ can also yield some insight into how the law ought to be 
applied to particular cases. For instance, after the 2008 Israeli incursion into 
Gaza as part of Operation Cast Lead, both the official report by the Israeli 
Government on the campaign and the Goldstone Report, which detailed the 
results of a UNHRC (UN Human Rights Council) fact-finding mission, reveal a 
similar understanding of which rules should have applied to the conflict. Both 
reports use the understanding of proportionality codified in API as the 
touchstone to begin their analyses307 and both cite liberally from the ICTY 
NATO Bombing Report, with each acknowledging that the standard against 
which a commander ought to be judged is that of a ‘reasonable military 
commander’ in the position of the accused.308 However, the authors of each of 
the two reports come to different conclusions about what that phrase means. 
The Israeli Government invokes the idea of a ‘reasonable military commander’ 
to pre-emptively justify conduct which may, prima facie, seem disproportionate: 
It is precisely because this balancing is difficult that international law confirms the need 
to assess proportionality from the standpoint of a ‘reasonable military commander,’ 
possessed of such information as was available at the time of the targeting decision and 
considering the military advantage of the attack as a whole… Thus, the core question, 
in assessing a commander’s decision to attack, will be (a) whether he or she made the 
determination on the basis of the best information available, given the circumstances, 
and (b) whether a reasonable commander could have reached a similar conclusion. As 
W. Hays Park has explained, ‘[u]nintentional injury is not a violation of the principle of 
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non-combatant immunity unless, through wilful and wanton neglect, a commander’s 
actions result in excessive civilian casualties that are tantamount to an intentional 
attack.’… The standard does not penalise commanders for making close calls. Rather, 
it is intended to prohibit ‘[m]anifestly disproportionate collateral damage inflicted in order 
to achieve operational objectives,’ because this results in the action essentially being a 
‘form of indiscriminate warfare.’
309
 
In contrast, the Goldstone Report describes a particular incident, the shelling in 
al-Fakhura Street, and uses the idea of a ‘reasonable military commander’ to 
assess whether the commander in charge of the forces involved in that incident 
behaved reasonably. In the Israeli Government’s account of the incident, an IDF 
(Israeli Defence Force) unit came under 120mm mortar fire and after 50 
minutes, the source of the mortar fire had been detected. The unit returned fire 
with 120mm mortars, which the IDF claims was the most precise weapon 
available at the time, and in doing so, killed the five Hamas mortarmen who had 
been firing at them.310 However, some of the mortars landed into a civilian 
neighbourhood, killing 33 people according to the Goldstone Report.311 In the 
opinion of the report’s authors, a reasonable commander would not have 
accepted the risk that the mortars posed to the civilian population in such a 
built-up area:  
The Mission does not say that the Israeli armed forces had to accept the risk to 
themselves at all cost, but in addressing that risk it appears to the Mission that they had 
ample opportunity to make a choice of weapons that would have significantly limited the 
risk to civilians in the area. According to the position the Government has itself taken, 
Israeli forces had a full 50 minutes to respond to this threat — or at least they took a full 
50 minutes to respond to it. Given the mobilization speeds of helicopters and fighter jets 
in the context of the military operations in Gaza, the Mission finds it difficult to believe 
that mortars were the most accurate weapons available at the time. The time in 
question is almost 1 hour. The decision is difficult to justify. The choice of weapon — 
mortars — appears to have been a reckless one. Mortars are area weapons. They kill 
or maim whoever is within the impact zone after detonation and they are incapable of 
distinguishing between combatants and civilians. A decision to deploy them in a location 
filled with civilians is a decision that a commander knows will result in the death and 
injuries of some of those civilians. Even if the version of events presented now by Israel 
is to be believed, the Mission does not consider that the choice of deploying mortar 
weapons in a busy street with around 150 civilians in it (not to mention those within the 
school) can be justified. The Mission does not consider that in these circumstances it 
was a choice that any reasonable commander would have made.
312
 
Even with a common understanding of the applicable law, by invoking the 
hypothetical decision-making process of a reasonable military commander, the 
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Israeli Government was able to come up with a ready-made excuse for the 
actions of its forces, while the authors of the Goldstone Report were able to 
condemn those same actions. What differed between the two accounts of the 
Gaza campaign was how the different sides determined what ought to been the 
acceptable buffer between the decisions of a reasonable commander and the 
commander involved in the incident. An investigator from Amnesty International 
described to me how the parties to a conflict tend to exploit these differences in 
interpretation to advance their respective political objectives:  
I have worked on many different conflicts over the past 25 years and so I’m in the 
perhaps ‘privileged’ position where I’m confronted with this daily. I can only apply the 
same principle whether I’m working on an investigation in a massacre of civilians in 
Nigeria, or in Gaza, or in Iraq, or in Iran, or in Yemen; whether it’s done by Shias, or 
Sunnis, or Christians, by minorities, by allies of this or that other superpower. I don’t 
really have any great difficulty doing that. You just apply the same standard, so the 
problem isn’t there. The problem is much more at the political level, where there is a 
deliberate willingness to be creative and over-flexible with the interpretation. I mean, if 
we know that a mortar is not an accurate weapon, then firing a mortar over a densely 
populated residential neighbourhood is not a good idea. It doesn’t make a lot of sense 
militarily, because your chances of hitting your target are pretty small (that’s an area 
weapon) and your chances of hitting something else (for example, a civilian or a civilian 
object) is much greater, so the moment you employ that tactic, you know what you’re 
doing (if you’re a military person), particularly when you do that and you have other kit 
at your disposal. Now, these are clear facts, but what you then see are politicians who 
are willing to apply that in a different way, depending on who fired the mortar into the 
neighbourhood — whether it was a US soldier in Baghdad or it was some rag-tag rebel 
group in Fallujah — and you can’t do that.
313
 
Particularly when making a legal argument for public consumption rather than 
for a court, the acceptable buffer or margin of appreciation for the commander’s 
decision has a great degree of elasticity. This elasticity can allow governments 
to easily justify actions that at face value seem excessive whilst also giving 
human rights organisations a vocabulary with which to condemn those same 
actions.   
 Although the Israeli Government did not cooperate with the Goldstone 
Inquiry whilst it was conducting its investigation, after Goldstone’s team issued 
its report, the Israeli Government released an update describing how it 
investigated allegations of LOAC violations.314 This report and other open-
source materials were included in the McGowan Davis Report, which was 
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written as a follow-up to Goldstone’s original fact-finding mission.315 Based on 
the information that had come to light as a result of Israel’s investigations, 
Goldstone later claimed that he did not believe that Israeli forces targeted 
civilians as a matter of policy and that if he had the new information at the time 
his team’s report was written, they would have reached a different 
conclusion.316 Nevertheless, both he and the authors of the McGowan Davis 
Report were frustrated with Israel’s unwillingness to work with the UNHRC and 
with the slow pace of their domestic investigations.317 Among the HRO 
community, there was a similar frustration with the fact that of the 150 incidents 
investigated by the Israeli Government, only 36 rose to the level of warranting 
criminal investigations318 and even fewer resulted in any sanctions. For 
example, B’Tselem remarked that: 
According to the information provided by the MAG Corps, only three investigations 
ended with indictments: 
 One indictment was served against a soldier for theft of a Palestinian’s credit 
card. He was sentenced to 15 months in prison, half of the term as a 
suspended sentence, and demotion. 
 A second indictment was served against two soldiers accused of using a nine-
year-old Palestinian boy as a human shield and ordering him to open suspected 
booby-trapped bags. The two were tried and given a suspended three-month 
sentence and demoted from staff sergeant to sergeant. 
 A third indictment was served against a soldier for “killing an unidentified 
individual” and for misconduct. The soldier was convicted of unlawful use of 
firearms and misconduct in a plea bargain. He was given a 45-day prison 
sentence, a six month suspended prison sentence and demotion.  
In three other cases, disciplinary action was taken against six officers… In conclusion: 
after massive harm to the civilian population, more than 300 minors killed, tens of 
thousands of people left homeless — and grave suspicions that these actions were the 
result of unlawful orders approved by the MAG Corps and the attorney general — the 
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military conducted hundreds of operational inquiries and launched dozens of MPIU 
investigations, but the harshest sentence given was for credit card theft.
319
 
This followed a similar pattern to the way that US forces in Iraq tended to have 
little problem prosecuting troops for deliberate attacks against civilians and 
crimes involving civilian property, but have had a far more difficult time dealing 
with crimes based on recklessness.320 Furthermore, given that Hamas had 
taken no actions to hold its operatives responsible for the indiscriminate rocket 
attacks against Israel,321 achieving accountability for unlawful attacks in this 
conflict has certainly been a challenge. 
 The shortcomings of Israeli investigatory procedures were discussed at 
length during the Turkel Commission, which examined an Israeli maritime attack 
against civilian vessels in 2010. The commission also considered international 
best practice for reporting and investigating LOAC violations and how the Israeli 
approach could be improved.322 From their findings, the commission made 18 
recommendations, one of which was to create a fact-finding assessment (FFA) 
mechanism within the IDF to perform the initial investigation of a complaint. 
Then, the MAG would forward the complaint on to the military police if there 
were reasonable suspicion that a crime had been committed.323 This FFA 
mechanism would later be used extensively to document the events 
surrounding allegations of unlawful behaviour by Israeli troops during Israel’s 
2014 incursion into Gaza.  
 The Israeli Government was prepared to receive new claims of excessive 
collateral damage and in its report on Operation Protective Edge, the 
Government thoroughly described the steps the IDF had taken to comply with 
LOAC ex ante:  
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During the 2014 Gaza Conflict, the IDF took steps to ensure the collection of all 
reasonably available, timely information regarding a target’s surroundings, focusing in 
particular on civilians and civilian objects that may be in its vicinity at the time of the 
attack, regardless of whether an advance warning has been given. For example, 
remotely piloted aircraft flew over countless targets to monitor the presence of civilians 
in real time. In addition, the IDF routinely used engineers and damage-assessment 
specialists to assist with the assessment of expected collateral damage by considering 
the specific circumstances of each case… Moreover, there are often situations where it 
is necessary to launch an attack without being able to acquire or receive all information 
regarding the likely collateral damage. For example, during ground operations, fire from 
a building near an infantry platoon may demand an immediate response, and the 
platoon may not have access to real-time data regarding the presence of civilians or the 
nature of surrounding structures. In such exigent circumstances, the platoon will have to 
rely on whatever partial information it does have, in addition to its prior training on the 
Law of Armed Conflict. The legality of the platoon’s conduct must be assessed in light of 
what a reasonable commander would or would not have done under the same or similar 
circumstances.
324
 
The Government’s assessment of the 2014 Gaza campaign covered much of 
the same legal ground as was included in their report on the 2008 conflict. 
However, it provided a clearer picture of why it was important to consider the 
perspective of a reasonable military commander, giving practical examples of 
the tough decisions that are needed to be made in combat. However, there has 
not been as much transparency with the investigation of alleged violations as 
there had been with the description of Israeli standard operating procedures. 
The new FFA mechanism investigated 360 incidents, but the MAG has not yet 
provided a complete breakdown of what these incidents entailed. He has 
provided some detail about 26 cases that were closed without referral to the 
military police, and of those, 17 of which were relating to strikes against 
residential buildings. 325  
B’Tsalem criticised the investigatory process that the Israeli government 
has adopted since the Turkel Commission, claiming that not all of the 
recommendations were followed326 and that there is little transparency 
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regarding why some cases are referred to the military police while others are 
not.327  However, from B’Tsalem’s perspective, the biggest obstacle for 
assessing Israel’s claim that it strictly adhered to the LOAC rules on precautions 
and proportionality was that the MAG treated each accusation of excessive 
civilian casualties as an ‘exceptional incident’, rather than considering how 
higher-level policy issued by the MAG himself might have contributed to the 
high number of causalities from attacks:     
[T]he MAG’s determination that the attacks he examined did, in fact, meet the 
proportionality requirement is also cast into doubt. This principle is based on balancing 
the assessment by those responsible as to the anticipated military advantage against 
their assessment as to the anticipated harm to civilians. Yet when the projection as to 
harm is made while knowingly disregarding the result of nearly identical strikes carried 
out in the days prior to the making of the assessment, namely that dropping a bomb in 
the middle of a residential neighborhood could result in many more civilian deaths than 
anticipated; that the warnings the military gives are not always efficient and that the 
intelligence information is sometimes incomplete or inaccurate — then their 
assessments of anticipated harm to civilians become hollow and worthless.
328
 
By treating each case as an ‘exceptional incident’, the MAG was able to de-
contextualise any individual strike, making it more difficult to establish if a 
pattern of high-casualty strikes resulted from a systematic failure of precautions, 
rather than a one-off mistake of fact.329 For example, if a commander knew that 
their intelligence picture was consistently wrong, should investigators merely 
accept the commander’s subjective assessment of the situation, or are there 
objective measures that a reasonable commander would take to mitigate civilian 
casualties after learning that their intelligence has been consistently faulty? To 
be sure, customary LOAC and the case law of the ICTY have shown that one 
should not assess the proportionality of a campaign as a whole.330 However, if 
investigators discover a pattern of strikes that are prima facie excessive, it could 
point to a violation of a commander’s duty to take all feasible precautions in 
setting up and launching their attacks and ought to warrant further scrutiny, if 
the law is to have any teeth.  
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It is important to recognise that that Israeli officials do not appear to have 
wanted to cause civilian causalities (unlike Hamas, who pursue it as a matter of 
stated policy331). Rather, the problem in this case is that without an effective 
accountability mechanism for dealing with excessive casualties, particularly 
when they arise from systemic issues, there is a worry that commanders will 
tend to err on the side of military advantage, rather than civilian harm when 
setting up their attacks: 
The MAG’s conclusion that all the attacks he examined were lawful in that those 
responsible for them could disregard the harsh outcomes of dozens of other attacks that 
took place during the fighting has a far-reaching implication that applies to all strikes 
carried out during the operation: It absolves every level of officials involved in the 
attacks — from the prime minister, through the MAG himself through to the soldiers who 
ultimately fired — of the duty to do everything in their power to minimize harm to 
civilians. In fact, the MAG sets the bar very low in terms of what is required of those 
responsible for the attacks — including senior military officers and the MAG (who are 
not under investigation in any case) — by doing no more than examining what they 
knew in practice, while entirely disregarding the question of what they should have 
known, including the obligation to learn from their own experience.
 332
  
Whilst B’Tsalem had worked with the IDF in previous conflicts to assess the 
effects of the IDF’s operations, it ceased cooperation with the Israeli 
Government in 2014 in protest of what it and Yesh Din believed were 
insufficiently robust domestic investigations of LOAC violations.333  
Some of the same problems with achieving accountability for violations of 
proportionality and attack precautions that have been discussed in previous 
conflicts were also present towards the end of the Sri Lankan Civil War in 2009. 
In this conflict, the Sri Lankan Government was accused, inter alia, of firing 
indiscriminately at civilians, while the rebel Tamil Tigers group (LTTE) was 
accused of using civilians as human shields. At the time, Human Rights Watch 
reported: 
Under international humanitarian law applicable to the armed conflict in Sri Lanka, both 
the Sri Lankan armed forces and the LTTE are obligated to take all feasible precautions 
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to minimize harm to civilian life and property. But since January [2009], both sides have 
shown little regard for the safety of civilians in the embattled Vanni region in 
northeastern Sri Lanka, and more than 4,500 civilians are believed to have died in the 
fighting, according to UN estimates. The LTTE has violated the laws of war by using 
civilians as "human shields," by preventing civilians from fleeing the combat zone, and 
by deliberately deploying their forces close to densely populated civilian areas. The Sri 
Lankan armed forces have indiscriminately shelled densely populated areas, including 
hospitals, in violation of the laws of war.
334
 
Unlike the Iraq war, in the Sri Lankan Civil War, even non-governmental 
organisations (NGOs) and IGOs had a difficult time assessing the number of 
civilian dead during this conflict, in part because staff could not move around 
the battlespace, but also because many civilians were buried before their 
deaths could be recorded by officials or hospital staff. Moreover, each side in 
the conflict had reason to manipulate reports regarding civilians casualties to 
suit their own information operations campaigns.335  Even when the United 
Nations tried to provide civilian casualty estimates to the Sri Lankan 
Government confidentially to help them reconsider their methods of attacks, the 
Government balked at the suggestion that was implied by the statistics.336 
Nevertheless, because of the widespread nature of the violations, in 2011, a UN 
Panel of Experts was able to state with confidence that if the Sri Lankan 
Government forces were not targeting civilians directly, their actions were, at 
the very least, disproportionate: 
While the Panel does not have information on all incidents, credible allegations suggest 
numerous violations of this provision [the CIHL rule of proportionality] insofar as the 
attacks on the NFZs [No Fire Zones] were broadly disproportionate to the military 
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advantage anticipated from such attacks. The Government’s repeated declaration that it 
had ceased using heavy weapons in these NFZs points to awareness that such usage 
could be considered disproportionate. Broadly speaking, once both the civilian 
population and the LTTE were confined to the very limited spaces of the second and 
third NFZs, the LTTE was no longer mobile as an armed force, and more precise 
means to defeat the LTTE than barrages of widely-spread artillery and mortar attacks 
could and should have been employed in order to ensure respect for international 
humanitarian law.
337
  
Since Sri Lanka is not a signatory to the Rome Statue, nor is it likely that the UN 
Security Council will forward the situation to the International Criminal Court, 
accountability for crimes committed during the war must come from an ad hoc 
international tribunal, a domestic court or hybrid mechanism. Considering the 
evidence of clear LOAC violations committed by both sides in the conflict, the 
UNHRC issued a resolution in 2015 which enjoined the Sri Lankan Government 
to seek accountability for those violations.338 As a result, the Sri Lankan 
Government agreed to establish a judicial mechanism to examine allegations of 
crimes committed during the final stages of the Civil War, but to date, there has 
been no progress towards setting up courts capable of trying individuals for their 
involvement in committing international crimes. In particular, the Sri Lankan 
Government opposes the notion that such courts ought to include international 
judges or prosecutors, even though their own Consultation Task Force has 
concluded that both the Tamil and Sinhalese communities support international 
participation in such an endeavour.339 As with the earlier examples, the state 
that is accused of being responsible for excessive attacks seems to be 
simultaneously claiming to support transparent and independent investigations 
of unlawful attacks, whilst also doing little to actually achieve that goal. 
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Some states go to great lengths to investigate suspected unlawful 
attacks, even if those involved never face criminal sanctions. In 2015, US forces 
fired upon a trauma centre operated by Medecins sans Frontièrs (MSF) in 
Kunduz, Afghanistan, killing 30 non-combatants.340 The aircrew did not have the 
right briefing material for their mission because they were ordered to launch 
early. Moreover, some of their targeting equipment malfunctioned in flight and 
the crew had to take evasive actions to avoid ground-to-air threats, so when the 
ground forces commander (GFC) provided coordinates of a prison building that 
Afghan forces said had been overrun by the Taliban, the aircrew were not able 
to find it and could only see an open field. The closest large building to the open 
field was the trauma centre, so the aircrew assumed that was the target. The 
aircrew did not check the coordinates of the trauma centre against the ‘no-
strike’ list, nor did they pass the coordinates of the building on to anybody else, 
but instead identified the building based on vague descriptions of the target 
provided to them by US troops on the ground, who could not themselves see 
the prison or the trauma centre.341 Internal recordings of conversations between 
aircrew members and external recordings between members of the aircrew and 
the ground team reveal that the aircrew had a great deal of uncertainty about 
what the target actually was.342  
 In the subsequent US Central Command (CENTCOM) investigation of 
the incident, Major General William Hickman and his team were scathing in their 
assessment of the attack: 
Neither the GFC nor the Aircraft Commander exercised the principle of distinction. 
Neither commander distinguished between combatants and civilians nor a military 
objective and protected property. Each commander had a duty to know, and available 
resources to know that the targeted compound was protected property.
343
 
The investigators also weighed in on whether the strike was proportionate, 
correctly noting that: ‘The critical issue with this strike is distinction and not 
proportionality, which relates the measured use of force against legitimate 
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military targets.’ However, they then conflated a failure to take precautions with 
the crime of launching a disproportionate attack: 
Proportionality assumes that the target to be engaged is a lawful military objective. 
Therefore, any engagement of a target that is not a lawful military objective is prima 
facie disproportional. The MSF Trauma Center was not a lawful military objective. At the 
point of engagement, any use of force against it was disproportional. 
344
 
There is a logic behind this claim — that by failing to take proper precautions to 
identify a target, the commanders have forfeited any claim to the proportionality 
of their actions. However, since the proportionality and precautions rules are 
listed separately in the law345 and since the crime of disproportionate attack 
requires one to actually ‘make the value judgement as described therein’,346 it is 
not appropriate to confuse the two legal concepts. Therefore, like the Fuel 
Tankers case and many of the Gaza allegations, the crux of the MSF Hospital 
Bombing case was that the commanders failed to take sufficient precautions to 
ensure that their target was lawful, rather than whether their actions were 
proportionate. The investigators’ claim that the aircrew failed in their duty to: 
‘take feasible precautions to reduce the risk of harm to individuals they could 
not positively identify as combatants’347 was well supported, invoking the 
language of reasonableness to decide if the aircrew’s actions were appropriate, 
given the conditions prevailing at the time: 
(d.) The crew members… could not confirm the target. They arbitrarily chose the 
building they engaged. There were several other buildings in the compound besides the 
main Trauma Center building. The aircrew assumed the T-shaped building was the 
prison based on the description by the JTAC [the controller on the ground]. The prison, 
later referred to as a C2 node by the aircrew, could have been any of the buildings in 
the compound. However, the aircrew chose the largest building, after observing nine 
individuals, and making an assumption about the status of the MSF Trauma center as a 
lawful target with no further confirmation… (e.) The GFC and Aircraft Commander 
actions were not reasonable under the circumstances.
348
 [emphasis added.] 
Despite the clear evidence of a precautions violation, the US Government 
claimed that the attack was not a war crime because those involved did not 
commit the violation intentionally. Therefore, they opted not to refer the case to 
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courts-martial on those grounds, instead issuing administrative punishments to 
those involved.349 Recklessness may have been deemed an appropriate mens 
rea for pursuing unlawful attack prosecutions at the ICTY350 and some have 
claimed that there is room for manoeuvre in prosecuting reckless attacks in the 
ICL regime generally,351 but like the other states mentioned above, the US does 
not seem prepared to try such cases in its domestic jurisdiction.352 
Even more recently, the intensity of the operations in the Syrian Civil War 
has sparked accusations that if the belligerents were not deliberately targeting 
civilians as a matter of policy, then at the very least, they are not adhering to the 
rules on proportionality or precautions in attack. In 2016, the HRO Airwars 
reported that within the first three months of Russia’s entry into the conflict, 
there was credible evidence to suggest that over 1000 civilians were killed in 
operations carried out either by Russian or pro-Government forces — six times 
higher than those caused by the US-backed Coalition forces over the same 
period.353 However, the Russian Government has denied being responsible for 
any civilian deaths during its air campaign. Despite vocal opposition to alleged 
Russian violations, the Coalition has itself been reticent to discuss civilian 
casualties purportedly caused by its own operations, claiming responsibility for 
damage in only a handful of the total alleged incidents involving its forces.354 
This raises another difficulty with achieving accountability for prima facie 
disproportionate attacks: when two opposing air forces are operating near each 
other, one cannot easily tell which side was responsible for any particular mass 
casualty strike.355 Without impartial investigators on the ground to assess the 
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scene of a strike, the belligerents are able to accuse each other of causing the 
damage. Furthermore, with each side eager to blame the other for casualties, 
there is less incentive for one side to unilaterally accept responsibility for 
collateral damage, even when that damage can credibly be ascribed to the 
actions of its own forces. This is not to say that there is a moral or legal 
equivalence between the different actors in the Syrian War, but that the lack of 
transparency from one side of the conflict tends to encourage less transparency 
from the other side. Furthermore, having multiple actors operating in the same 
battlespace can make it difficult to develop cases to the standard required by 
international justice against commanders for indiscriminate or disproportionate 
attacks. 
The crescendo of the conflict so far has been the Battle of Aleppo, where 
the Syrian Government and their Russian allies were accused of launching 
indiscriminate aerial attacks on both the civilian population and on healthcare 
facilities.356 The Atlantic Council’s report on the offensive highlighted the fact 
that it would not be possible to report every strike that was prima facie 
indiscriminate because of the sheer number of alleged violations that were 
brought to the Council’s attention:   
The scale of attacks on Aleppo makes it almost impossible to compile a robust and 
verified record of every attack on the city. But drawing on a broad range of information, 
it is possible to see that an extensive aerial campaign was waged in Aleppo, and that a 
high proportion of the munitions deployed against the city and its population were 
indiscriminate… Every indiscriminate attack is worthy of investigation. However, for the 
sake of brevity and specificity, the following Chapters will focus in detail on particularly 
pernicious sub-categories of the attacks on east Aleppo: strikes on hospitals and 
medical facilities; incendiary weapons; cluster munitions and other explosive munitions; 
and chemical weapons.
357
 
                                                                                                                                
 
western Syria leading to significant claims of civilian fatalities. Among the locations reportedly bombed was 
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The Atlantic Council’s report infers the Russo-Syrian commanders’ intent by 
looking at the strikes as a pattern, rather than as individual isolated incidents.358 
Furthermore, it examines how particular weapons, which are not illegal, per se 
(such as cluster munitions and air-launched incendiary munitions), can 
nevertheless be used illegally in urban warfare.359 The attacks drew 
international condemnation,360 yet there was little chance that any individual 
would be held accountable for the them at the ICC, either for individual attacks 
or for a systemic pattern of violations, because Syria is not a party to the Rome 
Statute and Russia could shield their ally from a security council referral.361 
Even so, in early 2017, the UN General Assembly created the International, 
Impartial and Independent Mechanism (IIIM) to collect and organise evidence of 
international crimes in Syria so it will be available, should a court ever have 
jurisdiction over the Syrian War in the future.362 The lack of a venue to pursue 
the grossest violations of ICL for this conflict suggests that it is even more 
unlikely that there will be accountability in the near term for violations of the 
rules on proportionality or precautions in attack, in particular. If anything, the 
fact that those who conducted the air war over Aleppo managed to run their 
campaign with little oversight and a high degree of impunity portends a worrying 
trend for the development of a permissive state practice when it comes to the 
care with which a state should be expected to carry out its air operations. Given 
the magnitude of the offenses carried out in the Syrian War and the lack of any 
robust response from the UN Security Council, one of the members of the UN 
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Commission of Inquiry into Syria, Carla del Ponte, resigned in protest, stating 
that her role had become nothing more than an alibi for more concrete action.363
  
Conclusions 
From this survey of the proportionality and precautions rules in the legal 
literature, one can see that there is broad agreement that any ex post 
evaluation of the criminality of an attack must acknowledge the intent of the 
commander and cannot be based solely on the effects of the attack. 
Furthermore, there is general agreement that one should look at the military 
advantage of a strike from the perspective of the attack as a whole, rather than 
from a bullet-by-bullet analysis or from the point of view of the entire conflict. 
Nevertheless, there is not a consensus about how to deal with patterns of 
marginally disproportionate attacks, which might suggest unlawful conduct 
when viewed in total, but appear lawful when each event is viewed in isolation.  
Moreover, some other unresolved debates have made the law difficult to 
apply in the courtroom. Depending on the jurisdiction, there is some confusion 
about how to translate what are essentially regulatory norms for the conduct of 
hostilities into robust criminal law — hence the disagreements over whether to 
consider the failure to take certain precautions in attack as a non-criminal LOAC 
violation, as evidence of a commander’s intent to violate the proportionality rule, 
or as a reckless direct attack against the civilian population. Also, despite the 
near universal acceptance of the ‘reasonable military commander’ standard as 
the most appropriate way to examine a commander’s decision-making process 
as it applies to proportionality and precautions, the vagueness of the standard 
allows prosecutors and other legal experts to excuse a great deal of behaviour 
which, prima facie, ought to be subjected to judicial action of some sort.  
Of the few cases that have even mentioned the rules on proportionality 
and precautions in attack, there is a worrying tendency for courts to defer to the 
military commander’s assessment of a particular situation or for extra-legal 
                                            
 
363
 Tom Miles, ‘Syria Investigator Del Ponte Quits, Blaming U.N. Security Council’ Reuters (6 August 2017) 
<https://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-syria-investigator-idUSKBN1AM0P4> . 
   
 
 
110 
 
 
factors (such as diplomatic pressure) to influence the outcome of judicial 
proceedings. The interpretation of these rules in international and domestic 
courts matters, not just for the sake of common law precedent, but also 
because judicial decisions influence the normative force of the law when human 
rights organisations try to use it to criticise state actions (e.g. the state’s conduct 
of a military campaign or the state’s arms trade policies). Therefore, if they are 
applied in a universally permissive manner by the courts, then HROs will find it 
more difficult to convince sceptical audiences that the state’s conduct has ever 
crossed the line into illegality.  
In effect, no case — neither criminal nor civil — has been resolved in a 
way that has found a state or its agents legally responsible for violating the rules 
on proportionality or precautions in attack. Nevertheless, there is no shortage of 
incidents where it could be reasonably argued that violations of these rules had 
occurred. For the moment, it seems that the law in this area has little force 
beyond an ex ante moral appeal. In Chapter 3, I shall explore how some of the 
unresolved issues surrounding the rules on proportionality and precautions in 
attack along with structural elements of the legal system that make it nearly 
impossible to try violations of these rules, particularly in international courts.  
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Chapter 3 
The Difficulty of Achieving Accountability for the Jus in Bello Rules 
on Proportionality and Precautions in Attack 
In Chapter 2, I presented the rules on proportionality and its associated attack 
precautions as they are codified into treaty law and as they are currently 
understood as customary international law. Though some of the logic behind 
these rules has been clarified by experts and through various court cases, the 
rules still evade robust adjudication. Without an effective accountability 
mechanism to put pressure on either the state or its agents, states might not be 
compelled to respect the regulatory function of the proportionality rule.  
However, a number of barriers stand in the way of effectively prosecuting 
a case of disproportionate attack, particularly if the attack was caused by a 
reckless or negligent attitude on the part of the commander towards their 
required duty to take all feasible precautions in setting up or executing an 
attack. The following discussion in this Chapter will explore some of these legal 
and practical problems and will examine the degree to which each issue could 
theoretically be resolved, were there the political will to do so. 
Weighing Incommensurables 
Some of the debate regarding the application of the proportionality principle 
concerns the particulars left unaddressed by the state representatives at the 
CDDH. In the ICRC commentary on the Additional Protocols, Michael Bothe 
and his colleagues were sanguine about the ability for the law to effectively 
deter disproportionate attacks, despite the fact that it required commanders to 
compare values for which there was no common denominator: 
As both sides of the equation are variables, and as they involve a balancing of different 
values which are difficult to compare, the judgement must be subjective. In the final 
analysis, however, most decisions on the major political, economic, and social affairs of 
societies as well as major military decisions rest on the subjective judgement of 
decision makers based on the weighing of factors which cannot be quantified. The best 
that can be expected of the decision maker is that he act honesty and competently… 
Despite the impossibility of quantifying the factors of the equation, a plain and manifest 
breach of the rule will be recognizable. The parties to the conflict, moreover, should 
curtail the limits within which commanders of operating units exercise their discretion by 
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issuing rules of engagement tailored to the situation prevailing in the area of conflict 
involved.
364
 
Even so, when trying to apply the proportionality principle to NATO’s conduct 
during the air war over Yugoslavia, the ICTY was unable to clarify this 
vagueness in a way that would allow court officials to identify what qualifies as a 
‘plain and manifest breach’ of the rule. Quoting from the final report of a 
committee set up by the tribunal to assess the legality of NATO’s bombing 
campaign, a member of that committee, William Fenrick, recounted four 
elements of the proportionality calculation that had yet to be adequately fleshed 
out: 
The questions which remain unresolved, once one decides to apply the principle of 
proportionality, include the following: 1.) What are the relative values to be assigned to 
the military advantage gained and the injury to non-combatants and/or the damage to 
civilian objects? 2.) What do you include or exclude in totalling your sums? 3.) What is 
the standard of measurement in time or space? 4.) To what extent is a military 
commander obligated to expose his own forces to danger in order to limit civilian 
casualties or damage to civilian objects? 
365
 
Since then, many of these questions have been resolved by case law or in 
scholarly works, such as the 2009 HPCR Manual on International Law 
Applicable to Air and Missile Warfare.366 In their commentary on Rules 14 & 30-
41 (regarding the proportionality rule), the Manual provided detailed, concrete 
guidance on what should be included in totalling up civilian damage and what 
should be considered military advantage. Importantly, it expressly stated that 
force protection should be taken into account for the proportionality calculation 
as part of military advantage, rather than being considered a separate concern. 
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It also clarified what ought to be considered the boundaries of a single attack in 
time and space.367   
Furthermore, the HPCR Manual actually provided a more robust proportionality 
standard by not commenting on Fenrick’s first question. On the face of it, the 
difficulty of weighing incommensurable values seems to be the key to 
understanding the intractability of the proportionality rule. However, Hamutal 
Shamash argued that, when discussing the proportionality of particular attacks, 
legal experts have tended to focus their discussions on the subjective decision 
making process of the commander, rather than the objective precautions a 
commander should have taken in attack. Narrowing the definition of an unlawful 
attack to only include the proportionality assessment implicitly serves the 
interests of an attacker,368 particularly if it is incumbent upon the court to prove 
that a commander was making a decision in bad faith. However, by examining 
the proportionality of an attack in light of whether an attacker had taken the sort 
of precautions set forth in the HPCR Manual, courts could subordinate the more 
polemic discussion of whether a commander had properly weighed 
incommensurables to a much easier discussion of whether they had followed 
the prescribed actions to ensure that all feasible precautions were, in fact, taken 
before and during the attack: 
The standard is objective in that expectations must be reasonable. If the attacker 
expected, in light of reliable information available at the time, that the collateral damage 
to civilians or civilian objects would be excessive relative to the anticipated military 
advantage, the principle of proportionality will have been violated. ‘Expected’ collateral 
damage and ‘anticipated’ military advantage, for these purposes, mean that that 
outcome is probable, i.e. more likely than not. Both terms assume a good-faith 
assessment by the commander planning or approving the attack, or the combatant 
executing it. They are ‘judged in the light of the information reasonably available’ at the 
time. Moreover, it must be acknowledged that mistakes occur due to the ‘fog of war’ or 
when it turns out reality did not match expectations, perhaps due to faulty intelligence. 
An attack does not violate the principle of proportionality unless such mistakes were 
unreasonable in the circumstances. See Section G on feasible precautions in attacks.
369
  
Although the drafters of the APs expressly rejected using the word ‘reasonable’ 
when formulating the language of API Article 57,370 the HPCR manual’s 
                                            
 
367
 Ibid, 91-94. 
368
 Hamutal Shamash, ‘How Much Is Too Much - an Examination of the Principle of Jus in Bello 
Proportionality’ (2005) 2 IDF L Rev 103, 62-63.  
369
  Commentary on the HPCR Manual on International Law Applicable to Air and Missile Warfare, 91-92. 
370
 See Ch 2 at note 178. 
   
 
 
114 
 
 
rendition of the precautions rule makes clear that the same reasonableness 
standard that applies to the proportionality rule generally also applies to taking 
precautions in attack, thereby creating a set of objective benchmarks that could 
be used to judge whether a commander had violated the proportionality rule. 
Some commentators argue that these objective measures are even more 
important for the regulatory function of LOAC than the more esoteric balancing 
of incommensurables demanded by the proportionality rule because they have 
a greater chance of actually promoting civilian casualty mitigation.371 From an 
operational perspective, the process-oriented provisions of the precautions rule 
are far more instructive than the proportionality rule and following the former 
almost always keeps a commander from getting close to violations of the 
latter.372 From an accountability perspective, investigators and courts will likely 
be attracted to the objective nature of the precautions rule, allowing them to 
side-step the thornier problem of second-guessing the commander’s subjective 
value judgement: 
If you’re looking for the rule and you’re looking for an international criminal legal basis, I 
would feel better as a prosecutor going with precautionary part [of proportionality]. 
These principles are so very loose, so amorphous and ambiguous that it’s hard to 
imagine a prosecution really stemming from the notion of the proportionality principle…. 
I think that that’s the relationship between the two. I envision precautionary notions of 
proportionality being more susceptible to prosecution than probably the principle.
373
  
While the problem posed by the inherent difficulty of assessing competing and 
vague values is substantial, it is not insurmountable and there are objective 
ways to infer whether a commander is applying the proportionality rule in good 
faith, so the fact that commanders have a responsibility to weigh 
incommensurables should not in itself allow the proportionality rule to evade 
adjudication. 
LOAC as a Civil Regulatory Norm versus ICL as a Criminal Accountability 
Mechanism 
It is tempting to think of any violation of the law of armed conflict as a war crime 
and indeed, many of the provisions in international criminal law have been 
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imported from LOAC verbatim. However, the underlying purpose of the two 
regimes is different and this affects the way that similar rules are articulated in 
each body of law. LOAC primarily issues regulatory guidance for troops to 
follow during the course of their military operations in an attempt to prevent 
them from behaving in a proscribed manner.374 Therefore, the language used to 
spell out the content of this law is aimed at military commanders, their legal 
advisors, and subordinates, but not necessarily legal professionals who would 
be using the law for prosecutions or litigation after the fact. Moreover, to the 
extent that LOAC was designed to be used in the courtroom, it was intended to 
be used as a way of establishing state responsibility for violations, rather than 
individual responsibility, making it more analogous to civil tort law (delicts), 
rather than a robust criminal code. 375   
In contrast, the corpus of ICL has evolved as a way to achieve individual 
accountability for war crimes after the fact. The interplay between ICL and 
LOAC is not always straightforward and the degree to which LOAC has 
influenced ICL depends upon which legal forum is hearing a particular case. For 
example, the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia was able 
to import more of the language used by the Additional Protocols into its 
jurisprudence than has the International Criminal Court because the ICTY 
Statute authorised that Court to try violations of the ‘laws and customs of 
war’.376 To criminalise violations of the laws and customs of war, the tribunal 
then had to reverse engineer, ex post,  a set of criminal elements for the 
behaviours proscribed in the APs — documents that were not designed to be 
used in criminal proceedings.377 Similarly, the negotiators of the Rome Statute 
also used treaty-based and customary (as it stood in the mid-1990s)  LOAC as 
the starting point to figure out which violations could be serious enough to be 
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considered criminal actions.378 However, because the ICC Statute was 
negotiated to be positive criminal law from the start, its designers gave greater 
ex ante specificity as to what behaviours would warrant criminal prosecution 
and what mental state would be required to trigger criminal liability for offenders 
than what is found in the fuzzier provisions of LOAC.379 It is also for this reason 
that the UK and US delegations at the Rome Conference were keen to include 
the phrase ‘clearly excessive’ in the version of the proportionality rule found in 
RS Article 8(2)(b)(iv). According to Charles Garraway, one of the UK’s 
delegates, the inclusion of this phrase was indeed meant to differentiate 
between ordinary violations of the rule under LOAC from those that would give 
rise to criminal liability under ICL. While a state could theoretically be held 
responsible for merely excessive strikes, individual commanders should only be 
criminally responsible for the most obvious violations of the rule. 
Additionally, in order to protect the human rights of the accused, any 
forum — international, hybrid or domestic — that tries a commander for a 
criminal breach of the proportionality rule will likely include certain safeguards 
which will make it more difficult for a prosecutor to secure a conviction. This 
includes the criminal law principle of in dubio pro reo, which states that if the 
facts of the case are disputed, the accused should receive the benefit of the 
doubt380 and the Rule of Lenity, which requires that if the definition of the law is 
                                            
 
378
 When presenting its Draft ICC Statute to the UN General Assembly, the International Law Commission 
explained the way its members conceptualised the relationship between LOAC and ICL: ‘The Commission 
shares the widespread view that there exists the category of war crimes under customary international law. 
That category overlaps with but is not identical to the category of grave breaches of the Geneva 
Conventions of 1949 and Additional Protocol I of 1977…  Reference is made here both to "the laws and 
customs” not only because the phrase is a hallowed one but also to emphasize its basis in customary 
(general) international law.  On the other hand not all breaches of the laws of war will be of sufficient 
gravity to justify their falling within the jurisdiction of the court, and article 20, subparagraph (c) is 
accordingly limited by the use of the phrase “serious violations”…’ ‘Draft Statute for an International 
Criminal Court with Commentaries ’ in Yearbook  of  the  International  Law  Commission, vol II 
(A/CN.4/SER.A/1994/Add.l  (Part 2), United Nations 1994), 39. William Lietzau, ‘International Criminal Law 
after Rome: Concerns from a US Military Perspective’ (2001) 64 Law and Contemporary Problems 119, 
122. 
379
 ‘On the battlefield, the conduct of the fighting parties is best governed by rules that are simple and allow 
the commander a certain level of discretion. However, fair criminal proceedings demand, first and 
foremost, that the parties in a criminal trial have recourse to clear rules that describe criminal conduct in a 
strict manner’. Bartels, 277.  Interview with Former ICC Official (3 Jun 2016). 
380
 Bartels, 279. 
   
 
 
117 
 
 
unclear, then the court must use the interpretation of the law that yields the best 
outcome for the accused.381  
Mens Rea and the Limits of Liability in LOAC versus ICL 
Further complicating efforts to achieve individual accountability for 
disproportionate attacks is the strict mens rea required for securing a conviction 
under ICL. As discussed in Chapter 2, in theory, it should be possible to try 
commanders for reckless attacks that result in disproportionate collateral 
damage, but not for attacks that result in disproportionate collateral damage 
arising from ordinary negligence.382 Nevertheless, in practice, there is some 
lingering confusion about how to prosecute disproportionate attacks, particularly 
whether one can point to violations of the precautions rule as evidence that the 
commander had the requisite mens rea needed to warrant criminal prosecution 
of the proportionality rule. This is important because normally attack precautions 
are considered part of LOAC, but not ICL, so in order to be criminally convicted 
for a disproportionate attack, the commander must know with a high degree of 
certainty that there are civilians or civilian objects present in the target area, 
make the judgement call that the military advantage is not high enough to 
warrant the attack — articulate that judgement call — and then nevertheless 
proceed with the strike.383 It is more likely that prima facie disproportionate 
attacks occur either by accident or because the commander approached the 
duty to take all feasible attack precautions with a blasé or indifferent attitude.384 
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In this second scenario, the commander may be going through the motions of 
making a proportionality assessment, but since the inputs are flawed (e.g. the 
commander is unsure of how many civilians are in a building because of an 
unreasonable reliance on one intelligence platform at the expense of another 
inconvenient, but feasibly accessible one), the resulting proportionality 
calculation will necessarily also be incorrect. The idea that there should be 
accountability for both types of intention has an intuitive appeal, and as a former 
ICC official put it to me: ‘I think there’s got to be some sort of move in the law 
that covers not just commanders who deliberately target civilians or deliberately 
use disproportionate force, but also those who are merely indifferent about it.’385 
In the ICTY case law, rather than examining the LOAC principles of 
distinction, proportionality and precautions separately, Jens Ohlin claims that 
the tribunal conceptualised these different principles as being facets of one 
crime: directly attacking civilians.386 Then, in several cases, they allowed the 
prosecution to assert that the accused was reckless in ordering or launching 
attacks where the eventuality of civilian casualties could be foreseen.387 In 
Ohlin’s estimation, the reason the ICTY has accepted this way to structure ICL 
is because many of the court’s lawyers and judges are conversant in continental 
law notions of criminal liability which include dolus eventualis (akin to 
recklessness) as a form of direct intent. He argues that this causes them to 
intuitively see any strike in which civilian death could be expected in the 
ordinary course of events as a direct attack on the civilian population. Ohlin’s 
worry is that ICL practitioners may be sleepwalking towards an interpretation of 
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unlawful attacks that renders the proportionality rule moot.388 Based on a 
thorough analysis of the negotiation history of the Rome Statute and the 
Additional Protocols, he argues that the delegates did not intend for the crimes 
of directly attacking the civilian population or of causing disproportionate attacks 
to include recklessness or dolus eventualis as a mode of criminal liability.389  
 This comports with what I discovered through my interviews. The two 
delegates to the Rome Conference that I interviewed for this project argued that 
there should be repercussions for reckless attacks that violate the 
proportionality rule, but not necessarily international criminal proceedings.390 
For example, US delegate Bill Lietzau explained that even if dolus eventualis 
can be considered a type of criminal liability in continental law, it does not 
necessarily hold that it should have been a subject for the ICC,391 since the 
court should only concern itself with international crimes where there is broad 
agreement of what constitutes a violation of the criminal norm across both 
continental and common law legal systems.392 Instead, both he and Garraway 
saw violations of the precautions rule as having a more solid basis for 
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prosecution under domestic criminal law or litigation under civil tort law.393  
Indeed, an ICC official, two US policy officials and a US military judge all 
claimed that, in theory, US military law could have easily handled something like 
the Kunduz Hospital Bombing case, had it been referred to courts-martial.394   
 However, the Hospital Bombing case was never referred to a domestic 
criminal court or court-martial395 — neither was the Kunduz Fuel Tankers case, 
despite dolus eventualis being a mode of criminal liability in German Law.396 
Assuming that violations of the precautions rule are not serious enough to give 
rise to a criminal mental state in any criminal code, surely they should be 
enough to establish state responsibility and civil liability for prima facie unlawful 
attacks? Nevertheless, in the case of the Kunduz Hospital Bombing, US 
domestic law prohibits claimants from suing the US government or its agents for 
actions that occur during combat397 and in the Fuel Tankers case, the civil court 
in Bonn that heard the case decided that Col Klein did not breach his official 
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duty, in spite of substantial evidence to the contrary.398 In both cases, ex gratia 
payments were given to the victims instead.399 Therefore, even with the lower 
liability standards of civil law, it is extremely difficult to prove fault in cases of 
prima facie disproportionate attack.  
The Reasonable Military Commander Test 
If there is any broad agreement in court cases and in the academic literature 
regarding the application of the proportionality rule, it is that the rule must be 
assessed from the perspective of a ‘reasonable military commander’ in the 
circumstances of the accused that were prevailing at the time. Though jurists 
were thinking of a reasonableness standard for the proportionality rule before 
the NATO Bombing Report was issued,400 after the report, international and 
domestic courts alike have cited the report’s ‘reasonable military commander’ 
standard as the appropriate way to gauge whether commanders correctly 
weighed the competing values of military advantage and civilian losses.401 
Moreover, this same standard has emerged as a way to evaluate whether a 
commander diligently took all feasible precautions in attack.402 It has also been 
invoked by investigators looking into allegations of disproportionate attacks, 
such as those who wrote the US report on the Kunduz Hospital Bombing,403 the 
Goldstone Report,404 and the Israeli Government’s reports on Operations Cast 
Lead and Protective Edge.405 However, there is still controversy over what the 
phrase means and how it is to be applied practically when looking at the legality 
of a strike after the fact.   
 Ideally, the function of the reasonable military commander standard is to 
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provide an objective test for what amounts to a subjective value judgement, 
thus allowing courts to infer if the accused possessed the mens rea required for 
the crime of disproportionate attack. As Constantin Groeben reveals in his 
discussion of the Fuel Tankers case, the problem is that the very idea of the 
reasonable military commander could itself be a rhetorical tool that allows legal 
professionals to pretend as though an objective standard for judging unlawful 
attacks exists, while allowing commanders to justify their actions however they 
see fit: 
Some argue that proportionality should be assessed from the viewpoint of a ‘reasonable 
military commander.’ This emphasizes the general idea that in cases of ‘armed conflict’ 
it is necessary to think in military rather than civilian terms. Unfortunately, beyond this 
general notion the introduction of the notion of a ’reasonable military commander’ does 
not bring much clarity to the issue but merely substitutes one term for another. We are 
hence left with the conclusion that in fact ‘objective standards for the appraisal of 
expected collateral damage and intended military advantage are virtually non‐existent.’ 
But without objective standards the proportionality of an attack has to be assessed by 
the attacker himself, in which case he enjoys not only a great margin of discretion, but 
in fact an unlimited margin. This undermines the value of the prohibition — for a 
prohibition that leaves the definition of its content to its addressee does in fact not 
prohibit anything at all. It can be argued that the function of this provision is ultimately 
only that of a moral appeal. The ‘law’ in this case would provide no binding rules; it 
would allow for an executive decision by the commanding officer. The case of Colonel 
Klein seems to suggest exactly this result.
406
 
Indeed, the invocation of a ‘reasonable military commander’ test does cause 
courts to defer to the military expertise of the commander and this, in turn, tends 
to have an exculpatory effect. This was certainly as true for the Fuel Tankers 
case407 as it was for the ICTY’s handling of the NATO Bombing Report and for 
several cases heard at the Israeli High Court of Justice.408 The only cases that 
go against this general trend were the Gotovina Trial Chamber judgement 
(which was overturned)409 and the Kunduz Hospital Bombing case, where 
military investigators were more than willing to weigh in on what behaviour and 
what decisions were considered unreasonable, given the situation prevailing at 
the time,410 but ultimately, the case was never sent to trial.  
 The fact that the ‘reasonable military commander’ test causes 
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investigators and courts to defer to the professionalism of military commanders 
should not in itself invalidate the standard as a way gauge the legality of an 
attack ex post. After all, in other high-stress professions, such as medicine and 
law enforcement, courts have been able to apply reasonableness standards in 
ways that respect professionals’ expertise whilst also guarding the level of 
competence society demands of such professionals.411 Accordingly, it stands to 
reason that courts could take up cases of disproportionate attack if they 
adopted some of the same procedures that are employed in medicine or law 
enforcement cases, for example, using expert witnesses to assess what 
reasonable conduct might look like for the case at hand – either in a battle of 
experts,412 or as independent advisors to the court.413  
 Although there is broad agreement that, in order to render an appropriate 
judgement on a proportionality case, a judge must consider the technical 
expertise of a military commander (as they should with any other profession), 
there is less agreement about whether they should have to ascribe to a military 
commander’s moral judgement regarding the relative values of civilian life and 
military advantage. To be sure, the debate over whether it is appropriate to 
entertain a reasonable military commander’s moral assessment about what 
would be considered excessive collateral damage is indicative of a larger 
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disagreement between military lawyers and lawyers from human rights 
organisations over the purpose of LOAC. As Luban aptly explains: 
The [military] LOAC vision of the law begins with armed conflict. It assigns military 
necessity and the imperatives of warmaking primary, axiomatic status. In this vision, the 
legal regulation of warfare consists of adjustments around the margins of war to 
mitigate its horrors. Those adjustments occupy a noble and important role that must be 
honored and that militaries in fact want to honor. But it is logically secondary, and it 
yields to the force majeure of military necessity. The law of war dwells in the interstices 
of warfare. The [human-rights] IHL vision begins with humanitarianism, and assigns 
human dignity and human rights primary status. It measures the progress of civilization 
in the enhanced protection of human dignity, views law as an indispensable instrument 
for advancing human dignity, and regards peace as the normal condition for human life. 
This vision regards war as a human failure—no doubt inevitable, in the way that poverty 
and injustice are inevitable, but, like poverty and injustice, not something that deserves 
legal priority over the protection of rights and dignity.
414
  
Though the object of both the military and human-rights visions for restrictions 
in war are roughly the same – to reduce human suffering – the different ‘tribes’ 
often offer very different legal prescriptions about how to accomplish this 
common goal.  
 Some commentators, such as Mark Oisel, have rightly pointed out that 
the tendency for members of the military to see themselves as a separate 
subculture from civil society can nurture the development of certain institutional 
values, such as discipline and self-sacrifice. This, in turn, can sometimes make 
members of the military less likely to commit atrocities on the battlefield 
compared with their civilian counterparts (e.g. civilians committed the bulk of the 
atrocities during the Rawandan Genocide and certain civilian units in Bosnia 
were more prone to committing atrocities than military units operating under 
similar circumstances).415 Recognising this, states have, to greater or lesser 
degrees, encouraged this divergence of values by holding members of the 
military to a separate (and usually stricter) legal system from the rest of civilian 
society.416 The military view of LOAC, therefore, encourages judges to show 
some deference to military commanders based on the fact that they ought to 
already have built-in restraints on their behaviour by virtue of their membership 
in the profession of arms – so any deviation from those internal norms must 
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have been due to overwhelming situational pressures. However, others, such 
as Bothe, contend – equally rightly – that the value system of soldiers serving 
democratic countries should never be so different from that of the general public 
as to make it necessary to specifically invoke the moral decision-making 
process of a military commander in order to adjudicate proportionality cases.417 
Though the military is indeed a society-within-a-society and judges would be 
wise to keep in that in mind, ultimately in a liberal-democratic state, civilians 
have the final say over what the military is or is not allowed to do – not the 
military itself. Ideally, under the assumption that the profession of arms 
inculcates higher virtues than those found in civil society, the standard of 
behaviour required of members of the military should be higher than that 
demanded of a civilian under similar circumstances. Therefore, if judges are to 
entertain special pleas to the moral decision-making of a military commander for 
proportionality cases, presumably the relative weight of military advantage 
compared against collateral damage should be higher than what would be 
assigned by a civilian in the same circumstances. However, in reality this does 
not seem to be the case.  
 As a matter of lex ferenda, the correct interpretation of the phrase 
‘reasonable military commander’ should be more nuanced than either the 
military or human-rights perspectives offer in the extreme. At the risk of setting 
up an infinite regress, I would suggest invoking the perspective of a reasonable 
military commander requires one to strike a proportionate balance between the 
value systems of both the military and civil society (if one is to assume that the 
value systems are different in the first place). The authors of the ICTY’s NATO 
Bombing Report were right to defer to the technical expertise of a reasonable 
military commander and their assessment of the tactical situation, given the 
information they reasonably had at the time.418 However, by defining a 
reasonable military commander in opposition to a reasonable human rights 
lawyer, the Committee discounted the possibility that the value system of a 
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reasonable military commander ought not be too different from that of a 
reasonable person in the same situation. In spite of the fact that the test has 
already been used in courts and elsewhere as a way for legal professionals to 
defer to the subjective opinion of military commanders, there should be room for 
alternate interpretations of the reasonable military commander test which would 
force judges to consider the appropriateness of a commander’s proportionality 
assessment, given both military members’ professional expertise and what a 
reasonable person would have done.  
 However, given that international courts have reached farther in other 
domains (such as stating that the attack precaution provisions of API Article 57 
are customary LOAC in non-international armed conflict419), it is a puzzlement 
as to why courts have not adopted some way to operationalise proportionality 
beyond the vague and deferential ‘reasonable military commander’ test and the 
flawed 200m standard used in the Gotovina Trial Chamber.420 This suggests 
that there is at least some value for courts to keep the definition of 
proportionality and precautions in attack (and their associated reasonableness 
tests) vague.  
Flexibility and the Value of Vagueness in the Law 
The particulars of the proportionality rule and its associated rule on precautions 
in attack have been convincingly pinned down in the writings of legal experts — 
such as those who wrote the HPCR manual — to such a degree that it would 
not be difficult with help from expert witnesses for a court to determine 
reasonable from unreasonable conduct in most cases. However, as a 
subsidiary source of law,421 such texts would not carry the same weight in a 
courtroom as statements made by the states or the vague black letter of 
international treaties. Furthermore, as with the ‘duelling experts’ problem 
associated with operationalising the reasonable military commander test, it is 
also possible to find some legal authorities who will argue for more permissive 
interpretations of proportionality and others who will argue for equally-
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convincing, but stricter interpretations. Nevertheless, this should not be a barrier 
to prosecution, since hearing conflicting interpretations of law and deciphering 
the better argument is precisely the role that the courts should play.422 If this 
vagueness could be addressed, it stands to reason the ambiguity associated 
with the proportionality rule serves some function, which is why it has yet to be 
pinned down by the states in a reliable way. 
It may seem, on the face of it, that a more precise law is better than a 
vague one, particularly when it sets forth a criminal standard.423 If a law is too 
vague, then the application of the law by states and the courts might seem 
arbitrary, allowing the same behaviour to be punished by one judge and 
excused by another.424 However, vaguely worded laws are not merely poor laws 
that should have been better drafted, but as Timothy Endicott argues, 
lawmakers often use words such as ‘reasonable’ as a deliberate way to 
introduce ambiguity into the law.425 It is hardly a revelation that lawmakers (be 
they legislatures or plenipotentiaries) do this, but what is interesting are the 
reasons why they do so given the problems associated with vague laws. Laws 
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 ‘[L]imitations of language and of ability to anticipate mean that courts do always have to construe the 
words of a statute and a big part of the job of judges, all the way up to the Supreme Court is to interpret: 
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 ‘Effective rules require a shared understanding of how they apply to specific cases, both so that actors 
can take account of those rules and the consequences of breaking them and so that others know how to 
respond. More detailed and specific rules help to produce such a shared understanding by clarifying what 
the rules mean.’ James Morrow, Order within Anarchy: The Laws of War as an International Institution 
(Cambridge UP 2014) 66. 
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reasons for preferring to interpret a vague law differently.  
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common law... Vagueness in legal instruments is generally far from trivial. When lawmakers use vague 
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over the principles of the standard in question. Because it may allow different, incompatible views as to the 
nature of the standard and the principles of its application (even among sincere and competent 
interpreters), it leads to the danger that its application will be incoherent.’ ibid 32. 
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might be intentionally vague because it is more efficient426 for lawmakers to 
delegate authority for determining the precise definition of a statute to the 
courts, particularly if lawmakers cannot come to a consensus regarding the 
law’s particulars.427 To some degree, this has occurred with proportionality. 
Recalling the fact that the original purpose of the APs is to be regulatory, rather 
than punitive, Lietzau claims that some of the vagueness in the proportionality 
rule was indeed intentional: 
[T]he treaties were written as agreements between countries, well knowing that when 
you have 130 countries in a room and they have to reach common agreement on lots of 
different clauses. That’s very hard to do, because they all have different interests and 
different ways of conceiving of the particular principles involved, so what they usually do 
is that they come up with ambiguous wording and the ambiguous wording allows each 
of them to go home and claim success and what you end up with frequently is slightly 
different interpretations of a general principle and the kernels of the principle are there, 
so that you’ve accomplished something, but you haven’t accomplished as much as your 
average legislator would want to accomplish, because he’d want to nail down these 10 
characteristics of the principle, and instead he’s nailed down the essence of the 
principle and then used ambiguous wording that is designed to let everyone go home 
thinking that they’ve succeeded. If you accept that paradigm as the way we write 
treaties, we can live with that if it’s a law of war treaty — the rights of one country 
juxtaposed with the rights of another country who might be in conflict with each other… 
It would’ve been negotiated with purposeful ambiguity, or at least sanctioned ambiguity, 
so that you could reach agreement and everyone goes home knowing: ‘there’s no judge 
that’s going to tell me that I’m wrong’.
428
  
As a regulatory norm, it suits states to keep the principle of proportionality 
somewhat vague, since it allows several competing interpretations of the 
principle to all be correct and this gives the states the ability to compromise with 
each other. This also grants the state some flexibility to choose whichever 
interpretation of proportionality advances its interests at a later point once 
decision makers have become aware of how the law affects the state’s freedom 
of action.429 However, as a criminal norm, the United States and the United 
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Kingdom actually wanted more precision for the proportionality rule, since they 
were unsure of how the law might be applied in the courtroom: 
Now you take it [proportionality] to an international criminal context and now you can put 
people in jail for it. So, a person like me comes to the negotiating table and I look at the 
proportionality principle as it might find its way into Protocol I or into some customary 
law treatise or something like that and I look at that language and I say: ‘oh my 
goodness, that is very murky!’. I do not to feel comfortable as a prosecutor knowing that 
I can prosecute someone for that and I certainly don’t feel comfortable as defence 
counsel or an advisor saying, ‘no, don’t worry, no one will ever put you in jail for this 
particular attack based on that murky language’… The jury system is hard enough — to 
have to figure out if the facts line up with the principles — but if you also don’t even 
know what the principles are, because you’re using ambiguous language, that’s a real 
problem and it doesn’t give comfort to the person who has been alleged to have 
committed crimes. So, we tried to build in precision and some specificity into the 
international criminal law norm, yet we tried to do it in the context of international treaty 
writing, where 130 countries had to agree and that was a very difficult process.
430
 
There was indeed a push to clarify RS Article 8(2)(b)(iv), but only to raise the 
liability needed to secure a conviction for the crime. Because the delegations 
were pressed for time, Garraway argued that much of the vagueness 
associated with the version of the rule as it was articulated in API had to be 
imported directly into the ICC Statute, since they were unable to come to an 
agreement otherwise: 
We never really reached agreement on quite a lot of issues. That is why Philippe Kirsch, 
on the last day, slammed a text down and said ‘take it or leave it’. Even the bits that 
were negotiated, a lot of them are deliberately ambiguous… You’ve got two completely 
conflicting views and what you have got to do is try to come up with a compromise. 
Now, the compromise allows both sides to claim victory. There was a classic example 
of that (in fact, we didn’t realise until it was too late, actually) in the elements of crimes 
on the proportionality test. There was deadlock between Bill Lietzau and myself, and 
Switzerland and Belgium. Both sides were adamant about what we wanted. We set it 
aside to be one of the problems that we would deal with at the end. On the last day, we 
were faced with having to reach a decision on this and a compromise was put to us. Bill 
and I looked at it and said, ‘great, but the other side will never agree’ and the Swiss 
looked at it and said, ‘great, but the other side will never go for it’. It was agreed… What 
then happened is that you had the commentary — the Roy Lee commentary on the 
elements, which was being written and the Swiss [Didier Pfirter] were given the task of 
drafting that section. He did and sent it around to all the authors and it came to me and I 
said, ‘no way!’ He had interpreted the wording to reflect his views — the Swiss position. 
I said that this is so serious that as a still-serving UK officer, I cannot be linked with this 
commentary any longer if that goes in. It is such a critical point; I would have to 
withdraw… We both knew each other well — after all, we’d been negotiating for 
something like six years or so. We phoned each other and we suddenly realised the text 
was actually ambiguous. It is still my view that, on an English reading of the text, it can 
                                                                                                                                
 
controversy is and we can see which side of it we’re on – some of it is strategic. Some of it is just 
incompetence. It’s an inability to anticipate the different circumstances under which the rule might arise 
and, if we could’ve thought about that, we would’ve dealt with it, but we just didn’t anticipate it.’ Interview 
with Former US LOAC Policy Official (2).  
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only mean one thing, but I had to accept that it was possible (certainly for a non-English 
speaker) to see that it could mean something different. So, the only way we could 
decide to deal with it was in the commentary, Didier wrote: ‘one view could be that this 
means…’. I then wrote: ‘another view is that this could mean…’. In the end, we had to 
say that it would be for the Court to decide. 
431
 
Therefore, some of the ambiguity in the criminal norm was sanctioned, some of 
it was accidental, and much of it was imported directly from API.  
In her interdisciplinary study of collateral damage, Janina Dill identified 
three levels of vagueness that have plagued the API version of the 
proportionality rule as it was negotiated at the CDDH and she argued that the 
cumulative effect (even if it was not the explicit intention) of the different types of 
indeterminacy in the law has been to shield attackers against judicial oversight: 
The principle of proportionality was adopted by many delegations [to the CDDH] in spite 
of, by some because of, its failure to put flesh on the bones of the prescription to 
balance humanitarian and military concerns (purposive indeterminacy). Most 
delegations hedged against IL [international law] imposing a standard for legally 
acceptable outcomes of an attack (consequential indeterminacy). And the drafters seem 
to have chosen the criterion of a military advantage without substantively agreeing on a 
necessary degree of nexus between an object and military action for the advantage to 
count as a military objective or for it to outweigh incidental civilian harm. Nor did the 
delegations clearly state the point of reference they envisaged would determine what 
counted as a military advantage in the first place (semantic indeterminacy). In Martti 
Koskenniemi’s language, it seems that the diplomatic conference made sure that IHL 
would be flexible enough to serve as a ready apology.
432
 
Vagueness in the law is able to provide a ready apology because, upon 
discovering lacunae in the law, either through its genuine absence or through 
extravagant433 vagueness in treaty-based or customary international law (or its 
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various domestic vehicles), judges might determine that the Rule of Lenity 
should apply and the accused should not be convicted.434   
An Impossible Evidentiary Burden  
It is not just vagueness in the law that frustrates efforts to achieve accountability 
for disproportionate attacks, but often the facts of a particular incident are also 
in doubt. Finding evidence of war crimes is generally challenging enough, but 
finding enough evidence to successfully prosecute disproportionate attacks is 
even more difficult.435 Rogier Bartels, a legal officer with the ICC, argued that 
the first problem with gathering evidence for conduct of hostilities violations — 
to include the crime of planning or launching a disproportionate attack — is that 
it is oftentimes difficult to penetrate the fog of war during combat, so it is equally 
difficult to reliably establish what occurred after the fact.436 This is particularly 
true if the attackers437 or defenders438 were engaging in operations designed to 
deceive the other side. 
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 ‘Trew: Do you still think you’d be difficult prosecute something like pillage or, you know, something that 
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confidence of an adversary with respect to protection under that law. The following are examples of such 
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Gathering physical evidence of a disproportionate attack should be 
straightforward, but sometimes investigators cannot access the crime scene 
because the authorities who exercise control of the site refuse to cooperate or 
because it is simply too dangerous.439 The longer investigators wait to access 
the site, the more opportunity there is for other actors to tamper with the 
forensic evidence or for it to be removed. The former ICTY official I interviewed 
stated that early on, the Prosecutor’s Office had difficulty accessing some of the 
sites in the former Yugoslavia where crimes were alleged to have taken place, 
so investigators had to rely on information that could be gained from satellite 
photographs combined with witness testimony.440 Compared to the richness of 
evidence that could be obtained by a site visit (e.g. shell fragments, 
explosive/incendiary material, internal effects of the attack on buildings), a 
satellite image may lack the detail needed to determine who launched the strike 
and for what reason. Witness on the ground can help, but witness memory 
tends to degrade over time and case take years to appear before a court.441 
Their testimony, particularly when describing the details of emotional events, 
can also be flawed since eye-witness memory is malleable, susceptible to 
suggestion after the fact.442  
Even if physical evidence of a prima facie disproportionate attack, 
backed up by the testimony of witnesses on the ground can prove the actus 
reus for the crime, it is also necessary for a prosecutor to find evidence of the 
offending commander’s criminal intent. Those with experience investigating443 
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or trying444 conduct of hostilities crimes have stated that it is more difficult to find 
evidence of a commander’s intent to plan or launch a disproportionate strike. 
The former ICTY defence counsel I interviewed worked on a case involving 
disproportionate attack and claimed: 
I do think that the chief obstacle [to prosecuting proportionality] is again evidentiary. It’s 
rare that the prosecutors are ever going to have the entire picture, unless you got a 
whistleblower or some sort of smoking gun in terms of evidence that was sitting in front 
of that commander. It’s enormously difficult to fill in the military advantage side of the 
scale — to get a true reading of what this attack was going to accomplish for the 
attacker.
445
 
Since forensic evidence may be sparse or difficult to obtain and witness 
testimony may be of limited reliability even if it is coming from a whistle-blower 
or someone with access to the commander, documentary evidence therefore 
becomes the lifeblood of an investigation into allegations of disproportionate 
attack. In my interviews, Former Chief Prosecutor for the ICTY, Richard 
Goldstone noted that many of the prosecutions at Nuremberg were able to 
proceed without much need for witness testimony because of the ‘treasure 
trove’ of documentation the investigators were able to collect from the 
vanquished Nazi state446 and another former ICTY official recalled a similar 
event when Stjepan Mesić was elected president of Croatia: 
[T]he new president of Croatia was our [former] witness and so all of a sudden, we 
started getting access to all kinds of Croatian documents. And, in fact, the first president 
of Croatia… Franjo Tuđman, had the Richard Nixon habit; he taped everything in his 
office and so we got copies of the tapes. So all of a sudden, we had a much easier way 
to document what was happening and, somewhat similarly, we got all kinds of 
information and insider witnesses and that sort of thing from the Yugoslavs as the 
country gradually shrank in size and as we got regime change there. So eventually, we 
had all kinds of evidence that could prove all kinds of things, but it certainly wasn't what 
we started with it certainly wasn't what we expected to have.
447
    
                                                                                                                                
 
evidence that the crime has happened is one thing; the evidence that the crime happened intentionally is 
another. Intentionality is more difficult to prove. The two greatest challenges for me have been: concerned 
parties not accepting the evidence for political or economic reasons or not being able to gather sufficient 
evidence about exactly what happened. Then, of course, I’m not a prosecutor. I’m in another line of work – 
I prosecute in the court of public opinion. It’s very different.’ Interview with Amnesty International War 
Crimes Investigator. Similarly, in his reflections on the UN report regarding Operation CAST LEAD, 
Richard Goldstone stated that it was difficult for his team to establish the intent of Israeli forces in that 
campaign, because they were not privy to information that Israel only released after his report. Goldstone, 
'Reconsidering the Goldstone Report on Israel and war crimes'. 
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Even so, investigators and prosecution teams will run into difficulties getting 
cooperation from state actors,448 particularly if they are investigating a 
government that is still in power. State actors may generate large amounts of 
documentary evidence, but they also might not be forthcoming with information 
about an attack, particularly if that requires offering up classified intelligence.449 
Furthermore, as Bartels notes, many of the cases heard at the ICC actually 
involve non-state groups which do not generate records the same way that 
state actors might.450 Aaron Fellmeth argues that this reticence regarding the 
events leading up to an alleged disproportionate attack also extends to the way 
states dispose of cases of disproportionate attack in their own national 
disciplinary systems.  
National legislation and most military manuals are a matter of public record, but many 
states have extremely secretive and closed military cultures that inhibit the gathering of 
information about their methods for ensuring compliance with the laws of war. This is 
especially so if, when the proportionality rule has been violated, the practical 
consequences take the form of informal or sub rosa sanctions or corrective measures, 
such as demotion, unpaid leave, reforms to classified procedures, or simply a private 
reprimand.
451
 
Garraway argues that some of the secrecy is necessary, not merely to protect 
the reputation of the state or its agents, but also the lives of intelligence 
sources: 
Trew: Do you suspect that it’s the states fear of having an external body prosecute 
that’s keeping them from being forthcoming or just the negative publicity that comes 
from having their eye gaze towards them? 
Garraway: A little bit of both of those, but also something further as well: they don’t want 
to release their intelligence, because they’d release their methods of intelligence and 
the sources of intelligence. I know that because in one country, … A UN report was 
being made into a particular operation and this was an internal UN report and the 
country decided to cooperate with the report and it provided the UN investigation team 
with the intelligence that they had. A lot of the intelligence was HUMINT — the guys 
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disappeared. It was leaked within the UN and those guys were dead and that particular 
country said, ‘never again will we release any intelligence to the UN’.
452
  
Nevertheless, when provided in good faith, declassified material can help 
immensely to clarify the events surrounding an apparent case of unlawful attack 
even when such sensitive information has been redacted. As US Central 
Command’s report on the Kunduz Hospital Bombing case shows, it is not 
necessary to divulge the exact specifications of certain pieces of equipment or 
the names of the individuals involved in the strike to fill-in the military’s version 
of what happened.453 Furthermore, the transcripts of the radio chatter that night 
gave both investigators and the public a way to determine what the aircrew or 
ground crew knew at the time and what their intentions were. When comparing 
that against what they should have known at the time, one can determine what 
could be considered reasonable conduct, given the circumstances. Likewise, it 
is technologically possible to record the goings-on in a military operations centre 
to provide investigators with a record of either criminality or a good-faith effort 
on the part of a military commander and there are procedures available to clear 
investigators to see the material or to provide them the information in redacted 
form.454  
Even without documentation from those accused of launching an 
unlawful attack, one can infer a certain criminal intent if it can be proved that the 
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 Interview with Garraway. Furthermore, expressing concerns regarding the use of intelligence at the 
ICTY, the United States proposed a strict non-disclosure policy for evidence submitted by states to the 
Court. In the original US proposal, not even the defendant could know the contents of intelligence given to 
the court if the state providing such information deemed it relevant to its national security. The rules that 
were eventually adopted by the Tribunal were not as strict as the ones that the US had lobbied for and 
they did require the prosecutor to turn over any evidence used in the indictment over to the defence. Laura 
Moranchek, ‘Protecting National Security Evidence While Prosecuting War Crimes: Problems and Lessons 
for International Justice from the ICTY’ (2006) 31 Yale J Int'l L 477, 482. 
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  Investigation Report of the Airstrike on the Médecins Sans Frontières / Doctors without Borders 
Trauma Center in Kunduz, Afghanistan on 3 October 2015. 
454
 In Interview with Former UK Commander, the participant and I speculated about the possibility of 
having a ‘black box’ style recorders for the ops room: 
‘Participant: ‘We have the technical capability to do this now (it would be highly classified because of 
everything that’s being sucked into them), but I’m sure we would have the ability to… 
Trew: …to declassify as necessary?  
Participant: Absolutely. I mean, if you have a war crimes trial now… 
Trew: … you would only have the effects.  
Participant: Yup, but if you went into the records, the logs, everything else that’s been recorded, if there 
was a top secret discussion that went on, there would be a mechanism of clearing those people who 
needed to make the decision to look at that information or to declassify that information. There’s a lot to be 
said for saying, “we are conducting live military operations, but we are conducting them, we believe, for the 
common good and there isn’t any reason why everything we do shouldn’t be recorded so that, if 
accusations are made subsequently, we can defend our people”.’  
   
 
 
136 
 
 
same commander was responsible for planning or launching a large number of 
apparently disproportionate attacks, or if it can be shown that a politician or 
high-ranking commander were responsible for allowing such attacks to occur as 
a matter of policy.455 As Goldstone reveals, evidence of a pattern of attacks was 
key to building many of the cases at the ICTY: 
Trew: So hypothetically, to go after the crime of disproportionate attack, do you suspect 
it would be easier if it were a pattern of widespread apparently disproportionate attacks 
all by the same commander as opposed to an individual incident? 
Goldstone: Absolutely. That was certainly the position in the former Yugoslavia where 
one was looking at it in the context of a situation where military commanders were 
pretty much given a free hand and encouraged not to spare civilians if there was a good 
military reason for taking any action. I think that one has to have a look the general 
atmosphere and the general rulings taken by the most senior commanders — 
sometimes political in addition (or as an alternative) to military command.
456
  
Similarly, under ICL, prosecutors could theoretically charge commanders whose 
attacks are reckless or who show a disregard for taking proper precautions if it 
can be shown that such attacks occurred as part of a systematic pattern of 
behaviour.457 However, if this is the case, then it leaves one to wonder why the 
ICL regime makes a distinction between the war crime of disproportionate 
attack and murder as a crime against humanity.458 The elements for that crime, 
as articulated in the Rome Statute, include: 
Article 7(1)(a). 1. The perpetrator killed one or more persons. 2. The conduct was 
committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against a civilian 
population. 3. The perpetrator knew that the conduct was part of or intended the 
conduct to be part of a widespread or systematic attack against a civilian population.
459
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 Interview with Amnesty International War Crimes Investigator, Interview with Desmond Travers, Former 
UN War Crimes Investigator (Telephone 6 Sept 2016). 
456
 Interview with Goldstone.  
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 ‘Applying the articulation of the criminal recklessness standard in Blaškić, prosecutors would need to 
focus on awareness of a substantial risk of a criminal outcome. The paradigmatic case might be the very 
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[emphasis added] Alex Whiting, ‘Recklessness, War Crimes and the Kunduz Hospital Bombing’ (Just 
Security 2016)  accessed 9 May 2016. 
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Robert Cryer has noted that the US representatives at the Rome Conference wanted all of the crimes 
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269. 
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Therefore, if there is value in holding commanders accountable for one-off 
disproportionate attacks, it stands to reason that the evidentiary burden should 
not be so high that it bleeds into another more serious crime.  
Conclusions 
There are a number of legal and practical reasons why unlawful attacks in 
general and disproportionate attacks in particular are difficult to prosecute. At its 
core, the proportionality rule requires commanders to weigh civilian life and 
property against military advantage – two values which are not easily 
compared. Because of this, the drafters of the Additional Protocols and the 
Rome Statue seem to have given the commander an extra margin of 
appreciation in drafting the criminal version of the proportionality rule compared 
to the one found in the more regulatory-focused provisions of LOAC. In theory, 
accountability for negligent/reckless attacks could be achieved under a civil law 
regime, leaving the criminal version of the law as a way to try clearly excessive 
attacks where the commander expressed knowledge of the attack’s 
disproportionate nature. However, this hasn’t occurred in practice as there are 
few civil or tort law fora for hearing cases of prima facie disproportionate attack 
and though there exist a few such tribunals for trying criminal violations of the 
proportionality rule, the weak liability provisions stipulated for this rule stipulated 
by the law and the steep evidentiary burden on the prosecution make it unlikely 
that even serious violations of the criminal norm will end with a conviction. 
Without a reasonable chance of success, it is hard to imagine a prosecutor ever 
choosing to pursue a case of prima facie disproportionate attack, particularly 
when there are other crimes in the docket that are easier to prosecute. It is 
possible that the barriers to prosecution have arisen by coincidence, but many 
of them seem to be the direct result of state actions, such as: writing the 
regulatory version of the proportionality rule in a deliberately ambiguous way; 
advocating for an equally vague reasonableness test to determine what 
constitutes a violation; raising the burden of proof for the criminal norm; and 
simultaneously guarding access to evidence of the commander’s intent. To be 
sure, as discussed in Chapter 2, the development of the law was an 
evolutionary process and those charged with drafting treaties or national 
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interpretations of customary law could not radically depart from the lex lata, as it 
stood at the time. Nevertheless, even within the framework of the law that 
existed in 1977 and certainly as it stands today, one could make a good case 
for including recklessness as a mode of liability for unlawful attacks. It is, 
therefore, possible that the inability to achieve accountability for the rules on 
proportionality and precautions in attack has as much to do with strategically-
motivated behaviour on the part of states and prosecutors as it does with purely 
legal problems. In Chapter 4, I shall review the literature on the strategic choice 
perspective which has been used effectively to analyse when states comply 
with LOAC and suggest that a similar approach could shed light on why it has 
been difficult to achieve accountability for violations of these rules.   
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Chapter 4 
Thinking Strategically About the Law 
Despite being one of the central tenets of the law of armed conflict, the 
proportionality rule is infamously vague. However, rather than clarifying the rule 
to give prosecutors solid guidance on what constitutes illegal behaviour, the 
negotiators at the CDDH and the Rome Conference merely raised the standard 
of liability required to convict a commander of a violation of the proportionality 
rule as a matter of international criminal law.460 Furthermore, the equally vague 
‘reasonable military commander’ test used by both international and domestic 
courts could, in theory, be operationalised in a way that allows courts to 
distinguish mistakes from criminal actions.461 However, to date, it has been 
invoked in a one-sided way, making it more of an exculpatory tool than a 
functioning test of criminality.462 On top of this legal uncertainty, it is also a 
challenge to uncover evidence of a commander’s criminal mental state. While 
investigators can usually find evidence of the effects of an attack, any evidence 
that shows the commander’s intention is often hidden behind a wall of 
secrecy.463  
On the face of it, each of these arguments for why the criminal 
proportionality rule is difficult to prosecute is convincing: the legal goods in 
question — military advantage and civilian suffering — are vague concepts;464 
one should indeed look at the commander’s intent as part of the elements of the 
crime of disproportionate attack; the accused should be given the benefit of the 
doubt when facts surrounding the case are not beyond all reasonable doubt; 
states oftentimes need to keep certain information classified on the grounds of 
national security. Furthermore, it is not entirely clear if precautions violations 
ought to indicate a commander’s reckless intent to launch a direct attack on 
civilians or a disproportionate attack. But taken individually, it ought to be 
possible to address each issue so the international community can achieve 
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accountability for disproportionate or cavalier attacks while also respecting the 
professional competence of military commanders and recognising that mistakes 
are likely to happen in combat.  
Nevertheless, the cumulative effect of these issues has been to insulate 
state actors from judicial scrutiny. Given the centrality of the proportionality rule 
in modern LOAC and the ubiquitous use of air power in modern warfare, if the 
function of the proportionality rule as a criminal norm is to promote 
accountability for gross violations of the corresponding regulatory norm, then 
one would expect that there would be at least one solid case of a commander 
being tried and convicted of a criminal violation. Or, at the very least, there 
ought to have been a robust attempt by international or domestic courts to 
weigh in on the problems that plague its application. If the barriers to successful 
prosecution for disproportionate attack are too high, then that would indicate 
that the criminal norm is merely decorative, serving no purpose above that of 
the regulatory norm.  
Of course, the lack of prosecutions could reflect the broader dearth of war 
crimes cases, in general, but both international and domestic courts have 
managed to effectively try cases of direct attacks on the civilian population (a 
more serious crime)465 and cases of looting (an arguably less serious crime).466 
Moreover, there is no shortage of possible test cases to choose from as HROs 
have documented numerous instances where the collateral damage from an 
attack was serious enough to warrant further investigation.467 It is certainly true 
that all conduct of hostilities cases are difficult to prosecute,468 but 
proportionality violations seem to be even more intractable than other rules in 
ICL.  
Therefore, given the manifold difficulties with applying the criminal 
version of the proportionality rule, the major world powers may have intended 
for it to be dead-letter law. Without addressing the underlying strategy for why 
the law is written and enforced a certain way, even if HROs or a group of ‘like-
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minded’469 countries could pressure states like the US or the UK into adopting a 
stricter mens rea for the crime of excessive attack, the latter could merely 
exploit other explicit and latent ambiguities in the law (like the reasonable 
commander test) or its enforcement regime to maintain their freedom to use air 
power without judicial scrutiny.  
 To explore the possibility that the lack of prosecutions for proportionality 
offenses is strategically motivated, it may be helpful to examine the how cases 
of disproportionate attack are adjudicated from the field of international relations 
(IR), specifically the strategic-choice perspective. The building blocks of this 
analytic framework are: 1.) the relevant actors’ prior beliefs and preferences 
regarding the outcome(s) of their interactions; and 2.) the strategic environment, 
which describes the possible actions that actors can take to pursue their goal(s) 
and the external structures that actors use to gain information about others.470 
From these elements: the actors and strategic environment, one can model the 
dynamics behind a particular strategic interaction in a way that sheds light on a 
particular research question, regardless of the subject that is under 
investigation.471 It remains just as relevant for understanding how trade 
ministers negotiate free trade agreements as it would for understanding why 
some countries comply with LOAC, while others do not.  
Rationalist Apologetics 
To make predictions about how state leaders and other international 
actors make decisions, those working from a strategic-choice perspective 
assume that such actors are rational.472 This is not to say that they are human 
calculators, or that they necessarily know what is in their self-interest in an 
objective sense, merely that, as a ‘methodological bet’, a methodological 
framework that assumes rationality on the part of international actors should 
accurately describe reality more often than one that assumes irrational decision 
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471
 Ibid, 5. 
472
 Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, Principles of International Politics (Sage 2013), 6. 
   
 
 
142 
 
 
making.473 To be considered rational, actors must have a set of preferred 
outcomes from a strategic interaction that are complete and transitive. By 
complete, I mean that they can express how each outcome relates to the 
others. For instance, in a possible set of outcomes, x, y, and z, a state leader 
could prefer x to y and can prefer y to z. By transitive, I mean that there is a 
logical consistency to the preferences; using the example above, the leader can 
prefer x to z, but not z to x. 474  
The strategic-choice perspective remains agnostic as to the content of 
actor’s preferences and side-steps some of the grand debates in IR, like what 
constitutes a state’s national interest.475 Therefore, the approach is more a way 
of examining specific strategic problems in international relations, rather than a 
theory in its own right.476 The core analytic tool of the perspective is game 
theory, which specifically addresses the way that actors try to achieve their 
preferred outcomes, given what they believe others will do.477 By assuming 
rationality as a baseline condition and using the methodology of game theory, 
researchers working under the strategic-choice approach can make clear and 
parsimonious478  predictions about questions in international relations which can 
be tested empirically.479 
None of this is meant to discount the actual complexity of the real world. 
Indeed, those who adopt a strategic-choice approach understand that the 
phenomena under observation are often influenced by many variables which 
may be interacting with each other in chaotic (and therefore unexpected) ways, 
but by choosing to engage with some facets of strategic decision-making and 
not others, researchers are able to make their assumptions and logic clearer. 
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 Lake and Powell, 6-7.  However, it should be noted that at this stage, the supporters of the strategic-
choice approach yield that they do not yet know what odds a bookie would assign this bet: ‘In sum, the 
strategic-choice approach, like all research approaches, is really a series of bets about what will prove to 
be fruitful ways to increase our understanding of international relations. Some aspects of this approach will 
undoubtedly turn out more helpful than others. Indeed, some are likely to prove counterproductive. 
Unfortunately it is impossible to be sure ahead of time which of these bets will pay off. Future research will 
have to probe the boundaries of usefulness.’ ibid, 20. 
474
 Bueno de Mesquita, 7 
475
 Ibid, 10. 
476
 Lake and Powell, 6. 
477
 Bueno de Mesquita, 29. 
478
 Ibid, 41. 
479
 Lake and Powell, 5. 
   
 
 
143 
 
 
James Rogers likens this sort of abstraction to the way that cartographers 
design maps.480 The cartographer knows fully well that a map does not include 
every detail about the geography of a place and may, in fact, design several 
maps of the same place, including different details that are fit for different 
purposes. To include all the known details of the place (location of electrical 
cables, local bird migration patterns, and the water table depth) would clutter 
the map, making it difficult to use for navigation (but such details could be 
reintroduced as needed for an electrician, an ornithologist, or a builder).  Such 
is the case with game theoretic modelling as well; the model is meant to be a 
useful abstraction, not the complete description of a political process. 
Furthermore, the strategic-choice perspective allows researchers to consider 
not only the historical path that lead to any particular equilibrium state in a 
strategic interaction, but also the counterfactual conditions.481 This feature of 
the strategic choice perspective enables researchers to make predictions about 
what changes to the interaction would be necessary to change the actor’s 
choices to a new equilibrium path.   
Similarly, Jeffrey Dunoff and Joel Tranchtman, argue that scholars could 
easily apply the insights gained from the related field of law and economics 
(L&E) to the study of LOAC and that doing so could complement more 
theoretically-complex doctrinal analyses.482 Though the results of this sort of 
economic analysis may appear quite dull to legal scholars, Dunoff and 
Tranchtman argue that nevertheless, there is value in making explicit what 
might be considered settled assumptions about the way the law functions: 
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In many respects these techniques formalize, extend and contextualize insights that are 
familiar to most international lawyers. But this formalization is important — it allows us 
to focus on relevant variables, generate hypotheses, and, to some extent, empirically 
test those hypotheses. Furthermore, it provides a firmer and less subjective basis for 
argumentation than traditional international law analysis. It is less subjective insofar as it 
eschews simple natural law or epithet-based argumentation, and provides the capacity 
to render transparent the distributive consequences of legal rules. Perhaps most 
important to scholars, it furnishes a basis for a progressive research program built on 
shared foundations, one that will seek to answer research questions and move on, 
farther than endlessly address the same tired questions.
483
  
Whilst it might not be surprising that the application of the law is susceptible to 
political influence (after all, the law is created through political processes), in 
some quarters, there is nevertheless a resistance to the idea of subjecting the 
study of international law to the sort of reductive strategic analyses favoured by 
political scientists. For example, Martti Koskenniemi expressed concern that: 
‘[I]nterdisciplinarity’ often comes with a dubious politics. I am particularly thinking of the 
kind of ‘managerialism’ that suggests that international problems — problems of 
‘globalization’ — should be resolved by developing increasingly complicated technical 
vocabularies for institutional policy-making… Managerialism wants to realize ‘actors’’ 
(often identified as billiard-ball states) more or less unproblematic ‘interests’. For it, the 
objectives of institutional action are given and the only remaining questions concern 
their manner of optimal realization… For the managerialist, normative questions about 
the ends of action or about the right order between conflicting ends appear only in the 
language of ‘legitimacy’ that translates them into empirically manoeuvrable ‘feelings’ in 
the audience... The more one conceives of international law in those terms, however, 
the sillier it begins to look. The world's causalities are too complex, the strategic 
simplifications too crude. The functional ‘interest’ is not a solid policy datum to ‘apply’ 
but an object of interpretative controversy, stable neither in place nor in time and just as 
indeterminate as the ‘rule’ that it was to replace — although of course accompanied by 
a different bias, that of the policy-science elite.
484 
 
Koskenniemi is correct that economic modelling can sometimes oversimplify the 
nature of a strategic interaction, but rather than dismissing the exercise outright, 
those working from the strategic-choice perspective would argue that the value 
of any individual model depends upon its ability to withstand empirical scrutiny. 
Therefore, even if a particular model is ill-fitting, that is no reason to abandon 
the perspective altogether.  
His other critique of the perspective is apt and something which political 
scientists should keep in mind when studying international law through a 
strategic-choice lens. Historically, game theory has been advanced, not as a 
way to describe strategic interactions, but rather as a normative tool to help 
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policy-makers make more rational decisions ex ante,485 so the perspective’s 
normative focus on maximising actors’ ‘utility’ can be problematic when those 
actors’ preferences are taken as an exogeneous feature of the problem under 
study. If efficiency is taken to be the highest good, then some outcomes which 
might shock the conscience can still be considered the ‘right’ outcome if the 
researcher ignores the moral implications of the actors’ preferences and what 
actions are taken to achieve pareto optimality. In this study, I endeavoured to 
first explain why accountability for errant strikes is the right outcome and then I 
bring in game theory to explain how it might be possible to achieve it. My goal 
here is not to hold up strategic thinking as a virtue in itself. Rather, I show that it 
is something that constrains what is possible when evaluating different ways to 
promote greater accountability for violations of proportionality and precautions 
in attack.  
Actors, Their Preferences and the Strategic Environment 
Instead of focusing solely on the state as the unit of analysis, the strategic-
choice perspective promotes a ‘boxes within boxes’ approach to understanding 
the interactions of actors across multiple levels of analysis.486 However, it is up 
to the researcher to set the boundaries of their study a priori, selecting those 
actors which will be the most relevant to the issue at hand and aggregating 
features from lower levels of analysis where appropriate.487 Often, researchers 
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will examine the pressures placed upon individuals in order to show how 
personal motivations influence global politics.488 In this study, the most relevant 
actors will be prosecutors and officials from a state that regularly uses air 
power. This is because these individuals have historically had the most direct 
impact on how the law on proportionality and precautions in attack was created 
and applied.489 By prosecutors, I mean those with the ability to pursue or defer 
prosecution of an accused war criminal, in either international or domestic 
courts. By state officials, I mean those officials of a state with the ability to 
influence that state’s war crimes policy. I make an added assumption for my 
analysis that the state official represents a country that regularly uses air power, 
because it is officials from those states who seem to be most threatened by the 
imposition of stricter accountability mechanisms for targeting violations.490 
Along with preferences, actors have beliefs about other players and 
about the strategic environment491 in which they find themselves. If an actor is 
reasonably certain about how to interact with others in a given game and about 
how those actors will, in turn, will respond to them, then it is easy for them to 
form a strategy,492 that will allow them to maximise their expected utility from the 
interaction.493 However, uncertainty over the rules of the game or the intentions 
of other actors makes it difficult to choose one particular course of action over 
another. An actor’s beliefs are thus shaped by the degree of this uncertainty 
                                                                                                                                
 
actors to include. Choosing the actors in a theory is a pragmatic judgment the researcher makes about 
what is likely to prove a fruitful way to analyze the issue at hand.’ Lake and Powell, 34. 
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and by how they judge the behaviour of the other actors.494 For example, if after 
playing several games of chess against someone who always makes the same 
opening moves, one might develop a belief about the opponent’s skill level. This 
belief allows that player to adapt their strategy to best deal with the opponent in 
subsequent games.  
Once the model has been built, one can then change the parameters 
which govern the actors’ expected utility or those which define the strategic 
environment in order to see how the interaction would logically progress under 
different counterfactual situations.   
Strategic Models of LOAC Compliance 
To date, the most complete analysis of LOAC using the strategic-choice 
perspective can be found in the work of James Morrow, who has argued that 
the law does affect the behaviour of actors during wartime, but not always in the 
ways that traditional IR theories would have expected. A question about 
whether a state will follow LOAC, for example, would not be best understood by 
examining how powerful that state is in relation to its enemy, or whether the 
state has internalised international human rights norms.495 Instead, he claimed 
that the law creates common conjectures about the way that the ‘game’ of war 
ought to be played. The signing of international treaties is strategic signalling 
tool, screening out those who will never play by the rules.496 National leaders 
then fight wars either according to the law or they adjust their strategies to deal 
with the effects of the law. Therefore, even if state leaders choose to violate the 
law, they do so knowing which behaviours will likely provoke a response from 
the enemy, domestic audiences and other actors in the international sphere. 
Furthermore, they might even have a good idea about what those responses 
will be.497 The insights gained from Morrow’s analysis are intuitive in many 
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ways, but could be considered problematic from a legalist perspective, 
particularly one that holds courts to be independent actors. This is not to say 
that legal reasoning is invalid or that it holds a subordinate role to politics — 
only to say that strategic considerations set the boundaries of how far power is 
willing to pay tribute to reason.   
In war, as with any strategic activity, common conjectures are necessary 
for creating expectations about how actors will respond to different signals in a 
given game.498 For example, if two people are playing chess, both players know 
that the knight can only make L-shaped moves. It allows people who have 
never spoken to each other or who speak different languages to nonetheless 
have a mutual understanding of what behaviour the other player is expecting 
from them when they move their knight.  A body of law may have different 
sources: shared cultural expectations, pre-negotiated treaties or organically 
arising custom,499 but the function of the law in Morrow’s view is the same—it 
serves as a way for states to plan their strategies around a common conjecture. 
His analysis of LOAC compliance identifies who the relevant actors are, what 
games are being played and what equilibrium states arise after the same actors 
play a game over time to study compliance with the law at national and 
individual levels.  
At the level of the states, a state leader must consider the domestic costs 
of non-compliance with the law, even if pursuing a policy of non-compliance 
might give the state an advantage against the enemy. This is a more acute 
concern for democratic leaders, than for autocratic ones, because the former 
must answer to domestic coalitions who wish to see the leader live up to 
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international agreements (or who worry about the effects of enemy reprisals on 
their fellow citizens). The latter have more freedom of action to ignore LOAC 
because they only need to worry about the law if they are concerned that 
enemy reprisals will significantly affect their war efforts.500 However, despite the 
general trend of LOAC away from reprisals,501 Morrow warns that reciprocity is 
a key ingredient for LOAC compliance. Unilateral restraint by one party to a 
conflict provokes more violations on the part of the other.502 In the absence of 
other mechanisms in the offending country, such as audience costs or reliable 
post-bellum prosecution, reprisals may be the only reliable way for a state to 
inflict costs on its enemy that are high enough to overcome the payoffs from the 
enemy’s violations. 
Compliance is not just an issue for state leaders. Rather, one must also 
look at the incentives for following the law at each link in the chain of command. 
Although the leaders of a state may have decided that it is in their best interest 
to comply with the law, Morrow claims that the ‘cruel logic of [the] battlefield — 
kill or be killed’ creates different games that can induce soldiers to violate the 
law under certain circumstances.503 Specifically, he sees compliance with the 
law at this level as a function of temptation and vulnerability. Combatants may 
violate the law because they are tempted to achieve better results on the 
battlefield for themselves and/or may do so because they feel vulnerable under 
their current rules of engagement and wish to perform an action that they feel 
will protect their own lives. In this model, the preferred outcomes of the state 
leadership do not count as much as the short-term (but personally very 
important) interests of the combatants. If the temptation to commit violations is 
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high because it gives the soldiers an immediately useful result, and the risk of 
retaliation is low, then violations will increase. Likewise, if the combatants on 
one side of the conflict feel vulnerable to violations from the other side, then 
they will also violate the law in order to protect their own forces.504 The main 
mechanisms keeping troops from violating the standard is the degree to which 
soldiers are monitored and punished by their own chains of command505 and 
the possibility of retaliatory violations from the other side.506 Zooming back out 
to the level of the state, leaders are making their own decisions to either follow 
or disregard LOAC. Violations507 by individual troops introduce ‘noise’ into the 
informational structure of these higher-order games, making it difficult for 
leaders to signal their true intentions. This sometimes forces reciprocal 
agreements to break down even though it was in neither party’s interest for 
them to do so.508  
In his final assessment, ‘successful law’ Morrow argues, ‘particularly at 
the international level, requires a marriage of moral principles with strategic 
logic if actors are to follow those principles’.509  His analysis focused mostly on 
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the way in which the strategic interactions of state actors affect compliance with 
the law of armed conflict, claiming that LOAC as an institution must be self-
enforcing.510 He was, therefore, far less sanguine about the ability of 
international courts to meaningfully contribute to LOAC compliance: 
Prosecution is primarily a threat to leaders who lose a war or to those in law-bound 
states that are willing to turn the accused leader over to the ICC. The former are 
unlikely to be deterred from violations that they think will help them win, thereby 
insulating themselves from the threat of prosecution. The latter are leaders of 
democracies that have been willing to comply with their treaty obligations even 
unilaterally. The prosecutions then are likely to be autocratic losers and democratic 
leaders who engage in legally questionable behavior, acts that some would not consider 
violations and so could justify under their treaty obligations. Both of these types of 
cases can be seen as politically motivated rather than the pursuit of neutral law; the 
former because the losers but not the winners are brought to court, the latter because 
some will accept those leaders’ public justifications of their acts as legal.
511
 [emphasis 
added] 
Given that the ICC has been accused of selectively investigating and 
prosecuting African leaders,512 some of whom could be considered autocratic or 
at least illiberal,513 Morrow may be correct about the fact that the courts only 
manage to go after the unsuccessful autocrats of the world. But, do the courts 
also go after the leaders of democracies, particularly powerful democracies, 
who engage in legally questionable behaviour, such as ordering or conducting 
disproportionate strikes? The case law presented in Chapter 2 suggests that 
they do not. Perhaps because he saw international courts as non-actors (or 
indeed as being actively harmful to the goal of ensuring LOAC compliance), 
Morrow did not look at strategic interactions happening between such courts 
and the states. However, modelling these interactions could prove to be fruitful, 
particularly if they reveal under what conditions a court might actually prosecute 
a democratic leader for a legally questionable action.  
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Strategic Models of Court Actors  
There is a rich literature in L&E and the strategic-choice perspective on the way 
in which judges will decide cases for strategic, rather than purely legal reasons. 
For instance, there has been much written on how U.S. Supreme Court justices 
are influenced by other actors in the balance-of-powers system. Theoretically, if 
justices’ decisions were to provoke the ire of the legislature or presidency, the 
other branches have constitutional checks that they could deploy against the 
Court.514 Several studies have indeed shown that justices tend to defer to other 
branches of government when exercising judicial review515 and they sometimes 
even adjust the content516 of their decisions based on what they expect the 
other branches of government might do in response. Moreover, judges from 
international courts have likewise deferred to the court’s member states (which 
supply the court with a budget and legitimacy) in their judicial decisions, unless 
there are domestic interest groups which can support the work of the court in 
the face of state pressure.517  
Looking specifically at ICTs, there is a nascent, yet growing literature on 
the role that strategic considerations play in the decisions of actors in these 
types of international courts as well. The studies conducted so far have tended 
to focus on the ability of ICTs to deter atrocious conduct on the part of state 
leaders. Dan Sutter, for instance, claimed that the mere threat of ICC sanctions 
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was enough to cause leaders to reconsider whether it would make sense to 
commit atrocities against their own populations to stay in power518 and as with 
Morrow’s analysis of LOAC generally, some scholars such as Michael 
Gilligan519 and Nada Ali520 have argued that the ICC regime521 may be self-
enforcing, requiring no special action on the part of the prosecutor to be 
effective. Gilligan suggested that without methodological rigour, it had been 
difficult for scholars to evaluate whether the ICC was capable of deterring 
leaders from committing atrocities: 
While the modal opinion in legal journals probably supports the creation of the ICC, the 
Court has been the object of virulent criticism from both legal scholars and 
policymakers. Unfortunately neither the Court's proponents nor its detractors have been 
particularly rigorous in how they have made their arguments, so it is difficult to tell if the 
disagreement stems from faulty logic or simply from differences in unstated 
assumptions.
522
 
Therefore, he constructed a game-theoretic model of a possible interaction 
between the court, a criminal state leader and a third-party willing to offer the 
leader amnesty, should they wish to ‘retire’ somewhere away from their 
enemies. Normally, after a leader commits an atrocity, they could either try to 
stay in power or flee to another country, if offered asylum. The third-party 
country, in seeking to shore up the instability caused by the criminal leader, may 
be willing to offer them asylum as an incentive to get them to step down (and 
presumably stop the abuses which are causing the instability). However, if they 
try to stay in power, there is a chance that they might be deposed and given a 
severe punishment by the opposition. However, with the ICC in play, a criminal 
leader may then choose between staying in power, seeking asylum or 
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surrendering to the ICC, with the understanding that the punishment meted out 
by the ICC will be less severe than if they are deposed by the opposition. This, 
in turn, changes the strategy of the country that was going to offer the criminal 
leader asylum. The third-country knows that a criminal leader, with no offers of 
asylum and rebels at the gates, will be inclined to turn themselves in to the ICC. 
If they do turn themselves in, this does not cost the third-country anything. 
Therefore, the third country will only accept the asylum request of those 
stubborn criminal leaders who find themselves at the point where they are 
confident enough in their chances of staying in power that they will not 
surrender to the ICC, but they are not so confident in their chances of staying in 
power as to risk being deposed.523;524  
Even without a police force to carry out its arrest warrants, Gilligan believes 
that the ICC regime can induce some criminal leaders to turn themselves in and 
that the mere existence of the court may prevent a leader from committing 
crimes in the first place, because they know that they won’t be granted asylum 
as readily as they might have been in the past and there is a possibility of 
punishment from both the Court as well as the opposition.525 
Critiquing Gilligan’s model, Ali similarly examined whether the ICC regime 
could successfully prevent leaders from committing atrocities in internal 
conflicts. However, breaking with Gilligan’s model, she looked at how the 
existence of the ICC might also affect the behaviour of opposition group 
leaders. Since the ICC would be just as likely to prosecute opposition leaders 
for committing atrocities as state leaders, rebels must factor in ICC prosecution 
as a possible cost associated with rebelling. If a rebel leader does not believe 
that the opposition forces are strong enough to win the conflict without 
committing its own atrocities, then they can expect to incur a cost from the ICC. 
The strength and likelihood of this cost must be compared against the expected 
utility the rebels hope to gain by seizing power. If the likelihood of post-regime-
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change prosecution is too high, the opposition may choose not to rebel. This, in 
turn, changes the incentives for the state leader that Gilligan described in his 
model. Without the rebels at the gates to motivate the leader’s departure from 
power, they are less likely to surrender to the ICC or to seek asylum elsewhere, 
thus motivating them to stay in power.  Practically, this means that having the 
ICC in play may perversely incentivise state leaders to commit more atrocities 
than they would in the absence of the court, because those leaders know that 
weak opposition groups (i.e. groups that must commit atrocities to win a conflict) 
will come under the prosecutor’s gaze if they win the conflict, so the opposition 
may therefore choose not to rebel in the first place, thereby removing a potential 
cost associated with committing atrocities described in Gilligan’s model.526 
Therefore, depending on what type of opposition the criminal leader thinks they 
are facing (i.e. strong or weak), it may be in the state leader’s interest to either: 
 refrain from committing atrocities, because it can expect a strong enough 
punishment from the strong opposition or the ICC; or 
 commit atrocities, because a weak opposition will not launch a rebellion 
in the shadow of future ICC punishment and without that rebel pressure, 
the state leader will not have an incentive to surrender to the ICC.  
If, on the other hand, the opposition is strong enough to fight without committing 
their own atrocities or the punishments meted out by the ICC are calibrated to 
account for the efficacy of the opposition, then Gilligan’s model should work as 
expected.  
Besides accounting for the possibility that the existence of the ICC 
regime would change opposition group behaviour, Ali also created a separate 
principal-agent model to examine the likelihood that subordinate criminals will 
provide high-quality evidence against their bosses in exchange for leniency 
from the court. As discussed in Chapter 3, one of the difficulties that 
prosecutors face when prosecuting cases of disproportionate attack is that they 
must acquire testimony from witnesses near the commander or other insider 
information that can confirm the commander’s criminal intent to cause 
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excessive collateral damage.527 The ICC might therefore be able to prosecute 
more high-ranking individuals for command responsibility than they otherwise 
might by offering the right incentives for lower-ranking offenders to testify 
against their bosses. However, those incentives should not be so high as to 
change the ‘price’ of committing an offense on behalf of their boss.528 The 
boss’s incentives change, based on whether such a leniency programme makes 
the subordinate offender’s defection public. If the prosecutor reveals the 
defection, leaders will likely retaliate against the defector, changing the 
subordinate’s costs associated with defection, so they will be less likely to report 
the leader. However, if the prosecutor does not reveal the subordinate’s 
defection, the leader will not have the information needed to retaliate against 
the subordinate who defected and will instead go after a random subordinate.  
Based on the logic of her model, Ali argues that the ICC can discourage 
atrocities by raising the costs of committing an atrocity for the leader, because it 
is more likely that a leader will be convicted if there is a post-regime-change 
trial. This, in turn, means that the leader must pay their subordinates more to 
ensure they will participate in the criminal enterprise, given they must factor in 
the costs associated with possible arbitrary retaliation from their boss down the 
road, if they get caught. If these combined costs exceed the benefits associated 
with committing the atrocity, then the leader will choose not to engage in such 
conduct in the first place. 529 Ali also believes that the existence of a confidential 
leniency programme might also incentivise subordinates to collect high-quality 
information about atrocities as they occur to hedge against prosecution down 
the road.530 Therefore, by merely looking at the costs and benefits incurred by a 
small number of actors (the ICC, the subordinate and the leader), making a 
small number of decisions (offer a leniency programme or not; collect info about 
atrocities/defect against leader or not; commit atrocities or not), Ali could 
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analyse the possible repercussions of several counterfactual paths through a 
decision tree to show under what conditions it might be beneficial for the ICC to 
offer leniency to low-ranking criminals.  
 To examine how an ICT might lure or compel indictees to appear before 
the court, Emily Ritter and Scott Wolford examined the only unilateral tool that 
courts have which might affect the behaviour of the accused: offering pre-arrest 
incentives to surrender.531 They envisaged the interaction between indictees 
and prosecutors as a bargaining game and defined three equilibria to determine 
how the game would logically proceed if the court were to offer varying levels of 
leniency to entice the indictee to secure their surrender. In the ‘high leniency’ 
equilibrium of the game, they set the indictee’s cost of surrender so low that any 
indictee would turn themselves over to the court rather than remain at large 
(and risk of being caught by one’s enemies). A court may be willing to sacrifice 
tough justice to get a full historical account of past atrocities or to be seen as 
pursuing a full docket of cases, thus justifying their institutional maintenance 
costs. However, the court’s efforts would end up incentivising crime because 
the payoffs of committing a crime and surrendering to the court would end up 
outweighing the payoffs of committing no crime at all. In the ‘mid-leniency’ 
equilibrium, the court would offer only as much incentive to the indictee as 
would be necessary to balance out the indictee’s incentives of remaining at 
large. To avoid making offers that are too low, the ‘mid-leniency’ court would 
issue fewer warrants; instead, they would only target those individuals whose 
incentive to remain at large matched an acceptable bargain for the court. 
Finally, in the ‘no-leniency’ equilibrium, the court does not bargain with the 
fugitive at all, offering only a full sentence if the indictee is tried and found guilty. 
In response, the fugitive remains at large with the only pressure to surrender 
coming from third-party actors. This court would issue a high number of 
indictments with the expectation that only a few individuals will be brought 
before the bench, but it does not incentivise crime in the same way that the 
‘low-leniency’ court does.  
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A court’s type could be determined endogenously, by looking at the 
incentives of the court either to appear strict or to appear to have a full docket, 
or set exogenously by its institutional mandate. The latter is the case with the 
ICC, which has no authority under its mandate to offer pre-arrest deals. Ritter 
and Wolford suggest that this could be thought of as a signal to potential 
criminals about its willingness to pursue only strict sentences.532 Formalising 
this game yields three important benefits for those researching court-indictee 
interactions. Firstly, it sharpens the logic of an argument, forcing the researcher 
to define precisely what is being held constant, what variables are of interest 
and the exact relationship between the variables in a game. Secondly, it also 
allows researchers to explore counterfactuals in a rigorous way. The ICC does 
not currently allow for pre-arrest bargaining, but by looking at the outcomes of 
the bargaining game at different equilibria, one can be reasonably confident 
about what would happen if it were to allow it. Finally, it also allows the 
researchers to develop testable hypotheses based on the model which can be 
explored empirically.533        
 Ritter and Wolford also developed a model of state-indictee interaction to 
complemented their earlier work on court-indictee interaction. They envisage 
this interaction as an iterated two-stage game. In the first stage, an indictee can 
either surrender to the court upfront or choose to remain at large. Then, in the 
second stage, if the indictee remains at large, a state authority must determine 
whether they should pursue them. The state authority will only do so if the 
anticipated political payoff of successfully apprehending the indictee outweighs 
the material and political costs of the effort. Through backwards-induction, one 
can then predict if the indictee, who is anticipating the costs of successfully 
matching the state’s apprehension efforts, will consider it more advantageous to 
surrender to the court upfront or remain at large. Since the game is iterated, the 
actors are constantly assessing both their own costs and payoffs and those of 
their opponent. Through their analysis, Ritter and Wolford derived several 
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testable hypotheses. Some seem quite intuitive. For example, they claim that 
the probability that states would apprehend indictees or indictees would 
surrender themselves to the court would increase when domestic support for 
the court’s work is high or when international incentives to cooperate with the 
court are high. Furthermore, they reason that capture or surrender is more likely 
when the indictee is accused of multiple counts of international crimes. This is 
because indictees with fewer charges levelled against them may be more 
controversial targets for state actors to pursue and it may be difficult to secure a 
conviction against indictees with fewer charges; therefore, the political costs to 
the state are higher vis-à-vis other indictees with more charges. Moreover, 
indictees are more likely to be caught or surrender whenever they are charged 
with participation in crimes, rather than command responsibility. This is because 
those bearing command responsibility are more likely to have resources which 
allow them to evade the state authorities, which decreases the costs of evasion 
for the indictee and correspondingly increases the cost of pursuit for the state.   
Compiling a database which included the Case Information Sheets of 
144 ICTY indictees, Ritter and Wolford could then test these hypotheses by 
showing how long each indictee could remain at large. Indeed, they found that 
general support for the idea that democratic institutions in a state increased the 
chances that an indictee would be caught or would surrender, as did increased 
international pressure on a state.534 Furthermore, as predicted, those who were 
accused of having minor roles in atrocities were more likely to surrender or be 
arrested opposed to those who bore command responsibility for them. Likewise, 
those who had more counts of crimes levelled against them were more likely to 
be caught or to surrender, but this was only the case for war crimes rather than 
genocide or crimes against humanity (suggesting again that those who commit 
bigger crimes have more resources to evade). However, Ritter and Wolford 
were unable to find evidence to support the hypothesis that international 
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pressure influenced the length of time that indictees spent at large.535 The work 
of Ritter and Wolford therefore shows the potential for using the strategic choice 
perspective to analyse the behaviour of international courts, the states and 
individual indictees and their empirical work provides support for previously 
unexamined assumptions.  
When combined with empirical support, strategic-choice modelling forces 
researchers to be clear about their assumptions and logic, so it makes it much 
easier to see if what they predict will happen will actually occur more often than 
not. This analysis helps to unstick some of the old debates in the field of 
international law where the acolytes of each camp are able to construct 
convincing rhetorical arguments for either side, but the evidentiary bases for 
either might only consist of a handful of case studies.  
The Basic Model of Prosecutorial Strategy 
Of particular interest to the present study is the role that prosecutorial discretion 
plays in helping (or hindering) accountability for violations of proportionality and 
precautions in attack. The basic model of prosecutorial strategy, developed by 
William Landes, describes a prosecutor’s decision to push forward with a 
prosecution as being contingent upon, inter alia, the number of cases a 
prosecutor has to deal with at any given point in time, the resources available to 
the prosecutor, and the likely sentence of the crime for which the defendant has 
been accused.536 The prosecutor’s motivation is to maximise the total value of 
the sentences issued to all defendants on the docket, so, all things being equal, 
they must allocate the most resources to those cases which are likely to end in 
conviction and to those which are likely to produce longer sentences.537 
Moreover, the prosecutor has a budget which constrains the maximum resource 
that they can bear for the whole caseload.538 Roger Bowles formulated the 
resultant function which describes this motivation as: 
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𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑒 ∑ 𝑝𝑗(𝑟𝑗) ∙ 𝑠𝑗     𝑠𝑢𝑐ℎ 𝑡ℎ𝑎𝑡 ∑ 𝑟𝑗 ≤ 𝑅
𝑚𝑎𝑥
𝑗
 
Where j represents an index of the prosecutor’s caseload, pj is the probability of 
conviction for any particular case, rj represents the resources allocated to a 
particular case and sj is the sentence given to a particular defendant if the case 
is won; Rmax is the prosecutor’s total budget.539 Therefore, it may be more 
efficient to drop those cases (or offer a plea bargain) where probability of 
conviction, pj, is not high enough to justify the added resource expenditure 
needed to raise the probability high enough to achieve a particular sentence, sj, 
given the context of the prosecutor’s full caseload.540 Even though the basic 
model is based on the criminal justice system, the fundamentals of this model 
can be applied to civil litigation as well.541 
 Though the most prominent extensions of this model explain the plea-
bargaining process,542 researchers have also built upon it by questioning 
whether it is appropriate to assume that a prosecutor’s motivation is necessarily 
driven by the number and length of criminal sentences they accrue over the 
course of their tenure. As Bowles notes,  
The Landes model is based on the assumption that prosecutors make their resource 
allocation decisions across cases in such a way as to maximize the product of the 
probability of a conviction and the sentence across cases. For this to be a reliable 
characterization of real-world behavior it is required that the agencies employing 
prosecutors construct employment contracts with incentives aligned with this 
objective.
543
 
For instance, when comparing the incentives of prosecutors in most US 
jurisdictions with their counterparts in England & Wales, the former are often 
elected or politically appointed whereas the later are hired by a politically 
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independent prosecution service. This has had the effect of making prosecutors 
in the US more likely to take cases to trial, even when taking advantage of plea 
deals would lead to a more socially optimal outcome. This is because a 
prosecutor who can show an impressive conviction record will be regarded by 
voters as one who is tough on crime. Therefore, to signal their quality to the 
electorate, prosecutors during an election season will take more cases to trial, 
even if offering more plea deals would have yielded higher overall sentences 
given the prosecutor’s time and resources.544  In contrast, the more 
bureaucratically-orientated nature of the Crown Prosecution Service motivates 
prosecutors to show their peers that they are working according to the 
standards demanded by the organisation (which are designed to be socially 
optimal) in order to secure further work.545  
 In war crimes cases, it is likely that the prosecutor will either work for an 
ICT or a national military justice system.546 In either case, the prosecutor will 
probably not be an elected official, but they might nevertheless be receptive to 
the way that their office is perceived by civil society.547 Although in broad 
strokes, the basic model correctly describes prosecutorial motivation in war 
crimes prosecutions, I would suggest that the acquittals are costlier for 
prosecutors in these cases than accounted for in the model. The only costs to 
the prosecutor in the basic model are those associated with running an 
investigation and presenting the case at trial, so once the prosecutor decides to 
go to trial, these costs are the same regardless of whether the case ultimately 
ends in a conviction or an acquittal. However, in a war crimes trial, the 
prosecutor must also consider the costs to their office’s legitimacy for having 
brought a case that ends in an acquittal. This is for two reasons. Firstly, the 
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victims may lose faith in judicial remedies for making amends,548 and secondly, 
popular opinion in the accused’s home country may turn against the prosecutor 
for having brought what the state and public perceive are vexatious charges 
against their service members.549 Therefore, popular legitimacy may be a better 
measure of what motivates the prosecutor in war crimes cases, than the length 
of a defendant’s sentence alone. 
Empirical Support for Strategic Treaty Writing 
In Chapter 3, I identified the vagueness of the wording used to define 
proportionality and precautions in attack as one of the difficulties which have 
made accountability for violations of these rules so difficult. One possibility for 
why the law is so vague is that it allows delegates to international conferences 
to introduce some strategic flexibility in to how the law might eventually be 
applied by international courts.550 This insight is broadly supported by the most 
empirically robust study of flexibility in international agreements, Barbara 
Koremenos’ Continent of International Law project. In it, she examined several 
characteristics of a random sample of international agreements, including the 
degree to which the provisions in an international agreement were vague or 
precise. Koremenos predicted that the amount of vagueness in an international 
agreement would vary depending on the underlying cooperation problem that 
the accord was meant to address.551  
Cooperation problems could be related to difficulties of coordination, 
difficulties of distribution, or some combination of the two. Coordination 
problems describe those issues where states need to agree on how to work 
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together to solve a mutual problem (such as creating common air traffic control 
procedures), whereas distribution problems are those which describe how 
states are meant to reconcile differences in preferences (such as a border 
dispute).552 In the case of treaties pertaining to human rights, the subject matter 
involves a distribution problem553  with no underlying coordination problem. This 
means that states have different preferences as to what should be included as 
part of a human rights regime. Nevertheless, a human rights treaty can allow 
states to adopt varying standards and still fulfil the overall goal of the agreement 
(i.e. they do not necessarily need to coordinate their actions for the treaty to be 
successful).  
Koremenos argues that the vagueness in the text of a human rights 
treaty arises as a way of dealing with the differences in the distribution of 
preferences between states regarding what should be included in the text. 554 
For example, if two states want to signal their commitment to human rights to a 
third state, with the hopes of convincing the third state to adopt the same 
standards, they could sign a treaty which enshrines those standards in law. If 
the issue is unlawful aerial attacks, State 1 may prefer a strict liability for all 
civilian casualties in combat, State 2 may prefer a standard that makes an 
exception for all damage caused while attacking a military objective and State 3 
rejects the idea that civilians ought to be kept out of the fight and wants full 
freedom to attack them during war.555 Each state is prepared to accept a 
negotiated settlement which brings the others in line with its own regulatory 
preferences, but will not accept a settlement which deviates too far from its 
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present stance. However, with some strategic vagueness like that found in the 
proportionality rule and the duty to take all ‘feasible’ precautions in attack, 
States 1 and 2 might reach an agreement which requires neither to support a 
standard which deviates too far from their current practice. In doing so, both can 
advance their shared preference for a general international norm of non-
combatant immunity to contrast their position against that of State 3. So, the 
vagueness of the treaty does not indicate that ‘anything goes’ or that the 
provisions of the treaty are infinitely flexible, only that there will be some 
variation in how the treaty is applied by State 1 or State 2.556  
To test the hypothesis that, without an underlying coordination problem, 
human rights treaties would use more vague language than other treaties that 
do require states to coordinate, such as economic treaties, Koremenos and her 
collegues coded each of the 234 treaties in her sample on a four-point scale of 
vagueness.557 Then, she compared agreements involving human rights against 
other issues, such as economics, security or the environment. As predicted, 
those treaties which had involved a distribution problem, but did not require 
states to coordinate their actions were vaguer than those which involved a 
coordination problem. For human rights treaties, this effect was even more 
pronounced as they had the least precise language out of all four issue areas 
included in the study. Moreover, states were far more likely to issue a 
reservation to a human rights treaty than an agreement from any other issue 
area.558  
On a cautionary note, treaties based on LOAC and ICL do not map 
neatly on to Koremenos’ issue areas. Though they may share some features 
with the human rights issue area, they also involve topics which bleed into the 
security issue area. Therefore, LOAC and ICL do require more state 
coordination than might be expected from a human rights declaration, which 
would be aimed at how the state conducts its domestic affairs. Nevertheless, 
her insight broadly corroborates what Lietzau had said about why he wanted 
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further precision on the proportionality rule as a matter of ICL, compared with 
the standard as it found its way into LOAC.559 API more closely resembles a 
human rights treaty than does the Rome Statute, which instead cuts deeper into 
the security domain by holding individual troops and leaders responsible for 
misconduct. Therefore, one would expect to see more precision in the Rome 
Statute compared to API.  
In the context of the present study, Koremenos’ work establishes the fact 
that state officials are strategic actors who use both the black letter of the law 
and its latent ambiguities to advance their preferred interpretation of the general 
principle that has been accepted by the international community. Moreover, it 
establishes that it might not always be in the state’s interest to keep a provision 
vague; rather for coordination problems, such as figuring out who should be 
sent to prison for war crimes, it may be in the state’s interest to resolve that 
vagueness in a way that ensures its citizens are not going to be the subject of 
the regime.  
Conclusions 
Although it is surely helpful to consider doctrinal and procedural reasons why 
the law functions the way it does, this type of analysis can be complemented by 
also examining a tricky legal problem from a strategic-choice perspective. The 
logic behind this perspective has already provided some deep insights about 
the way international law affects the behaviour of actors in armed conflict from 
multiple levels of analysis. Though Morrow’s ground-breaking application of the 
strategic-choice perspective to the study of LOAC helped to explain under what 
conditions the law would affect state behaviour, he did not see international 
criminal tribunals/courts as particularly significant actors. To the extent that he 
addressed the courts, he assumed that unsuccessful autocrats and legally-
questionable democrats would end up in the dock for LOAC violations. The 
crime of disproportionate attack is an example of such legally-questionable 
behaviour, but to date, no state or non-state actors from neither democracies 
nor autocracies have ever been convicted of it, suggesting that there might be 
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more at play than whether the accused came from a weak autocracy or a 
fastidious democracy. 
The strategic-choice approach has also been used to show how the 
actions of the president and Congress in the US balance of powers system 
affect Supreme Court justices’ decisions to hear cases and the content of their 
legal opinions. This suggests that despite their professed neutrality, court 
officials can still be influenced by strategic considerations. Although the 
literature on international courts is still nascent, the tools of this perspective — 
the use of economic modelling (such as game theory) and empirical testing — 
have been brought to bear on the question of whether elements of the ICL 
regime are effective at punishing or deterring wrongdoing on the part of leaders 
and their agents. The focus in the literature has been on cases of non-
international armed conflict and the researchers involved have assumed that it 
would be the court which would apply pressure against the state’s leaders or its 
subordinates, rather than the other way around. It would seem that any 
influence that the state might have had in designing the ICL regime is taken as 
exogeneous to the games being played in these studies. However, Koremenos 
did examine how states drafted treaties with a certain level of strategic 
vagueness in order to maximise their utility from an agreement, but then she 
never discussed how that vagueness would be resolved by international courts.   
Therefore, to understand why the criminal proportionality rule is so 
difficult to prosecute, I will propose a strategic-choice model of how state actors 
negotiate the content of ICL treaties, such as the Rome Statute and the grave 
breaches regime in API, given how those state actors expect prosecutors will 
respond to any particular allegation of unlawful attack. The results of this 
analysis may seem intuitive to many law scholars, just as it may seem obvious 
that the ICC has a deterrent effect on certain actors in non-international armed 
conflict. However, it is nevertheless useful to show the relationship between the 
reasons for the lack of prosecutions given by legal scholars and those reasons 
that are based on the interests of either the Court or those countries that 
regularly use air power. To that end, the following two Chapters will detail the 
characteristics of this strategic-choice analysis: Chapter 5 will cover the relevant 
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actors, their preferences, and beliefs, and Chapter 6 will describe the strategic 
environment.  
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Chapter 5 
State and Court Interests 
In adopting a strategic-choice lens to examine the question of why violations of 
the rules on proportionality and precautions are so difficult to prosecute, one 
must first identify who are the relevant actors in a strategic interaction. The real 
world is chaotic and many different players interact across multiple levels of 
analysis to determine how case of disproportionate attack might conceivably be 
handled. However, some elements of the interaction must be held constant to 
simplify the logic of the analysis. Otherwise, if the actions of each actor are 
dependent on the actions of hundreds of others, it becomes difficult to establish 
the causal links that explain or predict how an actor will behave. Once the 
actors have been defined, then it is necessary to identify their motivations and 
the relationship between the different costs and benefits that are available to 
them in the strategic environment.  
Defining State Officials & Their Motivation 
In Chapter 4, I presented several models that predicted how state leaders would 
behave, given what they believed court actors would do in response. Most 
often, the state actor was a head of state or government and the court actor 
was either a prosecutor or judge. Defining each actor allows the researcher to 
later describe what motivates them and what ‘moves’ are available to them in 
the game that the researcher believes most accurately represents the strategic 
dynamic in question. Therefore, for the purposes of this study, a state official is 
one who has the power to set state policy on LOAC. They will be able to argue 
for particular interpretations of international law and they have power to set 
state policy towards international courts. I make a further assumption that this 
state official represents a nation that relies heavily on air power during military 
operations (e.g. the United States or the United Kingdom).560  
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 For those states that maintain large, well-equipped air forces,561 air 
power provides its military decision makers with a unique set of capabilities for 
setting up attacks: 
The height, speed, and reach of air power enable and enhance air power’s additional 
attributes of ubiquity, agility and the ability to concentrate force rapidly. In combination, 
these provide air power’s flexibility as a highly versatile and responsive form of military 
force, and its cost effectiveness as a force multiplier. Precision weapons, while not 
unique to air power have endowed it with an even greater flexibility and use.
562
 
When fighting other, less well-equipped states or non-state actors, air power 
grants military decision makers the opportunity to achieve effects at the tactical, 
operational, and strategic levels of a conflict simultaneously.563 As I shall 
consider in more detail below, military commanders and state policy makers, 
therefore, place a high value on maintaining freedom of action for their air 
forces, since impediments to its use, either legal or political, could theoretically 
deteriorate combat effectiveness and risk mission success on the battlefield. 
As one of the most outspoken defenders of air power in the legal 
literature, the former US Air Force Deputy Judge Advocate General, General 
Charles Dunlap Jr, has argued that restrictions on its use often lead to problems 
in accomplishing mission objectives. Using the NATO air campaign in 
Afghanistan as an example of where war planners held themselves to a zero 
casualty rule for policy-based reasons, he claimed: 
By replacing the proportionality standard of Protocol I, which permits attacks that cause 
incidental civilian casualties so long as they are ‘not excessive in relation to the 
concrete and direct military advantage anticipated’ with a ‘zero casualty’ rule, NATO 
evidently did not seem to comprehend the wisdom behind the Protocol's approach. In 
its approach, NATO telegraphed to the insurgents that all they needed to do to protect 
themselves from air attack was to surround themselves with civilians-and that is exactly 
what they did. If NATO had followed the Protocol, the insurgents would not have had as 
much incentive to shield themselves with civilians. Unfortunately, General McChrystal's 
decision in June 2009 to further restrict airstrikes proved disastrous for civilians. By 
June of the year following the implementation of the restrictive rules, Afghan civilian 
deaths had skyrocketed by 31 percent, and Coalition military casualties likewise rose 
sharply. Importantly, the astonishing increase in civilian deaths was not the result of the 
airstrikes that did take place. A study released in July 2010 showed that airstrikes were 
responsible for only a small percentage of the casualties caused by Coalition forces. 
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For example, traffic accidents involving U.S. and Coalition vehicles killed two and a half 
times as many Afghan women and children as did airstrikes. 
564
 
More recently, he has expressed concern that by restricting the use of air power 
to only those situations where commanders are confident that they will not 
endanger the civilian population, opposition forces have an incentive to use 
civilians to shield their movements, materiel and operations from aerial 
attack.565  Such tactics exemplify what he calls ‘lawfare’ in which adversaries 
use (or misuse) LOAC to frame a state’s behaviour as illegal in order to make 
political gains without having to pay a military price for those gains.566 In his 
various writings, Dunlap has been careful to state that he is not opposed to the 
law on proportionality and precautions in attack as they have found their way 
into API, particularly because they can be seen as granting permission to cause 
civilian casualties so long as they are not excessive.567 In my interviews with US 
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assessment into our use-of-force polices. And, indeed, we ought to consider holding accountable those 
who yield to inaction when it results in unnecessary misery to others. Dunlap‘The Moral Hazard of Inaction 
in War’, 'The Moral Hazard of Inaction in War'; see also: Dunlap, ‘The American Way of Bombing: 
Changing Ethical and Legal Norms From Flying Fortresses to Drones', 123.  
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policy officials, they confirmed that generally-speaking, the US is apprehensive 
about curtailing its freedom of action when it comes to the use of air power. 568  
 Besides the humanitarian concern of encouraging the enemy to use 
human shields or to co-locate military objectives within civilian population 
centres, in my interviews with state officials and others, they have identified 
several mechanisms for how strict interpretations of the rules of proportionality 
and precautions in attack might compromise the success of a state’s own 
military operations. Firstly, the content of the rules affects the benchmark 
against which an attack will be deemed prima facie unlawful. This benchmark, 
in turn, determines how favourable media coverage will be towards the 
attacking state, since the mere act of opening an inquiry into a state’s actions, 
either by national or international investigators adds political legitimacy to its 
enemy’s narratives and benefits their information operations campaigns. 
Secondly, any attempts to investigate prima facie disproportionate attacks may 
reveal intelligence or procedures that the state wishes to keep secret to 
preserve its freedom of action in future missions. Finally, opening investigations 
or prosecuting individual commanders for prima facie unlawful attacks may 
send a chilling signal to other commanders which may dampen their 
enthusiasm for pursuing the enemy.  
 The political fallout from an allegation of unlawful attack may not 
necessarily weigh on a commander ordering a strike, but the ‘CNN effect’569 
does factor into the calculus of those policy makers whose job it is to determine 
state policy on LOAC. For example, in my interview with the US delegate to the 
Rome Conference, Bill Lietzau, he showed some sensitivity to how allegations 
of war crimes play out in the press during our discussion of the Kunduz Hospital 
Bombing incident. When I asked him about appropriateness of the punishments 
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meted out to those involved in the incident, given what the CENTCOM report 
had revealed,570 he mused: 
So, I’m going to assume, for the sake of this discussion, that the NJP
571
 [non-judicial 
punishment] decision was the correct one, because the commander usually cares about 
their people and tries to make the right decision. He’s already ruining careers with the 
NJP and it’s a question of whether they do jail time or not. He doesn’t lose anything if 
they go to jail, so he would put them in jail or try to court-martial them if he thought that 
was appropriate. Because he thought it wasn’t appropriate, I think what was 
inappropriate was then calling them ‘war crimes’ in their [the CENTCOM] report… And 
to me, as a public affairs matter for the United States, I am not going to call a non-grave 
breach, technical violation… a ‘war crime’. I’m going to call that a violation. So, the 
mistake was calling it a ‘war crime’.
572
 
Likewise, the former US state official, Hays Parks, has argued that: ‘A key 
lesson learned from Vietnam and subsequent conflicts, including present 
military operations against the Islamic State, is: “If you wish to assume 
responsibility for each civilian casualty incidental to a lawful attack, your enemy 
and others will let you”.’573 Indeed, state officials are keenly aware of the way 
that perceived LOAC violations affect their ability to set a narrative which 
legitimizes combat actions, both to the local population, whose trust will be vital 
to post-conflict reconstruction, and to sceptical international audiences.574 
Officials often struggle to justify such high-casualty attacks, even when they are 
within the bounds of what could be considered lawful by either LOAC or ICL:  
The military’s difficulty in accounting for the civilian casualties — exacerbated by 
classified regulations and a complex process for airstrikes — has allowed the Islamic 
State to advance its own version of the events. The group has accused the United 
States of killing hundreds of residents of Mosul and decried what it has said are 
‘continuous American-Iraqi massacres’ in that city and elsewhere. ‘We’re ceding space 
to the adversary who wants to create the perception of disregard for civilian life,’ said 
                                            
 
570
 See Ch 2 starting at note 340. 
571
 The use of the term NJP was my mistake. The service members involved with the attack were given 
administrative punishments, rather than NJP specifically. I was the one who stated that they received NJP, 
believing it to include letters of reprimand, and Lietzau merely repeated back what I had stated earlier in 
the interview.  
572
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David Deptula, a retired Air Force general who heads the Mitchell Institute for 
Aerospace Studies.
575
 
Therefore, it is safe to assume that state officials are wary of strict 
understandings of proportionality and precautions in attack, because they 
believe such interpretations undermine their ability to garner public support for 
the state’s political goals — even if no defendant is ever brought before a 
domestic or international court. 
 If the state or a third party, such as an ICT later opens an investigation 
into a prima facie unlawful attack, the state must deal with the legitimacy costs 
that come from not only the original allegation of unlawfulness, but also the 
credibility that the opening an formal investigation lends to those allegations.576 
State officials may be pressured into opening an investigation into an event, 
even when they have no legal obligation to do so, which not only increases the 
legitimacy costs for the state, but it also increases the expectation in the eyes of 
the public that future investigations must take place.577  
Beyond the legitimacy costs associated with investigations, there is also 
a fear among state officials that investigations will compromise state secrets, 
leading to difficulties in either mission success or force protection in the 
future.578 Therefore, officials stress that greater transparency should not come 
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at the cost of national secrets. For instance, when the ICTY Office of the 
Prosecutor opened a preliminary investigation into NATO’s bombing campaign 
during Operation Allied Force, Ambassador David Scheffer recalls how fiercely 
his colleagues at the US Department of Defense defended their organisation 
from what they perceived as an outside influence:  
The military fiercely resisted this particular prosecutorial initiative. The Pentagon and 
NATO allies objected to any effort by an international court to force them to reveal 
targeting decisions and the processes and procedures behind selected decisions in 
order to comply with law of war and international humanitarian law principles, which 
involve considerations of military necessity, distinction between combatants and 
civilians, and the proportionality of military actions.
579
 
Indeed, when conducting their research into the transparency of civilian 
casualty reporting for the 14 members of the coalition fighting Islamic State, 
Airwars found that: ‘The most widely cited reason given by nations when 
refusing to disclose the dates and location of their airstrikes is national security 
or domestic security concerns’.580 Even when states investigate and report on 
prima facie unlawful attacks in good faith, much of what is written is only 
presented to the public behind a veil of redaction. Such was the case with 
CENTCOM’s final report on the Kunduz Hospital Bombing, which was so 
thorough that Garraway, who is a member of the International Humanitarian 
Fact-Finding Commission (IHFFC) thought it would have been difficult to 
improve upon.581 However, although its damning conclusions were made 
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public,582  great care was taken not to reveal too much about the way that US 
forces collect intelligence or conduct airstrikes.583  
The perceived need for states to investigate high-casualty strikes puts 
state officials in a difficult position where providing information about a strike 
might compromise state secrets, but its reticence might incur legitimacy costs 
as critics claim the state is not being transparent in its operations. Yet, often 
states will choose to withhold information unless absolutely necessary and only 
under pressure, suggesting that the costs of revealing the information are 
higher in most cases than the legitimacy costs associated with reticence.  For 
example, when initially asked to volunteer information to the Goldstone 
Commission, Israel declined to cooperate with investigators and it was only 
after the Goldstone Report was published that state officials elected to report 
their side of the story.584 In a more recent operation, while responding to a 
report by Human Rights Watch which claimed that US forces failed to take all 
feasible precautions to avoid striking a mosque in al-Jinah, Syria,585 CENTCOM 
merely asserted that its actions were lawful, without offering any supporting 
evidence to substantiate its claim.586  
In addition to the legitimacy costs and the fear of compromising mission 
success by exposing classified information, state officials are also concerned 
with the possibility that military commanders may find themselves subject to 
disciplinary actions for decisions made in combat. Turning once again to 
CENTCOM’s report on the Kunduz Hospital Bombing case, the names of all the 
individuals involved with the airstrike were redacted, even though many were 
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later given letters of reprimand.587 This suggests that officials wanted to spare 
these individuals from the sort of public scrutiny that would have come with a 
criminal prosecution. The prospect of being held criminally liable for LOAC 
violations hangs heavily on commanders, perhaps even more so than the 
political fallout from a high-casualty strike as a UK commander explained: 
So, when we first started, we had zero CDE [collateral damage estimate]. No civilian 
casualties whatsoever and people like me went back and said you cannot operate 
effectively in — [Trew: Zero civilian casualty?] Yeah. But, then we went from 0 to 3 and 
then 3 to 30, then from 30 to 300. Well, you’re never going to get 30-300 [authorised] 
and I think we operated in the 3-30 range for about half the time. But even then, if you 
end up killing 30 civilians, there would have been questions asked. Let me put it this 
way, I had more visits from military policemen and lawyers about incidents that my 
people were involved in than anybody ever asked on the policy or political level. It was 
all legal enquiries.
588
 
Amongst state policy officials, there seems to be an assumption that their own 
military commanders will act in good faith with the law and that their own 
municipal systems of justice will be adequate to hold rogue commanders to 
account.589 Therefore, depending on how state officials value legitimacy versus 
the success of future military operations, the potential legitimacy benefits to the 
state for cooperating with ICTs might be outweighed by the substantial costs 
associated with having their commanders indicted or prosecuted.  
 If anything, there is a strong sense among some state officials and 
commanders that this sort of independent review unnecessarily compounds the 
stresses of combat for their troops. For instance, in his 2016 speech to the 
Conservative Party Conference, the UK Defence Secretary, Michael Fallon, 
promised to derogate from the European Convention of Human Rights 
ostensibly to protect UK service members from ‘vexatious’ claims: 
I also know how much stress is caused by legal claims years after conflicts have ended. 
It is right that we investigate serious allegations but we've seen our legal system 
abused to falsely accuse our armed forces. So we're taking action. Of more than 3,000 
claims about half have already been discontinued — and another 1,000 further cases 
will be thrown out by January. Already one of the firms that filed thousands of these 
claims, the so-called ‘public interest lawyers’ — has had its legal aid contract terminated 
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and shut down in August. It won't be missed… But much of the litigation we face comes 
from the extension of the European Convention on Human Rights to the battlefield. This 
is damaging our troops, undermining military operations, and costing taxpayers' 
millions. So I can announce today that in future conflicts we intend to derogate from the 
Convention. That would protect our Armed Forces from many of the industrial scale 
claims we have seen post Iraq and Afghanistan.
590
 
Along with being an end in its own right, state officials value shielding 
commanders from judicial scrutiny as a way to ensure that they will be willing to 
wage an aggressive air campaign, safe in the knowledge that their decisions will 
not be second-guessed. Therefore, in addition to the general concern that 
LOAC may be used to restrict the state’s freedom of action, state officials 
specifically worry that commanders who fear prosecution will become too 
skittish to do their jobs properly, making it impossible to effectively fight the 
state’s enemies: 
It may be hard to believe that executive branch officials, many of whom risk their lives to 
protect the nation, really care much about criminal law, investigation, and possibly, jail. 
But they do care — a lot. In my two years in government, I witnessed top officials and 
bureaucrats in the White House and throughout the administration openly worrying that 
investigators acting with the benefit of hindsight in a different political environment 
would impose criminal penalties on heat-of-battle judgment calls. These men and 
women did not believe they were breaking the law, and indeed they took extraordinary 
steps to ensure that they didn’t… Why not play it safe? Many counterterrorism officials 
did play it safe before 9/11, when the criminalization of war and intelligence contributed 
to the paralyzing risk aversion that pervaded the White House and the intelligence 
community. The 9/11 attacks, however, made playing it safe no longer feasible. 
591
 
Indeed, in my interview with a former UK commander, he expressed frustration 
with the performance of the troops from some of the more highly-constrained 
NATO countries: ‘[They’ll] turn up on the day, but are so heavily caveated that 
you can’t use them for a great deal and, actually, what would you want to use 
them for anyway? They’re not properly trained or equipped to do stuff.’592 For 
states that use air power regularly, one would expect that state officials would 
be particularly concerned about commanders deciding to ‘play it safe’ with 
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ordering airstrikes in the fear that their decisions will be later dissected to 
ensure compliance with proportionality and precautions in attack.  
 My purpose at this stage is not to pontificate about whether endorsing 
certain interpretations of the law based on a strict liability for civilian casualties 
actually makes it difficult for the state to achieve its political ends. This is an 
interesting question and has yet to be subjected to robust empirical testing, but 
its answer is immaterial for the purposes of this analysis. Instead, what the 
previous statements reveal is that state officials believe that introducing a 
stricter liability for civilian casualties than the one that is currently in place will 
adversely affect the state’s freedom of action in times of armed conflict. 
Furthermore, I submit that rather than being the whims of a particular political 
party or a new trend in response to recent operations against non-state actors, 
such as Al-Qaeda or Islamic State, this belief represents an enduring 
consensus view amongst state officials and informs state policy on LOAC. To 
explore this further, I shall examine the negotiation positions of the United 
States and the United Kingdom at the CDDH and the Rome Conference.      
State Negotiating Position at the CDDH 
As the director of the US Department of Defense’s Law of War Working Group, 
tasked with reviewing the impact of the Additional Protocols,593 Parks had an 
inside view into some of the challenges that faced the US at the CDDH. In 
particular, he noted in his seminal treatise, ‘Air War and the Law of War’, that 
third world countries and non-state actors, who did not have access to air 
power, saw enshrining a total prohibition against collateral damage as a way of 
negating the huge tactical advantage that countries like the United States 
enjoyed from air power:  
Third World nations that had waged anti-colonialism wars since 1945 had much the 
same experience as their pre-war predecessors in being confronted with the threat of 
airpower. The Vietminh… admitted that one of the greatest advantages held by the 
French during their war was airpower, as also was the experience of the Front de 
Liberation Nationale (FLN) in the 1954-1963 Algerian war for independence from 
France, and North Vietnam and its proxy, the Viet Cong, in the war against the 
government of-the Republic of Vietnam (South Vietnam). Third World concern regarding 
airpower was fueled by the Israeli victory in the 1973 Yom Kippur War, which took place 
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between the second session of the Conference of Government Experts and the opening 
of the Diplomatic Conference in 1974. The comments of the senior U.S. representative 
to the first session of the Conference of Government Experts were insightful in 
recognizing the desire of Third World nations to negate the air power advantage of the 
developed nations, permitting the labor-intensive Third World nations to fight in terms of 
manpower rather than firepower: Third World desire to negotiate a new law of war treaty 
clearly had as much if not more of an arms control angle than a humanitarian interest.
 
594 
 
Likewise, he claimed that some non-aligned Western governments also saw a 
strict proportionality rule as a cost-effective way of defending themselves from 
aerial attack.595 Lawrence Rockwood cautions that Park’s scepticism marked a 
departure from a traditional US policy preference, which was to increase non-
combatant protection, and instead was informed by his own ideological 
preference for Clausewitzian realism: 
For Parks, the main problem with Protocol I was its relation to the Clausewitzian tenet of 
friction in war. The ICRC, by its ‘unrealistic interpretations of the Just War principle of 
proportionality’ and its obsession with limiting aerial bombardment, created friction by 
limiting the natural tendency of war to expand toward its natural maximum intensity.
596
 
However, even if he did not share the particulars of Park’s critique, Ambassador 
George Aldrich, the head of the US delegation at the CDDH and one of the 
proponents of API within the US government,597 did share some of Park’s 
general scepticism of the motivation behind the conference: 
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We agreed in Istanbul in 1969 to the ICRC effort that laid the foundation for this 
Conference, but we did so with considerable misgivings. As a country that relies for its 
military effectiveness more on technology, modern equipment, and firepower than on 
massed manpower, the United States had to approach this Conference with caution 
and concern. Moreover, we had seen in other contexts the risk that conferences of one 
hundred or more countries would be dominated by a majority of developing countries, a 
majority of which all too often seems to be led by radical states bearing grudges against 
the wealthy countries and against the United States in particular. These concerns were, 
in fact, justified.
598
 
In a confidential Department of Defense preparation memo for second session 
of the CDDH, which was intended to help guide the delegates during 
negotiations, it was clear that the DoD was wary about giving the impression 
that, in built-up areas, attackers had to confine the effects of airstrikes to military 
targets. However, even internally, there was not a flat-out rejection of the 
proportionality rule in principle: 
The US Delegation should support a reaffirmation of the principle that the civilian 
population as such, as well as individual civilians, shall not be made the object of attack 
([draft] Article 46). It should, however, oppose any rule derived from this principle which 
might create the illusion that civilian casualties incidental to attacks against military 
targets located in populated areas can be avoided. Prohibition against indiscriminate 
means of combat should not extend beyond restrictions against:  
1. Those which are intended to attack indiscriminately the civilian population and 
military targets, and 2. Those for which there is a high probability of incidental civilian 
casualties known to be disproportionate to the military advantage anticipated ([Draft] 
Article 46).
599
 
Dill clarifies that the US delegation championed the proportionality rule at the 
CDDH precisely because they saw it as permitting collateral damage in some 
circumstances.600 Recalling the motivation of some of the members of his team, 
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to honour and unlikely to be obeyed. The US was one of the principle’s greatest advocates. The delegation 
emphasised that “collateral damage to civilians and civilian objects was often unavoidable and it was 
unrealistic to attempt to make all such damage unlawful: the rule of proportionality was as far as the law 
could reasonably go”. It is the limited ambition of the provision that appears to have appealed to the US. 
The delegation was adamant that “[t]he task of the Conference was not to prevent the consequences of 
war, but to moderate them as much as possible. The rules should be capable of acceptance by 
   
 
 
182 
 
 
Aldrich explained that they saw the CDDH as an opportunity to recalibrate 
public expectations regarding civilian casualties and to restore the US’s 
freedom of action after the Vietnam War: 
Among the military lawyers who worked with me during the negotiation of the Geneva 
Protocols I, I detected a desire to prove that the armed forces of the United States had 
acted in Vietnam in accordance with international law — not merely the law of the old 
Hague Conventions, but also wanted, I believe, to have it demonstrated that the 
restrictions under which the military chafed in Vietnam were not required by law.
601
 
[italics in original]  
Moreover, rather than instructing the delegation to keep the wording of the rules 
on proportionality and precautions vague, the DoD preparation memo instead 
argues that: ‘The rules limiting military operations with a view to providing 
reasonable protection of the civilian population and civilian objects against the 
effects of hostilities should be stated more clearly so that they can be easily and 
readily understood ([draft] Articles 46-50)’.602 However, the DoD also supported 
the idea of attackers having to take ‘reasonable precautions’ in setting up an 
attack, without specifying what sorts of actions would be considered 
reasonable.603 Therefore, state officials may very well have wanted the 
                                                                                                                                
 
Governments and of practical application … [Proportionality] set out the maximum protection that could be 
provided.” Many delegations agreed. The flexibility of the principle was considered an asset. Dill, 98-99.  
601
 Aldrich, 132. The problems that plagued US forces in Vietnam, which inspired the US’s involvement in 
the CDDH seem nearly identical to the claims being made by the proponents of a minimally restrictive air 
campaign against Islamic State today: ‘By the early 1970s another development had affected American 
attitudes and, I suspect, those of most western countries, and that was the extensive coverage of the war 
in Vietnam by the news media, particularly television. Every evening for years the horrors of war were 
displayed graphically in every living room and the suffering of the civilian population in a war of guerrillas 
and high technology was often emphasized. A free press also gave a platform to propogandists of all 
persuasions, and the Government of the United States became sensitive to charges of indiscriminate 
bombardment, attacks on civilians, attacks on dikes and the environment and similar charges. In fact, the 
American forces in Vietnam operated under more restrictions than, I suspect, any other armed forces in 
history – restrictions that went far beyond what the law required and were imposed strictly for political 
reasons… This strange combination of severe political restrictions on the use of force and a pervading 
sense of defensiveness, if not guilt, about the suffering caused by the war, and by aerial warfare in 
particular, resulted, I believe, in an increased American willingness to participate in the review and 
improvement of the part of international law that deals with the conduct of hostilities.’ ibid, 132. 
602
 Clements, 8. A few years later, during the US Joint Chiefs of Staff Review of the 1977 protocols, DoD 
officials explained what parts of the rule seemed unclear: ‘Paragraphs 4 and 5 of Article 51, for example, 
prohibit indiscriminate attacks, and are vague and ambiguous. They can be interpreted as excluding use of 
tactical nuclear weapons. They make no allowance for time constraints, weapon availability and cost, and 
projected loss of US troops using various weapons or means of attack. Further, how far apart must 
separated military targets be in order for the restrictions in paragraph 5 to apply? How large a 
concentration of civilians constitutes “a similar concentration” referred to in paragraph 5(a)? Does “direct 
military advantage” accrue to the military unit inflicting the damage or is it sufficient that a direct military 
advantage accrue to the force as a whole? It is recognized that these matters cannot be calibrated and 
defined with great specificity in these protocols, but the language used should at least point the way for the 
commander.’ Report by the J-5 to the Joint Chiefs of Staff on Jcs Review of the 1977 Protocols Additional 
to the 1949 Geneva Conventions (Department of Defense, JCS 2497/24-6, 1982), 31. 
603
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operational details of these rules to be easy to understand, but that did not stop 
them from endorsing the ambiguous language of reasonableness to describe 
the right balance between precautions that were technically possible, but overly 
tedious, and those that were too cursory to make a real difference in reducing 
civilian suffering.604 
 Similarly, in a restricted UK Ministry of Defence memo to its delegation, 
the MoD warned that draft Article 46 posed the greatest threat to the future UK 
operations: ‘In terms of limitations of tactical freedom of the armed forces it is 
the most important article.’605 For instance, when discussing the paragraph on 
indiscriminate attacks, the memo warned the UK delegation that:  
[T]he principle of the prohibition of indiscriminate attacks is acceptable, but not the 
prohibition of employment of indiscriminate ‘means of combat and any methods which 
strike or affect indiscriminately’. It is likely that this is a back door method of attempting 
to prohibit nuclear and neo-conventional weapons… It would mean that an attack 
launched with a weapon which by its nature was indiscriminate as between civilians and 
soldiers would be prohibited. It is essential to introduce the element of intention into this 
prohibition to avoid prosecutions for war crimes of soldiers who launched an attack 
bona fide believing that it would not have indiscriminate effects but which did in fact 
have such effects.
606
 [emphasis in original] 
Even though UK officials believed that one must take into account the mental 
state of the commander when deciding if an attack were indiscriminate, it also 
opened the door to include mental states other than direct intent, adding: 
‘However the criterion of intention would include a reckless disregard.’607 The 
UK was also generally satisfied with the provisions that required states to take 
precautionary measures,608 but as later MoD guidance for the final session 
reveals, its position was conditioned on the purposeful ambiguity that was put 
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 Even if the US delegation would have been satisfied with a reasonableness standard in principle, Dill 
claims (consistent with other literature) that: ‘The same reluctance to establish objective standards that 
could be used to judge the consequences of an attack, and hence pin its illegality on its outcome, is visible 
in the negotiations for precautionary measures in attack. That Article 57 was meant to concretise the 
implications of the obligations to distinguish and to observe proportionality should have created a strong 
case for formulating the provision as clearly and precisely as possible. Yet the ICRC went on record to 
state that it had “deliberately proposed a flexible wording … as … it was for the parties concerned to make 
it more precise, in terms of the organisation of their armed forces and of the kind of troops engaged”. The 
negotiations revolved around the extent of belligerents’ duty of care. Most delegations ultimately preferred 
the prescription to do everything ‘feasible’ in order to do justice to proportionality and distinction to an 
obligation to do everything “reasonable”. Of course, both terms acknowledge situational contingency, but 
reasonableness is a legal category generally used to judge behaviour with hindsight.’ Dill, 101-102. 
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 Brief for 1974 Diplomatic Conference – Humanitarian Law in Armed Conflict. (UK National Archives UM 
48/3, 1974), 44. 
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 Ibid, 44-45. 
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 Ibid, 45. 
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 Ibid, 52-53 
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into the language of the article during the negotiations: ‘This Article goes further 
than the UK would have wished in the obligations it places on soldiers. But it is 
substantially qualified by phrases like “do everything feasible …” and “unless 
circumstances do not permit” etc. These so soften the obligations as to make 
the Article acceptable as a whole.’ 609 [ellipsis in original] Therefore, on the one 
hand, the ambiguity of the language used to define the proportionality and 
precaution rules frustrated state officials, but on the other, it also allowed them 
to re-insert some flexibility into the provisions so they would have a minimal 
impact on future operations in practice.  
 However, even with the ambiguous language and despite the 
assurances of other western governments, an MoD official reported that the 
West German (FRG) delegation was nervous about the potential problems that 
the new restrictions would pose its forces, particularly because of the way that 
API would be imported into domestic FRG law: 
Protocol I will introduce several new provisions on the methods and means of combat. 
The FRG considers that these rules, and particularly those relating to the protection of 
civilians and civilian objects, are incompatible with NATO planning. Under the FRG 
constitution the Protocol will form part of German domestic law, and will be enforceable 
in their domestic courts. They are concerned that NATO planning may become the 
subject of court actions. 
610
 
In the same memo, the official mused that they might feel the same way, were 
these rules to be imported directly into UK law. It would seem that as long as 
the rules of proportionality and precautions remain an aspiration, there was no 
problem with including them in the protocol, but if there were a chance that they 
might be used to form the basis of prosecutions, then those officials would 
become more circumspect about the language used to couch the same 
provisions.611 
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 Draft Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949 and Relating to the Protection 
of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (UK National Archives, DS 22, 1977), 6. 
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 Humanitarian Law - Brief on Nato Study (UK National Archives, DS 22, E7, 1977). 
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 The DoD even said as much during the JCS review of the Additional Protocols: ‘Article 48, for example, 
requires that the commander “at all times distinguish between the civilian population and combatants….” 
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between military objectives and civilian objects is often impossible, as military objectives often appear to 
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When they are prohbibtory, however, and their violation constitutes a war crime, they should be more 
explicit in stating that good faith effort is all that is called for.’  Report by the J-5 to the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
on Jcs Review of the 1977 Protocols Additional to the 1949 Geneva Conventions, 31. 
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 These behind-the-scenes memos present an even clearer picture of the 
concerns that US and UK officials had whilst negotiating the Additional 
Protocols than even their official reservations might reveal. Although it is not 
clear as to how much of the ambiguity of the rules on proportionality and 
precautions can be attributed to state officials’ desire for them to be so, what is 
clear is that those officials eschewed any formulations of the law that would 
impose anything approaching strict liability for violations of the rules.612 
Furthermore, they seemed more concerned about how the rules might be 
applied in the court room, than how they might be argued over in the court of 
public opinion. Two decades later, at the Rome Conference, these preferences 
had changed very little.  
State Negotiating Position at the Rome Conference 
There was a remarkable stability in the preferences of those who negotiated the 
US and UK positions at the CDDH and those who negotiated the same at the 
Rome Conference.613 Even after two decades of advances in weapons 
technology that enabled those who plan or conduct operations to have access 
to better intelligence and to attack with greater precision, state officials were still 
wary of the possibility that the use of air power could be scrutinised by either 
domestic614 or international courts.  
 One key difference between the attitudes of those officials who 
negotiated the Additional Protocols and those who negotiated the Rome Statute 
was that the latter were less willing to use ambiguous language to define which 
actions would constitute unlawful attacks, as Lietzau explained: 
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 See Ch 3 at notes 428-431. 
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 This stability is important in for the strategic-choice approach because, as Frieden argues, preferences 
must be held constant for at least one ‘round’ of a game-theoretical analysis: ‘If we are interested 
diplomatic relations between two countries, it does little for our analysis simply to assert that one of the 
countries’ preferences changed in the middle of the interaction. Of course, this may well have been the 
case – governments are overthrown or voted out of office and replaced by others with different 
preferences – but this is better regarded as changing the character of the interaction so that it is another 
round or game.’ Frieden, 46. By showing that the US and UK government preferences on this issue are 
stable, I can model the historical interaction that has taken place between state officials and prosecutors, 
even if the whole game takes several years or decades, rather than the span of one administration. This is 
because I can assume that the government officials of one administration have, broadly-speaking, the 
same preferences on this issue as the one that came before it.     
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 The complementarity principle would have compelled states to take measures to implement the 
provisions of the Rome Statute in their respective domestic laws.  
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There was purposeful ambiguity then and that ambiguity is fine. It’s actually helpful if 
you’re the superpower. If you’re the superpower of the world and the provision is 
ambiguous, your freedom of action hasn’t been particularly highly constrained. If you’re 
an individual human being and the powers of the world are able to prosecute you, 
ambiguity is not your friend. You want to rely on the law, especially if you’re a 
representative of the superpower of the world.
615
 
Lietzau explained further that his motivation for pinning down the law was not 
just to keep US personnel safe from prosecution as its own end, but rather he 
was also worried that ICC prosecutions could be used to influence the US 
policy, effectively reining in its freedom of action in foreign affairs and on the 
battlefield: 
So, if the Secretary of State knows, or the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff knows 
that by targeting this location, he can be personally prosecuted, you are influencing our 
foreign policy with this court and that is more true for the United States than it is for 
other countries and so, the need for precision is greater for us, because we wanted it to 
be rigid enough that this guy can at least feel somewhat comfortable that: ‘I’m doing the 
right thing; I will make this decision and I’m not really risking a successful prosecution 
against me’, because we have that precision. That’s why you’d have a completely 
different purpose in an ICC negotiation then you’d have in a Protocol I negotiation.
 616
  
Of all the crimes listed in the Rome Statute, it was Article 8(2)(b)(iv) that the US 
delegation believed would have the greatest possibility for opening up US 
personnel to politicised prosecutions.617 In this case, though, rather than 
clarifying the thorny issues of how to calculate proportionality or which 
precautions must be taken before launching a strike, the emphasis for the US 
delegation was to clarify the elements of the crime in such a way that it would 
be very difficult to prosecute it. 
 Pfirtier diplomatically explains that: ‘The lengthy elements with two 
footnotes indicate the complex nature of this crime, in which the mental 
elements are of crucial importance. As was the case with the negotiations 
concerning the exact wording of the crime in the statute, the negotiations of its 
elements were difficult and at times rather ‘heated.’”618 He recalled that during 
the negotiations of the elements for the crime of disproportionate attack, it was 
the representatives from various NATO countries who were arguing against the 
imposition of a strict mens rea for the crime. The United States, in particular, 
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617
 ‘We thought: “what are the crimes that could actually be used against us in some kind of a political 
trial?” and this was the big one.’ ibid 
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fought for the inclusion of a statement that would require the commander to 
have made the value judgement that attacking a particular target would result in 
civilian death and loss that was clearly excessive in relation to the anticipated 
military advantage before the court could find the accused guilty.619 
Indeed, the US motivation for raising the standard of liability for 
proportionality rule at Rome mirrored the other battle that the US fought 
regarding the court’s ability to try the personnel of a state that was not a party to 
the treaty. As Ambassador David Scheffer recalls, the DoD was intransigent on 
the issue of protecting US service members from any possibility of prosecution 
by the court. Despite personally holding a different view on the matter, in his 
role as a US state official during the Rome Conference, he tried to argue for a 
regime that would make it nearly impossible for the court to prosecute 
Americans: 
Other governments understandably were confused and annoyed with the U.S. strategy 
in the talks for the International Criminal Court… [T]hat strategy ended up seeking to 
protect the United States as a nonparty to the treaty regardless of how its military might 
wage warfare on foreign territory. Because the United States deploys its armed forces 
globally, the Pentagon understandably has been concerned that an international court 
exercising its jurisdiction on the territory of any state party to the treaty might try to 
prosecute U.S. soldiers who have to fight on such foreign land… Foreign negotiators 
found it difficult to square the U.S. position on nonparty protection with how that same 
privilege would be used by civilian and military leaders of other nonparty states and 
rogue elements to shield themselves from the court’s jurisdiction and perpetrate atrocity 
crimes at will on the territories of states parties. The confusion only multiplied when I 
walked into the negotiating room to argue for Washington’s prior consent to any 
prosecutions of Americans, even if the United States were to join the court. I appeared 
as the guardian of impunity, rather than its slayer. 
620
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 Ibid, 150. Lietzau confirmed that the US wanted to make the mens rea for the crime of disproportionate 
attack as difficult as possible to prosecute out of a fear of what the prosecutor might do if it were any 
different: ‘I mean, we came up with the knowledge element because we didn’t trust how that standard [the 
reasonable military commander standard] would get implemented and I don’t know that it was clear what 
the standard would be. There’s no doubt that there were other standards being offered like the “reasonable 
man standard” and sometimes they were being offered clearly to promote more prosecutions. There is 
clearly a group of people at an ICC whose goal is well-meaning: to stop warfare in general and the way 
that they’re gonna stop warfare… [Trew: …is by prosecuting everybody?] …is by prosecuting everybody 
and somehow they’ll be doing good by doing that. Obviously, there is another view that: no, there wouldn’t 
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prosecute that war effectively by a threat of prosecution is not going to help the world. With that in mind, 
we went with a knowledge element as a more protective device, but if we had to go with a standard, I think 
that the ‘reasonable military commander’ is the only reasonable standard that you could use.’ Interview 
with Lietzau. See also Ch 2 at note 197. 
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This has led scholars to believe that the law, as it is articulated in the Rome 
Statute, was intentionally drafted to be more difficult to apply than its equivalent 
customary formulations. For example, Robert Cryer concludes: 
States drafting the Rome Statute were not merely setting down law to deal with anyone 
else, but law that could be applied to both them and their allies. Also, this law is to be 
enforced by a court which is to be independent of the creating States. This meant that 
the way to rein in the court was by ensuring that all the law to be enforced was defined 
by the States themselves, leaving as little discretion as possible in the Court. This 
setting down of the law need not necessarily be unwelcome, primarily because parts of 
international criminal law had, at least up until recently, been rather open-textured, and 
without authoritative interpretations legitimacy was affected. The problem with the 
Rome Statute is that definitions of crimes are sometimes narrower than customary 
international law permits (or, in some cases, requires). This is particularly the case for 
war crimes, with a closed list of crimes which are frequently defined in a limited fashion. 
621
 
Nowhere is this effect clearer than with the drafting of RS Article 8(2)(b)(iv). 
Given the consistency with which state officials, across different 
administrations, have defended the state’s right to use air power with as few 
restrictions as possible, particularly when it comes to war crimes prosecutions 
based on the proportionality rule, for this project, it will be safe to assume the 
following: 
 State officials value mission success as its own end.  
 State officials’ primary concern is with maximising the likelihood of 
mission success for any particular military operation; 
 State officials believe that prosecutions of their personnel will decrease 
the likelihood of mission success because of indecision; 
 State officials believe that investigations of their actions will decrease the 
likelihood of mission success because they may have to reveal state 
secrets; 
 State officials believe that investigations and prosecutions decrease 
public support for military operations, decreasing the chances of mission 
success, regardless of whether they are triggered by an international 
court or a domestic court. 
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 State officials believe that failure to investigate or prosecute the 
individuals responsible for a prima facie unlawful attack will decrease the 
state’s legitimacy in the eyes of the public.  
With these assumptions in mind, I posit that state officials believe that the 
probability of mission success is inversely related to the probability of a 
successful prosecution against a military commander for violations of the rules 
on proportionality or precautions in attack, but that failure to address prima facie 
unlawful attacks will incur a legitimacy cost. Again, it is important to stress that I 
am not stating whether successful prosecutions of violations of the rules on 
proportionality or precautions actually constrain a state’s freedom of action, but 
rather that state officials believe this to be the case and that they will make 
rational decisions based on this belief.  
Defining Court Officials 
Although many strategic models of court and state interaction take judges to be 
the actor of greatest interest, in the current analysis of why it is difficult to 
achieve accountability for violations of the rules on proportionality and 
precautions in attack, it may be more fruitful to look at prosecutors. This is 
because, with the exception of the ICTY Gotovina case, no cases of 
disproportionate attack have ever made it to trial622 and even in that case, the 
defendants were eventually acquitted on appeal because the judges did not 
have a good way to examine the reasonableness of the attack without resorting 
to an arbitrary standard.623 However, for many cases of prima facie 
disproportionate attack, such as those during the NATO bombing campaign in 
Operation Allied Force,624 the Kunduz Fuel Tankers Bombing,625 or the Shelling 
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 [This is] the biggest problem we’ve seen, for decades now and certainly since the ICC was established 
or since international jurisdiction has taken a greater role via hybrid courts or a variety of other 
mechanisms. We haven’t so often been in the situation where cases get to court, it is proven that the crime 
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problem we have when thinking about how to deal with impunity is still the number of cases that even 
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to be prosecuted, whether it’s by a national court or a hybrid court or by an international special court or by 
the ICC; it doesn’t matter. Interview with Amnesty International War Crimes Investigator. 
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of Yeonpyeong,626 the decision to open an investigation or to prosecute an 
individual commander rested with either an ad hoc, domestic or ICC prosecutor, 
respectively. Though the legal rules which constrain prosecutors from each of 
these legal regimes differs slightly, each type of prosecutor is drawing 
conclusions about the likelihood of successfully prosecuting a case, given a 
corpus of law on proportionality or precautions in attack that is largely based on 
either the Additional Protocols or the Rome Statue. Even in the United States, 
where war crimes are typically couched in terms of violations of the Uniform 
Code of Military Justice (UCMJ),627 rather than violations of international law, 
the report on the Kunduz Hospital Bombing cited API and borrowed the 
language used in API to describe what its authors believed were violations of 
LOAC628 and it was in his quasi-prosecutorial role that the CENTCOM 
commander made the decision not to prosecute those involved. This is not to 
say that prosecutors have a completely separate set of interests from judges. 
Indeed, it can be helpful to examine some of their shared institutional interests, 
but ultimately it was the prospect of the prosecutor’s ability to pursue a case 
that most concerned state officials at the CDDH and at the Rome Statute which 
lead to their own decision to fight against a strong liability for the crime of 
disproportionate attack.   
 For the purposes of this study, I define court officials as those with the 
authority to indict, or otherwise refer to trial, a commander for a prima facie 
disproportionate attack and most likely, this will be a prosecutor. Under the 
following assumptions, I believe one can use the same analytic frame to 
examine the strategic interaction between state officials and prosecutors at 
either the domestic or the international level. Firstly, I assume that the state in 
this analysis has some mechanism to import the provisions on proportionality 
and precautions in attack either into its own criminal code or as military orders 
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 Interview with Former US Military Judge. Since the US is not a party to the Additional Protocols or to 
the Rome Statute and there is not another vehicle to import customary international law directly into US 
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that could be used to hold troops to account for LOAC violations.  
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for which commanders can be held criminally accountable. Secondly, I also 
assume that the court is sufficiently independent of the political branches of 
government as to grant the prosecutor enough freedom of action to choose their 
own cases.629  
Prosecutorial Motivation 
I submit, perhaps uncontroversially, that the prosecutor’s primary motivation is 
to win cases. Of the all the pressures put upon the prosecutor, this seems to be 
the most salient, based on what court officials had told me in my interviews. For 
instance, when I asked Richard Goldstone what he thought were the procedural 
and political barriers to prosecuting disproportionate attacks, he replied: 
Well, you know there’s really only one barrier and that is the availability of evidence. No 
prosecutor is going to issue an indictment (and let me tell you it’s a huge responsibility 
to issue an indictment alleging that somebody has committed war crimes) if there isn’t 
sufficient evidence available and not only sufficient evidence, but sufficient available 
evidence that the prosecutor knows — reasonably — is going to be available should the 
matter come to trial.
630
 
Clearly if a prosecutor wishes to secure a conviction, they must build their case 
upon a sturdy evidentiary base.631 If a prosecutor does not have evidence to 
prove all the elements of the crime or if they do not believe that the law is clear 
enough, then there is no rational reason for investing the time or resources to 
launch a formal investigation or to try to take the case to trial. As one court 
official put it to me: ‘It's supposed to be clear. You should only be prosecuting 
the clear-cut cases because it cost too much money!’632 Particularly if there is 
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 This assumption will limit the generalisability of this analysis to the US, since in that state it is the 
commander who refers cases to courts-martial and despite a prohibition against unlawful command 
influence (UCMJ Article 37), it is more likely that the convening authority will at least share the institutional 
interests of the executive branch, rather than the judiciary.   
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 Interview with Goldstone. 
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 Though there are several challenges to this as mentioned in Ch 3 at note 436. 
632
 Interview with Former ICTY Official. Similarly, Allison Danner believes that financial constraints will lead 
the prosecutor of the ICC to similarly prioritize their caseload to make the most of scant resources: ‘The 
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lower-hanging fruit, then it is rational for the prosecutor to select those cases 
which provide a conviction in exchange for the resource costs associated with 
running an investigation.   
Having examined the possible political forces that could influence the 
ICC Prosecutor, David Bosco believes that the legalist ideal of an apolitical 
court should not be dismissed out of hand: 
The legalist expectation forms an important baseline possibility: that the ICC prosecutor 
will be essentially apolitical. On this view, the court should examine information about 
potential crimes with little reference to the political realities surrounding them and to the 
preferences of major powers. The prosecutor’s only job is to determine whether crimes 
of sufficient gravity have been committed, whether the court has jurisdiction, and 
whether relevant domestic judicial institutions are handling the matter adequately.
 633
 
However, given the work that has been done on strategic deference in 
international courts, he also believes that the most likely route that states would 
use to influence court behaviour is to withhold support for their work: 
An alternative, more pragmatic view is that the prosecutor has no choice but to consider 
diplomatic realities in selecting situations, if only to ensure that an investigation will be 
feasible. In most cases, some level of support from the state where the alleged crimes 
had occurred, or at least from neighbouring states, would be necessary to conduct 
complex investigative work… Without this official support, an investigation could be a 
futile gesture. On this view, the prosecutor should include an assessment of likely state 
support before launching an investigation. He or she might choose not to open an 
investigation if the prospects for that support appeared weak. Pursuing an ideal 
apolitical form of justice by ignoring the need for state support would only sap the 
institution’s credibility.
634
  
Even if the prosecutor believes that there is a good evidentiary basis for 
prosecution, because of the ambiguous wording of proportionality and 
precautions in attack, it would not take much mitigating evidence to acquit the 
accused. For instance, when discussing the possibility of referring the Kunduz 
Hospital Bombing case to courts-martial using US domestic law, one former 
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military lawyer explained that even with the full cooperation of the US military 
and access to classified information, the prosecutor’s case might not survive 
first contact with the defence counsel: 
Now obviously, we don’t know everything because it [the CENTCOM report] is a heavily 
redacted report and there may be other information that we aren’t aware of and of 
course, one thing to keep in mind is (and that anybody you talk to who has been a 
military prosecutor will tell you): if you think the facts in a fact-finding investigation like 
this end up being the facts that actually get presented at trial, you’re deluding yourself. 
Because (let’s be honest here) the one piece of this where there has been no influence 
has been an advocate that has been working on behalf of the defendant trying to 
develop alternate facts, right? So, if you try to charge one of these guys with a criminal 
homicide and I’m their defence lawyer, I might find tons of other stuff that wasn’t in the 
report. We have no idea how that would turn out.
635
  
Therefore, in deciding whether to investigate or issue an indictment for a prima 
facie disproportionate attack, prosecutors could still be deferring to the political 
whims of those states that use air power regularly, not necessarily because they 
fear material retribution,636 but rather because they fear the professional 
legitimacy costs that come with taking a case to trial without the necessary 
resources to back it up.  
Prosecutor’s Discretion in Case Selection 
Although most legal systems grant prosecutors some level of discretion to 
choose which cases to take to trial,637 the legitimacy of the prosecutor’s actions 
in the eyes of society depends upon their ability to exercise that discretion in a 
coherent and consistent way: ‘A rule is coherent when its application treats like 
cases alike and when the rule relates in a principled fashion to other rules of the 
same system. Consistency requires that a rule, whatever its content be applied 
in a “similar” or “applicable” instance’.638 Some amount of discretion to dismiss 
cases will be tolerated by those who fall within the prosecutor’s remit if the 
prosecutor’s reasoning is stated clearly and is based on technical issues, such 
as lack of evidence639 and not on political issues, such as whether the 
prosecutor believes a state under investigation will publicly denounce the court. 
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However, if states have purposefully raised the standard of liability that is 
required to convict a commander of criminal behaviour by insisting that the 
prosecutor prove direct criminal intent, then this technical issue allows 
prosecutors to dismiss cases which otherwise might merit a full investigation or 
a trial. Even if a prosecutor were not consciously deferring to major powers, the 
result will be a de facto deference to states that employ air power, since the 
OTP will prioritise other, more easily provable crimes that do not have such a 
high mens rea hurdle to pass. 
 The ICC Prosecutor has, in practise, tended to prioritise cases in a way 
that keeps the court from antagonising major powers, and in each case, the 
OTP has offered non-political rationales for why it has decided to drop a case 
that could come within its remit:    
That pattern of deference is also evident in the prosecutor’s critical decisions about 
where to start full investigations. There is strong circumstantial evidence that the court 
has used its discretion in opening investigations to avoid entanglement with major 
powers and to reassure them about the court’s intentions… There is no “smoking gun” 
evidence that the prosecutor has made these choices because of perceived major-
power preferences or out of a desire to avoid entanglement with them. There are 
plausible nonpolitical arguments against investigations in each of these cases. Because 
the prosecutor has only infrequently explained a decision not to open an investigation, 
moreover, there is little documentary evidence to assess. But the overall pattern 
strongly suggests that the prosecutor’s office has, to this point, used its discretion on 
where to open investigations strategically.
640
 
Indeed, commentators such as Bill Schabas have suggested that the 
Prosecutor uses the ‘gravity’ threshold for determining which situations are 
worth investigating as a way to screen out cases that would put it in conflict with 
major world powers. As an example, he noted that the Prosecutor’s choice to 
not investigate the situation in Iraq in 2006 seemed more motivated by political 
pressure than any objective measures of gravity.641  
Perhaps in response to such criticism, the ICC OTP released its Policy 
Paper on Case Selection and Prioritisation in 2016 and it sheds some light on 
how the OTP justifies the use of the Prosecutor’s discretion. In the document, 
the OTP stresses that it will not exercise the Prosecutor’s discretion to appease 
certain states: ‘[T]he Office of the Prosecutor shall act independently of 
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instructions from any external source. Independence goes beyond not seeking 
or acting on instructions: it means that decisions shall not be influenced or 
altered by the presumed or known wishes of any external actor.’ Furthermore, 
as Goldstone mentioned above, this document explains that the exercise of the 
Prosecutor’s discretion is primarily a function of the availability of evidence:   
Case selection is an information and evidence-driven process. This means that the 
Office will select and pursue cases only if the information and evidence available or 
accessible to the Prosecution, including upon investigation, can reasonably justify the 
selection of a case. As part of the case selection process, the Office will balance the 
strength of a case theory against its weaknesses… The case hypothesis will be 
reviewed on a continuous basis taking into consideration the evidence collected. Both 
incriminating and exonerating evidence will be fairly and objectively evaluated and the 
case hypothesis may be adjusted or rejected on the basis of further investigations.
642
  
Legally, there is no requirement for the ICC OTP to release the criteria it uses to 
determine which cases to pursue and how they ought to be prioritised.643 
Therefore, the fact that it has released such guidelines shows that the 
Prosecutor is sensitive to the way that its discretion is perceived by the public. 
Specifically, since the Prosecutor felt that it was necessary to publish these 
internal guidelines, she must fear that her office will suffer a legitimacy cost 
when it is accused of dropping a case for political, rather than strictly legal 
reasons. Struett suggests that the ICC OTP must be aware of how extra-legal 
factors affect its work, but should never mention those factors when explaining 
its decision-making process in order to preserve the institution’s legitimacy. 644  
To explore this further, I shall examine a couple of high-profile instances of 
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court officials deferring to state interests and how they tried to avoid incurring 
legitimacy costs for doing so.  
Strategic Deference in International Courts 
When examining court actors’ motivations, particularly the court’s appetite to 
weigh in on polemic, yet highly ambiguous law, it may be helpful to think about 
the effect that institutional interests may have on a prosecutor’s decision to 
issue an indictment. In Chapter 4, I reviewed the small, yet growing body of 
strategic-choice literature as it has been applied to decisions made by domestic 
and international courts. These studies suggested that both judges and 
prosecutors will sometimes make strategic decisions counter to their professed 
ideological preferences in order to obtain the best outcome for their institution, 
given what other actors may do in response. Choices in how to structure an 
investigation or on how to rule in a particular case are strategic decisions and it 
is a safe assumption that the actors in an international or domestic court, be 
they prosecutors or judges, would like to do what they were trained to do — 
apply the law to the particular facts of a given case. However, if their institution 
is to survive, their actions must take into account what they believe other 
domestic or international actors might do in response to their decisions. 
As a case involving a highly political issue and ambiguous law, the 
contentious 1996 International Court of Justice (ICJ) advisory ruling on the 
Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons provides an example of how 
judges might react in such circumstances.645 In their dispositif, the judges voted 
on several replies to the UN General Assembly concerning the legality of the 
threat or use of nuclear weapons, and for four out of six of their replies, the 
judges were able to find unanimous agreement.646 However, on the crux of the 
                                            
 
645
 Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons (International Court of Justice). 
646
 For example, the judges were in unanimous agreement that: ‘A threat  or use  of nuclear  weapons 
should also be compatible with the requirements of the international law applicable in armed conflict, 
particularly those of the principles and rules of international humanitarian law, as well as with specific 
obligations under treaties and other undertakings which expressly deal with  nuclear weapons.’ Legality of 
the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, 44. On the face of it, this statement seems a bit banal and 
tautological – in essence, a legal use of nuclear weapons must comply with international law. However, it 
did clarify that the use of nuclear weapons was not in a legal category of its own, divorced from IHL 
requirements of distinction, proportionality, etc. 
   
 
 
197 
 
 
matter—whether the threat or use of nuclear weapons was allowed under 
international law in extremis — the court issued a non-liquet response: 
It follows from the above-mentioned requirements that the threat or use of nuclear 
weapons would generally be contrary to the rules of international law applicable in 
armed conflict, and in particular the principles and rules of humanitarian law; However, 
in view of the current state of international law, and of the elements of fact at its 
disposal, the Court cannot conclude definitively whether the threat or use of nuclear 
weapons would be lawful or unlawful in an extreme circumstance of self-defence, in 
which the very survival of a state would be at stake.
647
 
This response divided the court eight to seven. Those who dissented, such as 
Judges Schwebel (USA) and Higgins (UK) criticised the non liquet on the 
grounds that the law is sufficiently clear and that it does authorise the use of 
nuclear weapons in extremis.648 In his opinion, Judge Schwebel lambasted his 
colleagues for not coming to a decision one way or the other about the issue 
and hinted that the decision said less about the true state of international law, 
than the state of international politics: 
When it comes to the supreme interests of the state, the Court discards the legal 
progress of the Twentieth Century, puts aside the provisions of the Charter of the 
United Nations of which it is the ‘principal judicial organ’, and proclaims, in terms 
redolent of Realpolitik, its ambivalence about the most important provisions of modern 
international law.
649
 
The strategic nature of the Nuclear Weapons non liquet has not been lost on 
scholars either. Kati Kulovesi claimed that, in the absence of specific 
international rules regulating nuclear weapons, those looking to LOAC for 
further guidance were able to find convincing legal arguments for either side of 
the Nuclear Weapons debate.650 Even so, the ICJ had managed to rule on 
politically sensitive topics before and the judges were certainly no strangers to 
the tricky problem of finding applicable legal principles to fill in lacunae. Why, 
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after decades of delivering definitive judgements on other political issues did the 
Court refuse to rule on this one?651  
Kulovesi suggests that definitively ruling on the legality of nuclear 
weapons would have severely damaged the court’s legitimacy in the eyes of the 
states, particularly those on the losing side.  A non liquet provided the court with 
a way out of this high-stakes problem: 
[I]n order to avoid an open conflict with either side [of the debate], the Court then 
decided to formulate its answer in an indefinitive manner. The impression that the non 
liquet was due to strategic reasons is reinforced by the fact that most judges in fact 
expressed in their added opinions [--] the view that international law does give a 
definitive answer to the question before the Court. As Kohen has noted, only three of 
the judges agreed with the conclusion in paragraph (2)E of the dispositif. All the others 
either conclusively defined what in their view was the legal status of the threat or use of 
nuclear weapons under international law, or claimed that the court should have refused 
to answer the question.
652
 
Former Finnish diplomat, Martti Koskenniemi, concurs with this position, 
claiming that a ruling coming down definitively in favour of, or in opposition to, 
the use or threat of nuclear weapons would not have been in the Court’s 
institutional interests: 
Both would have entailed a collision between law and politics, politics being understood 
either as the structure of the world’s politico-military system or generally shared politico-
humanitarian ethic. In neither of these conflicts could it confidently have been expected 
that law would have prevailed.
653
  
Had either the law been better defined, or had the issue of nuclear weapons not 
been so clearly the domain of high politics, the judges may have felt more 
confident in prescribing a legal remedy to the General Assembly. The non liquet 
allowed the court to acknowledge the valid legal arguments of both sides of the 
nuclear debate without alienating the other, thereby maintaining their legitimacy 
as a neutral arbiter for future cases.   
Similarly, when presented with reports of LOAC violations committed by 
NATO in its air campaign against Serbia during the Kosovo War, the Office of 
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the Prosecutor (OTP) at the ICTY was obliged to consider the matter to head off 
the legitimacy costs that would be incurred for pursuing prosecutions against 
one party to the conflict, but not the other.654 However, as with the Nuclear 
Weapons case, the subject matter for this investigation, NATO’s use of air 
power, was fraught with risk for the continued operation of the court. The chief 
prosecutor at the time, Carla Del Ponte, tasked William Fenrick to head a 
committee to assess the legality of the alliance’s actions, including the 
proportionality of several airstrikes.655 Though not directly threatened by NATO 
to cease her preliminary investigation, Del Ponte and her committee faced an 
uphill battle for information on the incidents her committee was researching: 
I quickly concluded that it was impossible to investigate NATO, because NATO and its 
member states would not cooperate with us. They would not provide us access to the 
files and documents. Over and above this, however, I understood that I had collided 
with the edge of the political universe in which the tribunal was allowed to function. If 
I went forward with an investigation of NATO, I would not only fail in this investigative 
effort, I would render my office incapable of continuing to investigate and prosecute the 
crimes committed by the local forces during the wars of the 1990s.
656
 
Since the CDDH, the United States, in particular, has had concerns that the 
proportionality rule could be used to limit its freedom of action with regards to 
the use of air power, which it regarded as an unacceptable way of levelling the 
playing field vis-à-vis less technologically capable countries. Del Ponte and her 
committee now found themselves in a position to weigh in on the application of 
the proportionality rule in precisely the way that the US had feared. Scheffer 
recalls the diplomatic pressure that US state officials put upon the Prosecutor to 
get her to relent: 
During the entire period that Washington responded to the Kosovo bombing inquiry and 
up until the report issued by Del Ponte announcing the decision not to investigate NATO 
or the United States, Del Ponte was persona non grata in Washington… I understood 
but disagreed with the strategy of Berger, Albright, and Cohen to isolate and annoy Del 
Ponte at a time when we needed to cultivate a cooperative spirit during a highly 
sensitive and potentially risky inquiry into the NATO targeting strategy over Kosovo and 
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Serbia. They decided to play hardball with her, clearly resenting how she shamed the 
United States for what we all considered to be a singular achievement in liberating 
Kosovo from the clutches of Serb criminality. 
657
 
To give the ‘wrong’ answer in her report would risk alienating NATO, but to not 
say anything would weaken the ICTY’s legitimacy, making it difficult to be seen 
as an impartial adjudicator of international justice. This realisation caused her to 
accept the committee’s assessment that the law regarding proportionality was 
unclear as a way to defuse the tricky political situation:  
I felt the committee members had drawn restrictive interpretations [of LOAC] to avoid 
being obliged to go on. I must confess, however, that I knew going on was impossible, 
both technically and professionally. We had no cooperation, none, from anybody—this 
was the technical problem. And it was impossible to go on politically without 
undermining the rest of the tribunal’s work. I could discount the political considerations, 
because of the technical impediment. This is why I went public with the committee’s 
report.
658
 [emphasis added] 
The ‘restrictive interpretations’ of LOAC to which the committee held could not 
give clear guidance on the legality of the incidents under investigation. 
However, in my interview with a member of that committee, they pushed back 
against the idea that the report’s contents were influenced by NATO’s 
combative stance, instead arguing that even if the alliance had cooperated with 
the court, it would have been difficult to sustain a conviction: 
There may or may not have been pressure exerted on The Prosecutor, meaning the 
senior person in the organization, not the person who prosecuted a particular case. But 
I think it was their job to keep it off our backs. Certainly, no prosecutor while I was there 
said, ‘we can't do this because it is politically unacceptable’. We just — We didn't 
recommend prosecuting for NATO stuff because we didn't think there was anything 
there that was big enough or that had senior enough people involved for us to do the 
job — for us to be involved. If we compared what we were doing [in the NATO report] 
with potential accused from Bosnia or Croatia or Serbia, they were either people who 
had done much worse things or people much higher up the totem pole.
659
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Even if the members of the Prosecutor’s NATO bombing committee felt 
insulated from the political posturing taking place between the Office of the 
Prosecutor (OTP) and NATO, it seems clear that Del Ponte believed that she 
would be unable to proceed with other cases if she lost NATO’s support and 
this affected her willingness to proceed with a full investigation of the air 
campaign.660 Despite the fact that state officials from NATO countries may have 
thought they were complying with the court in good faith,661 and despite the fact 
that the committee members themselves did not believe that NATO was 
influencing the outcome of the OTP inquiry, once again, it is not whether NATO 
was actually withholding evidence that is important here, but rather whether the 
Prosecutor believed this to be the case. This is because ultimately, it is the 
Prosecutor’s decision to push forward with an indictment or to drop the case.  
 Clearly court officials are politically aware and understand that state 
officials will likely take actions to marginalise the court (or will withhold crucial 
evidence) if they make decisions that are not in the state’s interest.662 The 
Nuclear Weapons non liquet demonstrates that despite their formal 
independence, international courts, like their domestic counterparts, rely upon 
other actors for resources and legitimacy. Court officials may be inclined to 
make decisions that do not reflect their ideological preferences, but instead are 
made to avoid the institutional costs that would come from exercising their 
discretion freely. The history behind Prosecutor Del Ponte’s difficulties with 
investigating NATO’s bombing campaign during Operation Allied Force further 
shows that court officials do not necessarily fear direct political action against 
the court, because states can exert pressure merely by not cooperating with the 
court on its investigations. Furthermore, as with the Nuclear Weapons case, if 
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the law regarding proportionality and precautions in attack is ambiguous 
enough, then the prosecutor has a technical way to avoid a conflict with state 
officials without suffering a legitimacy cost for not issuing an indictment.     
 Since it seems that court officials are at least aware of the strategic 
environment in which they operate and there is evidence that prosecutors and 
judges will sometimes use their discretion to dismiss cases for extra-legal 
reasons, I will make the following assumptions for the purposes of this study:  
 Prosecutors value successful prosecutions since it justifies their raison 
d'être.  
 Prosecutors believe they will incur a legitimacy cost for bringing cases to 
trial that do not result in a conviction.  
 Prosecutors believe that state officials will not cooperate with 
investigations if it is not in their interest to do so. 
 Prosecutors believe they will incur a legitimacy cost for not bringing forth 
cases that ostensibly fall within their remit, if they cannot otherwise justify 
their decision.  
 Prosecutors will incur material costs when they choose to investigate 
cases.  
As with my assumptions regarding state officials, I suggest that these 
motivations are stable, holding true for both domestic663 and international 
criminal courts and do not change when the person of the prosecutor changes 
in any particular court. Moreover, these assumptions are roughly in line with 
what Landes had proposed in his basic model of prosecutorial strategy.664 
Conclusions 
Although there are many reasons for why it has been difficult to achieve 
accountability for the rules of proportionality and precautions in attack, the 
strategic choice perspective offers researchers a way to cut through some of 
this complexity by looking at the relationship between the motivations of court 
and state officials as they interact with one another in a given strategic 
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environment. For the purpose of this study, I am defining state officials as those 
who come from states that use air power regularly and have the power to set 
state policy on LOAC. There is a great deal of evidence which reveals that state 
officials want to maintain their state’s freedom of action to pursue mission 
success with minimal restrictions and are particularly sensitive to having their 
commanders prosecuted. In this study, I am defining court officials narrowly as 
prosecutors, since in this case, nearly every instance of a prima facie 
disproportionate attack that has been brought before a court has been 
dismissed by a prosecutor before being taken to trial. For their part, prosecutors 
are concerned with having enough evidence to secure a conviction, given what 
the law requires, because they do not wish to waste resources or to suffer the 
legitimacy costs associated with failure. Prosecutors are sensitive to how the 
public views their exercise of prosecutorial discretion to dismiss cases, but they 
have also found ways to use the technical problem of acquiring evidence as an 
excuse to minimise the legitimacy costs associated with dismissing a case for 
political reasons.  in Chapter 6, I shall formalise these assumptions by showing 
how state officials and prosecutors attempt to maximise their payoffs in a game-
theoretical model.   
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Chapter 6 
A Model of State Official and Prosecutor Interaction 
The logic of the proportionality rule arose as the result of a long history of 
development in LOAC and ICL, but it is nevertheless difficult to try violations of 
this rule, especially in criminal courts. Generally, the rule requires commanders 
to make sure that the expected collateral damage caused by an attack is not 
going to be excessive when compared with the military advantage they expect 
to gain from striking a military target. Furthermore, in order to make sure that 
commanders can properly make this decision, the rule on precautions in attack 
requires them to, among other things, take all feasible measures to verify the 
nature of targets so they have all the information they need to make a 
proportionality calculation in good faith. Although these rules can be effective at 
guiding attackers’ actions before launching a strike, particularly when legal 
advisors act as a compliance fence around the commander’s decision-making 
process,665 they are fiendishly difficult for legal professionals to apply to a case 
of prima facie disproportionate attack ex post.666 The criminalisation of these 
rules theoretically includes liability for reckless attacks,667 but there have not 
been any successful prosecutions of the proportionality, either for direct intent to 
cause a disproportionate outcome or for recklessness in targeting or performing 
the proportionality calculation. Neither national nor international jurisdictions 
have managed to effectively deal with alleged violations of these rules in a 
robust way.668  
There are several legal and practical reasons for this, but after 
considering the literature, there seem to be two main reasons that explain why 
the rules have proved to be so elusive. Firstly, those countries that rely heavily 
on air power have lobbied for the ICL definition of proportionality to require the 
commander to have direct knowledge of the disproportionate nature of the 
attack669 and they have used the vagueness of the rule’s provisions to take 
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advantage of other criminal law norms which give discretion to the commander, 
such as the Rule of Lenity.670 Secondly, any prosecutor wishing to try an 
alleged case of disproportionate attack must find evidence, not only of the 
effects of the attack, but also the commander’s mental state when they 
launched the attack and this often requires investigators to seek information 
from state officials who may not be forthcoming with such evidence. The 
combined effect of these difficulties has been to substantially limit the 
implementation of the criminal version of the rule.   
If the ICL version of proportionality rule represents a case of dead-letter 
law, is this the necessary consequence of trying to criminalise a provision that is 
just too difficult to pin down in a fair way, or are there strategic conditions which 
make it unlikely that a case of disproportionate attack would be taken to trial? In 
Chapter 4, I introduced the strategic-choice perspective and reviewed the 
literature that described how court actors might interact with other strategic 
actors, such as lawmakers, in order to achieve their personal or institutional 
goals. I suggest that this same approach can simplify the problem of achieving 
accountability for the rules on proportionality and precautions in attack. To that 
end, in Chapter 5, I identified the relevant actors for this problem as state 
officials who can influence LOAC and prosecutors from either domestic or 
international jurisdictions who have the authority to prosecute war crimes. In this 
Chapter, I will detail a model of their interaction and will explore what conditions 
must change in order to produce a different equilibrium state from the one that 
case law suggests is currently the case.  
The Model 
To model the strategic interaction between state officials and prosecutors, I 
have chosen to use a three-level game of perfect information. There are six 
paths through the game and it covers: 
 the state official’s decision to lobby for a particular interpretation of 
proportionality and precautions at an international law conference; 
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 the prosecutor’s decision to pursue a case of disproportionate attack; 
and  
 the state official’s subsequent decision either to cooperate with the 
prosecutor or not.671  
In Chapter 5, I identified the motivations of both state officials and prosecutors. 
To formalise these motivations for the purposes of this model, L will represent 
the anticipated legitimacy payoffs for either the state (Ls), or the prosecutor (Lp); 
m will represent the anticipated payoffs to states from future military action, and 
c will represent the fixed costs associated with running an investigation into an 
alleged incident of disproportionate attack. Each path through the game also 
has a unique value for p, which will represent the probability that a commander 
will be convicted of planning or launching an unlawful attack. Clearly, if a 
commander is not indicted, this value will be zero, but for all other paths through 
the game, the value of p will be affected by the decisions made earlier in the 
game. Figure 3 below lists each of these variables along with their definitions: 
ps,i,c Probability of conviction after indictment, given a strong liability regime and state cooperation with the 
prosecutor 
ps,i,~c Probability of conviction after indictment, given a strong liability regime and no state cooperation with the 
prosecutor 
pw,i,c Probability of conviction after indictment, given a weak liability regime and state cooperation with the 
prosecutor 
pw,i,~c Probability of conviction after indictment, given a weak liability regime and no state cooperation with the 
prosecutor 
m Anticipated value of future military action 
Ls Anticipated state legitimacy  
Lp Anticipated prosecutor legitimacy  
c Anticipated costs associated with running an investigation/prosecution 
Figure 3: Notations table 
The relationship between these variables is based on the motivations I 
discussed in Chapter 5. Beginning with the relationship between the different 
values of associated with the commander’s probability of conviction, I suggest 
that p is higher on any path under the strong liability672 condition than on any 
path under the weak liability condition (ps>pw) simply because it will be easier to 
convince a panel of judges or a jury that the commander clearly violated the law 
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 In the definition of cooperation, I include providing insider evidence and assistance with rendering 
suspects into custody. 
672
 To avoid any confusion caused by using terms of art, like ‘strict liability’, I use the terms ‘strong liability’ 
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under a strong liability condition than under a weak liability condition. Then, for 
each subgame that occurs after a prosecutor’s indictment, the commander’s 
probability of conviction is higher under the cooperate condition than the do-not-
cooperate condition (pc>p~c), because the prosecutor will have better access to 
the evidence needed to prove the commander’s criminal mental state. I posit 
that these two assumptions can be combined to form the following inequality: 
ps,i,c>ps,i,~c>pw,i,c>pw,i,~c. Although it is possible that pw,i,c>ps,i,~c, I am going to 
assume for this model that the liability condition has a greater impact on the 
value of p than whether the state decides to cooperate with the court. 
Next, I turn to the relationship between the different variables used in the 
players’ payoffs. The legitimacy terms, Ls, for the state official, and Lp, for the 
prosecutor,673 can be either negative or positive, depending on whether the 
particular outcome bolsters or undermines the legitimacy of either actor. The 
term, m, only applies to the state, since an independent prosecutor should not 
be concerned with the outcome of a future military action. The value of m can 
also be positive or negative, depending on whether the outcome represents 
military success or failure. Finally, the term, c, only applies to the prosecutor, as 
the state should not be concerned about the costs of prosecuting a suspect 
commander.674  Since the statements and actions of state officials in the 
literature and in my interviews indicate a preference for military success over 
state legitimacy for countries that use air power frequently, I will initially assume 
that m>Ls. Furthermore, for the prosecutor, the legitimacy value of pursing a 
successful prosecution must be higher than the prosecution costs; otherwise, 
the prosecutor would have more incentive to do nothing, thereby earning a 
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 Breaking from Landes’ basic model, I’ve decided to model the prosecutor’s motivation in terms of 
legitimacy, rather than the length of a suspect’s sentence. Though there is clearly a relationship between 
these two ideas (the prosecutor justifies their position in society by securing as many tough sentences as 
they can), particularly in the context of international justice, legitimacy for the Office of the Prosecutor more 
accurately reflects the prosecutor’s motivation. Furthermore, it allows me to have this term change valance 
according to whether the prosecutor wins or loses a case. When the prosecutor is only motivated by 
sentence length, the worst they can do is obtain a payoff of 0. However, if the prosecutor incurs a 
legitimacy cost for losing a case, then it adds an extra element of risk to a prosecutor’s decision to issue 
an indictment which would be present in high-profile war crimes cases. See Ch 4 at notes 536-541. 
674
 Because I am more interested in how the liability regime and state cooperation affect the value of p, 
rather than how the prosecutor’s ability to resource the investigation affects this value, unlike Landes’ 
basic model, I envisage the prosecutor’s resourcing of the investigation as a fixed cost that the prosecutor 
incurs for undertaking an investigation, but which does not affect the probability of conviction. See Ch 4 at 
note 536-541. 
   
 
 
208 
 
 
payoff of zero, rather than take on even an easily winnable case and be 
burdened with the logistical costs associated with the prosecution. Therefore, I 
assume that Ls>c.  
Figure 4 depicts the game tree for the complete game between a state 
official and a prosecutor along with the payoffs associated with each path 
through the game. The game begins with a decision by the state official to either 
lobby for a version of international law that includes a strong liability for prima 
facie disproportionate attacks or to push for a version that keeps the liability for 
such attacks as weak as possible. This could be done any number of ways. The 
state official may try to influence the wording of the crime at an international law 
conference, they could try to coordinate with other states to include a 
reservation to a LOAC or ICL treaty that bolsters their preferred interpretation of 
the law, they could make official statements which promote a weaker liability 
under customary law or they could incorporate some level of vagueness into the 
provision in the knowledge that the Rule of Lenity will make it impossible for the 
commander to be convicted. The prosecutor knows under which condition they 
are working and they must then decide to either indict a suspect commander or 
to drop the case. To simplify the model, the decision to indict a commander 
includes preliminary processes, such as an investigation of the incident; 
moreover, I assume that if a commander is indicted, the court will have a way to 
bring them into custody. If the prosecutor drops the case, the game ends. 
However, if the prosecutor issues an indictment, then the state official must 
decide if they should cooperate or refuse to cooperate with the court. This 
subgame models the real-life problem that courts have had with obtaining 
evidence of the disproportionate nature of an attack from less-than-forthcoming 
state officials. In the next section, I shall first examine each of the two 
subgames to show the logic behind them and then I shall substitute in some 
numeric values for each variable so the equilibria states become more 
apparent.  
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Figure 4: Game tree of an interaction between a state official  
and a prosecutor with player payoffs675 
 
Just as important as what is included in the model, I should also describe some 
of the details of this strategic interaction that have either been left out or 
collapsed into a single term for the sake of parsimony. For instance, one could 
have included a cost associated with the state relinquishing its intelligence to 
the court that was separate from the ‘future military value’ term. This would 
have represented the fear, described by Charles Garraway, that the court might 
mishandle sensitive intelligence, thereby compromising their sources or 
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 The state official payoffs are depicted above prosecutor payoffs. This model was designed using the 
Game Theory Explorer online modelling tool. See Rahul Savani and Bernhard von Stengel, ‘Game Theory 
Explorer -- Software for the Applied Game Theorist’ (2015) 12 Computational Management Science 5. 
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methods of intelligence-gathering.676 The cost could be added to the state 
official’s utility function under the ‘cooperate with the court’ condition and then 
left absent in the ‘do-not-cooperate’ condition. I chose not to model the 
interaction this way because it seems possible for the state to work with the 
court in question to review and clear intelligence in such a manner as to not 
jeopardise national security or the state’s sources.677 Furthermore, in the case 
of an international prosecution by the ICC, Article 72 of the Rome Statute 
specifically addresses the national security concerns of the states by allowing 
the court to negotiate an: ‘Agreement on conditions under which the assistance 
could be provided including, among other things, providing summaries or 
redactions, limitations on disclosure, use of in camera or ex parte proceedings, 
or other protective measures permissible under the Statute and the Rules of 
Procedure and Evidence.’678 Therefore, it ought to be possible for the state to 
offer meaningful assistance to either a domestic or an international court without 
compromising national security.  
 Moreover, regardless of whether a case of prima facie disproportionate 
attack were to be taken up in an international or a domestic jurisdiction, the 
prosecutor would likely have more than one chance to decide whether to pursue 
the case. For example, at the ICC, the prosecutor can first choose to open a 
preliminary examination,679 then if they believe there is sufficient cause to 
proceed, they can petition the Pre-Trial Chamber to open a formal 
investigation.680 Afterwards, if they believe there is still a reasonable basis to 
prosecute a case, they can choose to issue an indictment for the accused to 
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 See Ch 3 at note 452.  
677
 See Ch 3 at notes 453 & 454. Furthermore, Richard Goldstone was still able to secure state 
cooperation with the court, despite the ICTY’s policy of liberally sharing evidence with the defence: 
‘Arrangements to receive police information, and, even more so, intelligence information, required lengthy, 
complex and detailed negotiations. Again, there was no substitute for personal visits. Trust and confidence 
had to be built between the institution and the government concerned. This could not be achieved without 
direct contact with the relevant officials. The necessary agreements required special procedures, including 
the building of secure premises to house such confidential documents. The rules of procedure had to be 
amended to enable the Prosecutor to accept information in confidence. More particularly, the Prosecutor 
had to be allowed to receive 'lead' evidence without the obligation to disclose it to defendants and their 
legal representatives.’ Richard Goldstone, ‘A View from the Prosecution’ (2004) 2 Journal of International 
Criminal Justice 380, 381. 
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 Article 72(5)(d), Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court of 1998. 
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 Article 15(2), ibid. 
680
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appear before the Court.681  The model simplifies the decisions taken at each of 
these stages by collapsing them into one decision to indict or not indict the 
accused. In reality, the interaction between state officials and prosecutors is 
more iterative, with the prosecutor choosing to proceed with different stages of 
an investigation and the state officials re-evaluating their decision to cooperate 
at each new stage. The iterative nature of the actual strategic interaction also 
increases the likelihood that exogenous factors will affect the outcome of the 
game. For example, if after cooperating with the court during a preliminary 
examination, public opinion within the state turned against the Court, the state 
official, fearing a legitimacy cost for continuing to cooperate with the court, may 
decide not to cooperate after the prosecutor launches a formal investigation. 
Nevertheless, the value of simplifying the interaction for this model outweighs its 
lack of resolution in this case.  
 Another way in which the model represents a simplified version of reality 
is the assumption that the same state official who chooses to lobby for a 
particular type of liability for unlawful attacks will also be the official who 
chooses whether the state should cooperate with the prosecutor. Given the 
stability of preferences held by different US delegates to the CDDH and to the 
Rome Conference,682 I believe it is appropriate to assume that even if a different 
individual argues for the state’s position on the content of the law from the one 
who must decide whether to cooperate with the prosecutor, both state officials 
share a common understanding of what is in the state’s interest. Therefore, they 
can be treated functionally as the same official for the purposes of the model.  
 Finally, I assume for the purposes of this model that the path players 
take through the game is the only factor that influences the probability of 
conviction for a suspect commander, p. In reality, there could be any number of 
exogenous factors that might affect this probability which are independent of the 
liability condition or whether the state official decides to cooperate with the 
court. For example, an insider witness could agree to testify against a suspect 
commander without prior approval from the state or the evidence against the 
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commander could be so overwhelming that the court does not require any state 
cooperation to secure a conviction. Nevertheless, such events will occur with a 
frequency that is difficult for the state official or the prosecutor to predict, so I 
have decided not to include their effects in the original model. However, when I 
discuss how changing the values of the different variables affects the Nash 
equilibrium of this model, I will mention how exogeneous effects on the value of 
p might change the path that the different players follow through the game.  
The Indictment Subgames 
Beginning at the node where the Prosecutor makes their decision, the game 
between the prosecutor and the state official proceeds with the same strategies, 
regardless of whether the players find themselves in either the strong liability 
condition or the weak liability condition. There are, however, two main 
differences between these two conditions. Firstly, if the prosecutor chooses not 
to indict a suspect commander under the strong liability condition, then they will 
suffer a legitimacy cost associated with not pursuing a case that had a 
reasonable chance of conviction, but if they choose not to indict under the weak 
liability condition, then they will be able to, in Del Ponte’s words, ‘discount the 
political considerations, because of the technical impediment’683 and use the 
weak liability as an excuse for not pursuing the case. Secondly, the liability 
condition also affects the probability of conviction, so the values of p under the 
strong liability condition will always be higher than those under the weak liability 
condition. Other than these differences, the functions which describe the 
expected utility of each player follow a similar logic in each subgame.  
 In both conditions, if the prosecutor chooses to indict a suspect 
commander, the state official expects that the value of any future military action 
will be dependent on whether the commander is convicted. If the state official 
agrees to cooperate with the court, the first part of the state official’s expected 
utility, (1 — p)m, will represent the gains made from an acquittal and the next 
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part, -(p)m, will represent the losses incurred by a conviction.684 The last part of 
the function, +Ls, represents the legitimacy the state receives for cooperating 
with the court. If the state official does not agree to cooperate with the court, 
then their expected utility will again feature the value of future military success, 
moderated by the probability of the suspect commander’s conviction, (1 — p)m 
— (p)m. However, rather than receiving a legitimacy bonus, the state will suffer 
a legitimacy cost, -Ls, for seemingly defying justice.  
 Regardless of whether the state official chooses to cooperate with the 
court or not, the prosecutor’s utility function remains the same whenever they 
choose to issue an indictment. As with the state official, the prosecutor’s 
expected utility is dependent upon the likelihood of securing a conviction of a 
suspect commander, should the case go to trial. Therefore, the first term in the 
function, (p)Lp, represents the legitimacy that will be gained from a successful 
conviction and the next term, -(1 — p)Lp, represents the legitimacy that will be 
lost from failing to make a successful conviction. As stated above, the final term, 
-c, accounts for the fixed resource costs associated with running the 
investigation. Although scholars such as Bosco685 suggested that court officials 
might be intimidated by state retribution against the court, none of the court 
officials I spoke with endorsed this idea wholeheartedly and they more often 
insisted that legal and logistical issues were more pressing than direct threats 
from the state.686 However, states do not need to directly threaten the court to 
have an impact on prosecutorial decision-making. By merely making it more 
difficult for them to secure a conviction, states can change the prosecutor’s 
payoffs, consistent with Landes’ basic model.687 Therefore, for the sake of 
parsimony, I am not including a separate ‘state intimidation’ term into the 
prosecutor’s utility function and I will assume that indirect influence over the 
outcome of a potential verdict (e.g. either by structuring the law a certain way or 
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by refusing to hand over evidence to the court) will be enough to change the 
prosecutor’s behaviour.   
By substituting numeric values for each of the variables in this game, it 
becomes possible to explore it in a more concrete way. Figure 5 lists all of the 
variables used in the model and their corresponding numeric values for this 
exercise. Importantly, these values satisfy the assumptions made earlier in this 
Chapter. Notionally, I have set Ls and Lp as equal to each other, but this is not 
imperative as these are theoretically two separate variables. Furthermore, 
unless a variable is used in the utility function of both players, it is the 
relationship between the variables within a player’s own utility functions that is 
important, rather than the relationship between variables used across the 
different players’ utility functions. This is because ultimately the point of the 
game is to maximise one’s own absolute payoff, rather than to maximise the 
relative payoff vis-à-vis the other player.  
ps,i,c 0.8 m 3 
ps,i,~c 0.6 Ls 2 
pw,i,c 0.4 Lp 2 
pw,i,~c 0.2 c 1 
Figure 5: Substitute values 
 
   
 
 
215 
 
 
 
Figure 6:Game tree showing numeric payoffs based on the substituted values 
The resulting game, depicted in Figure 6, can be solved through backwards 
induction, so I shall consider the results of the two ‘indictment’ subgames first, 
before turning to the results of the complete game. Since the state official has 
the last move, their payoffs will be analysed first. For the subgame that occurs 
under the strong liability condition, the state official has the choice to either 
cooperate with the court and receive a payoff of 0.2, or to not cooperate with the 
court and receive a payoff of -2.6. Therefore, the court official has a dominant 
strategy to cooperate with the court in this particular subgame. The prosecutor, 
believing that the state official will choose to cooperate, must decide if they 
should indict the suspect commander and receive a payoff of 0.2, or to not indict 
the suspect commander and receive a payoff of -2. In this case, the decision to 
indict strictly dominates the decision to drop the case. The Nash equilibrium for 
the strong liability condition is therefore: (indict  cooperate). For the subgame 
that occurs under the weak liability condition, the state official can either 
cooperate with the court and receive a payoff of 2.6, or not cooperate and 
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receive a payoff of -0.2. As with the strong liability subgame, the decision to 
cooperate strictly dominates the decision to not cooperate. However, the 
prosecutor’s decision changes. Believing that the state official will cooperate, 
the prosecutor anticipates receiving a payoff of -1.4 for issuing an indictment to 
the suspect commander688 and they will expect a payoff of 0 for not issuing the 
indictment. In this case, not issuing an indictment is the dominant strategy for 
the prosecutor and the Nash equilibrium for this subgame becomes: (do not 
indict).  
Solving the Complete Game 
Combining the results of the two subgames, it becomes possible to develop a 
rational-choice explanation for why it is difficult to achieve accountability for 
apparent violations of the rules on proportionality and precautions in attack. At 
the first node in the game, the state official will anticipate all the subsequent 
moves in the game and will therefore believe that their payoffs will be 2.6 under 
the strong liability condition and 3 under the weak liability condition. Since the 
state official anticipates a higher payoff under the weak liability condition, they 
will decide to lobby for a version of the law which will achieve that effect. This 
comports somewhat with what Lietzau told me about his thinking during the 
negotiation of the Rome Statute:  
Well, I showed up to the treaty negotiation on the US delegation, to negotiate the crimes 
definitions and the list of war crimes — the definition of crimes against humanity, war 
crimes — Articles 6, 7, and 8… Now, admittedly, I’m thinking like a defence counsel at 
that point time, not because, as some would say, the United States just wants to avoid 
liability. No. Because we intended to prosecute our own people and the assumption is: if 
an American is ever brought before the International Criminal Court, it’s not a legitimate 
trial. It’s some politically motivated thing, because if it was an actual crime, we would 
have been prosecuting that ourselves.
689
 
Anticipating how the court might use the law against the US, Lietzau (and 
presumably other state representatives) were concerned about what the 
political fallout might be if they pursued one definition of the law over another. 
As Lietzau stated, it may be the case that the US, at the time of the Rome 
Conference, was prepared to accept liability for sloppy or disproportionate 
attacks in its domestic jurisdiction — just not in an international forum. 
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Nevertheless, the interaction, as he described it, still follows the logic of the 
model: In anticipating the international prosecutor’s motivation to indict under a 
strong liability regime, the state official decides to lobby for a weaker liability, 
which, in turn, changes the prosecutor’s incentives. Indeed, the model predicts 
that the prosecutor will choose not to indict the commander and will receive a 
payoff of 0. Therefore, the Nash equilibrium of the complete game is: (lobby for 
a weak liability  do not indict).  
This describes what has occurred in the case law history for the crime of 
disproportionate attack. Thanks to the weak liability regime, endorsed by those 
states which use air power frequently, prosecutors have chosen to drop cases, 
rather than press forward with an indictment and a formal investigation of an 
alleged case of disproportionate attack. It is important to note that this decision 
takes place in the absence of any direct intimidation of the court by state 
officials. It is merely an extension of the usual prosecutorial motivation to pursue 
only those cases which will likely end with a conviction.  
One of the surprising conclusions predicted by the model, given these 
notional values, is that if an indictment were made, it would be in the state 
official’s interest to cooperate with the court, rather than suffer the legitimacy 
cost associated with appearing to obstruct justice, even if it increases the 
chances of conviction for their commander. This stands in contrast to my 
findings in Chapter 3, where it seemed as though state officials would go to 
great lengths to preserve their state secrets.690 Although the point is mooted by 
the fact that the state official’s endorsement of a weak liability condition 
guarantees that the prosecutor will choose not to indict a suspect commander, it 
does show that as long as the state sufficiently values the legitimacy associated 
with following the rules-based order, the state official will have an incentive to 
cooperate with the court, rather than play hardball. 
Changing the Equilibrium  
By designing a game which accurately models the interaction between state 
officials and prosecutors, one can make explicit the logic behind why the crime 
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of disproportionate attack has been such a difficult one to prosecute. However, 
this formalisation also allows researchers to examine which conditions might be 
expected to produce a different equilibrium state from the one which has 
occurred in history.  
 Beginning with the prosecutor’s payoffs, when would the prosecutor be 
more likely to issue an indictment under the weak liability condition? In order to 
change the prosecutor’s choice, the payoffs for the path (lobby for weak liability 
 indict  cooperate) must be greater than those for the path (lobby for weak 
liability  do not indict). Expressed formally, this becomes: 
 (𝑝𝑤,𝑖,𝑐)𝐿𝑝 − (1 − 𝑝𝑤,𝑖,𝑐)𝐿𝑝 − 𝑐 > 0 . 
Solving for p and c, reveals the following relationships between the variables: 
1. 𝑝𝑤,𝑖,𝑐 >
𝑐+𝐿𝑝
2𝐿𝑝
  
2. 𝑐 < 2(𝑝𝑤,𝑖,𝑐)𝐿𝑝 − 𝐿𝑝  
The first inequality suggests that the value of p must be high enough to 
overcome a ratio defined by the costs of running the prosecution plus the 
legitimacy term divided by two times the legitimacy term. This is quite a high bar 
to surmount and would likely require an exogenous influence on the value of 
pw,i,c. For instance, assuming that Lp=2 and c=1 (as described in Figure 5), it 
would mean that the resulting value of pw,i,c would need to be: 0.75 in order to 
change the prosecutor’s mind about pursuing a case under the weak liability 
condition. That would not leave much room to differentiate the weak liability 
condition from the strong liability condition and still preserve the assumption that 
ps,i,c>ps,i,~c>pw,i,c>pw,i,~c. However, it is possible. Practically, this could equate to 
having a case where the available evidence were so damning that even under a 
weak liability regime, the case would be easy to prosecute. As one official from 
the ICTY put it when speaking about the NATO Bombing Report: ‘I think if we 
had big clear-cut cases, you know: NATO carpet bombing Belgrade or 
something like that with hundreds or thousands of people killed… I think we just 
would've had a duty to go ahead with a prosecution, come hell or high water. 
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But I don't think that was the situation.’691 Legally, this example blurs the line 
between distinction and proportionality, but the comment does exemplify that 
when the likelihood of conviction is high for reasons that are not necessarily 
connected to the liability regime, it is still possible that the prosecutor will press 
forward with an indictment.  
The second inequality shows the relationship between the logistical costs 
associated with running a prosecution and the values of pw,i,c and Lp. Assuming 
pw,i,c= 0.4 and Lp=2, that would mean that c must be less than -0.4, meaning 
that the court would have to have its budget supplemented above and beyond 
the fixed costs of running the investigation in order to be motivated enough to 
indict a suspect commander. However, when combined with the effect of raising 
the ‘probability of conviction’ term, it may be possible to cajole the prosecutor to 
issue an indictment under the weak liability condition if pw,i,c > 0.5 and c = 0.  
Another way to induce the prosecutor to issue an indictment under the weak 
liability condition would be to add the same -Lp term for failing to make an 
indictment as is the case in the strong liability condition. Practically, this would 
mean that there would need to be a similar amount of pressure from human 
rights organisations, states and other public interest groups for failing to issue 
an indictment under the weak liability condition as under strong liability. In this 
case, these various audiences would not accept the excuse that prosecutor 
cannot make an indictment because the state of the law makes the probability 
of conviction unlikely. That is, the relevant audiences would not find this to be a 
credible reason for not pushing forward with an indictment. Importantly though, 
if the prosecutor did receive a legitimacy cost for failing to indict a suspect 
commander under the weak liability regime, and was therefore more likely to 
issue indictments, there would be more trials, but not a great deal of 
convictions, because the value of p for a given path through the game would 
remain unchanged. 
 Under the strong liability condition, it is clearly possible to motivate the 
prosecutor to issue an indictment; however, it is still helpful to explore precisely 
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which conditions lead to their decision. For the prosecutor to decide to issue an 
indictment rather than dropping the case, the payoffs for the path (lobby for a 
strong liability  indict  cooperate) must be higher than the path (lobby for a 
strong liability  do not indict). This can be formalised as: 
(𝑝𝑠,𝑖,𝑐)𝐿𝑝 − (1 − 𝑝𝑠,𝑖,𝑐)𝐿𝑝 − 𝑐 > −𝐿𝑝 . 
Again, solving for p and c reveals the following: 
1. 𝑝𝑠,𝑖,𝑐 >
𝑐
2𝐿𝑝
  
2. 𝑐 < 2(𝑝𝑠,𝑖,𝑐)𝐿𝑝  
For the first inequality, the value of ps,I,c must be higher than the ratio of 
the logistical costs of the prosecution over two times the value of the legitimacy 
term. Using the substituted values for Lp and c from Figure 5, this would mean 
that ps,I,c would need to be at least 0.25, a value that should be easily reached if 
the prosecutor were operating under a strong liability condition. Similarly, in the 
second inequality, the value of c could be quite high and the prosecutor would 
still be motivated to proceed with an indictment — it would be 3.2, assuming the 
values of ps,I,c and Lp from Figure 5. Combining these two observations, the 
prosecutor will choose to issue an indictment under conditions of strong liability, 
as long as ps,I,c and Lp are both positive numbers and c is less than two times 
the product of both. Realistically, this means that under conditions of strong 
liability, the prosecutor may have an incentive to indict suspect commanders 
even if there is not much of a chance that they will be convicted, provided the 
legitimacy they hope to gain (or fear losing) is sufficiently greater than the costs 
of running the prosecution.    
 Recalling that one of the more counterintuitive conclusions the model 
suggests is that it should be in the state official’s interest to cooperate with the 
prosecutor,692 what would need to change to induce the state official to not 
cooperate with the prosecutor? For this to occur, the payoffs to the state official 
from making a decision to not cooperate with the prosecutor must be greater 
than the payoffs that come from a decision to cooperate. This can be expressed 
as: 
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(1 − 𝑝~𝑐)𝑚 − (𝑝~𝑐)𝑚 − 𝐿𝑠 > (1 − 𝑝𝑐)𝑚 − (𝑝𝑐)𝑚 + 𝐿𝑠. 
Solving for each variable reveals: 
1. 𝑚 >
𝐿𝑠
𝑝𝑐−𝑝~𝑐
   
2. (𝑝𝑐 − 𝑝~𝑐) >
𝐿𝑠
𝑚
  
3. 𝐿𝑠 < 𝑚(𝑝𝑐 − 𝑝~𝑐) 
The first inequality suggests that the value for future military success must be 
higher than the state’s value for legitimacy divided by the difference between 
the value for p if the state official cooperates with the prosecutor versus the 
value of p when the state refuses to cooperate. Assuming the state leader finds 
themselves in the weak liability condition and assuming the substitute values for 
Ls, pw,i,c, and pw,i,~c from Figure 5, this means that the value of future military 
success would need to be greater than 10 to prompt the state official to change 
their strategy. The second inequality shows that the difference between the two 
values for p must be greater than the ratio of the values for legitimacy and 
future military success. Using the substitute values for Ls and m, the difference 
between pc and p~c must be greater than 0.667 in order to make the state 
official decide to not cooperate with the prosecutor. Finally, using the substitute 
values for m, pw,i,c, and pw,i,~c, the value of Ls must be less than 0.6 to effect a 
change in the state official’s strategy. How might these conditions come to pass 
in the real world? For one, the difference between the two values for p may 
widen based on what sort of support the state official could provide to the 
prosecutor. Perhaps the state official anticipates that the inside intelligence they 
are able to give the prosecutor is so damning that it will substantially affect the 
likelihood of conviction compared with the do-not-cooperate condition.  
Furthermore, it is also possible that certain exogenous factors may influence the 
values of these variables in such a way as to prompt a shift in strategy. For 
example, the state official may believe that the relative value of future military 
action would be substantially greater than the value of legitimacy if the state 
were to find itself fighting an existential threat as opposed to a war of choice.  
One of the most important insights that can be gleaned from this sort of 
analysis is to figure out if the state would ever choose to lobby for a strong 
liability regime. For this to be the case, the anticipated payoffs on the path 
   
 
 
222 
 
 
(lobby for strong liability  indict  cooperate) must be higher than the 
anticipated payoffs on the path (lobby for weak liability  do not indict). 
Expressed formally, the resultant inequality is: 
(1 − 𝑝𝑠,𝑖,𝑐)𝑚 − (𝑝𝑠,𝑖,𝑐)𝑚 + 𝐿𝑠 > 𝑚. 
Which, in turn, produces the following relationships between the variables: 
1. 𝐿𝑠 > 2(𝑝𝑠,𝑖,𝑐)𝑚  
2. 𝑝𝑠,𝑖,𝑐 <
𝐿𝑠
2𝑚
  
In this case, the first inequality shows that the anticipated value for legitimacy 
must be at least twice as large as the anticipated value for military success 
times ps,i,c. Using the substitute values for m and ps,i,c, this means that the value 
of Ls must be higher than 4.8 to effect a change in the state official’s strategy. 
Alternatively, if one were to take the converse of this relationship, the value of 
future military success must be sufficiently lower than the value of legitimacy to 
incentivise a change in strategy. Translating this into a practical example, there 
are several conditions which might lower the relative value of future military 
success for the state: 
 the state does not anticipate that it will be fighting an existential threat in 
the future; 
 the state could be powerful enough that the value of future success for 
any particular military operation is not very high;  
 the state has protection from another actor which causes its value of 
future military success to not be very high; or  
 the state does not believe it will be involved in future conflicts at all.  
If one or more of these conditions exist and the state official believes that the 
state could benefit from appearing to be following a rules-based order to either 
appease domestic audiences or to gain diplomatic benefits internationally, then 
the state official might be inclined to lobby for a strong liability regime. This 
comports somewhat with the reservations that my interviewees and Hays Parks 
had articulated in Chapter 5 regarding those states that seem most committed 
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to pursuing a strong liability for civilian casualties.693 At the time of negotiating 
the Rome Statute, some of the states in the ‘like-minded’ group, such as 
Switzerland, saw no immediate military threats on the horizon. Indeed, the head 
of the Swiss Delegation to the Rome Conference, Dider Pfirter, recognised that 
his country was not likely to be involved in the sort of conflicts that would give 
other states pause about restrictions on the use of force: ‘Switzerland is a small, 
wealthy, and internally stable country, which at least for the last fifty years has 
been surrounded by peaceful neighbors and whose army in the last 500 years 
has engaged in combat activity only once, when Napoleon attacked and 
occupied Switzerland some 200 years ago. As a result, Switzerland or Swiss 
soldiers are unlikely to be defendants before the ICC.’694 
Not only did the Swiss Delegation expect that its own armed forces 
would remain outside the Court’s gaze, but Switzerland was also under 
domestic pressure to develop the law in a way that provided as much protection 
as possible for civilians. Whether it was because Swiss citizens value their 
country’s humanitarian legacy, or because strong civilian protection measures 
may prevent the sort of large-scale refugee flows that have proven politically 
difficult for the European governments to manage, Switzerland had more of an 
incentive to argue for a strong liability for civilian casualties than did the United 
States:  ‘Apart from general concern for the fate of humanity, Switzerland's 
involvement with the ICC is due to its disproportionate exposure to international 
atrocities. Switzerland has the highest number of refugees per capita of any 
country in Western Europe. For instance, Switzerland has the second largest 
number in absolute terms of Kosovo-Albanians outside of Kosovo.’695 
The other way to change the state official’s mind about lobbying for a 
strong liability regime is to exogenously change the anticipated probability, ps,i,c. 
Assuming the substitute values for Ls and m from Figure 5 for the second 
inequality, the value of ps,i,c, would need to be less than 0.33 in order to motivate 
the state official to lobby for a strong liability regime. However, as noted earlier, 
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if one assumes that the main determinant of the value of p is the path that the 
players take through the game, then it becomes problematic to allow exogenous 
factors to substantially lower or raise the value of p for any particular path, 
particularly if those factors were to also change the relationship between the 
different values of p.  
 Exploring the problem of why disproportionate attacks are so difficult to 
prosecute from a strategic choice perspective yields several insights. Figure 7 
presents the highlights of the findings from the model presented in this Chapter. 
Many of these are intuitive, but there is value in making what is implicit, explicit. 
Not only does this sort of analysis uncover the logic behind this strategic 
interaction, but it can also be used to gauge the likeliness that new measures to 
achieve accountability will succeed.  
Outcome Necessary Changes to the Model 
The prosecutor decides to 
prosecute under weak 
liability condition. 
 The prosecutor must be completely reimbursed for the logistical 
costs of an investigation and the probability of conviction must be 
at least 50:50; and/or 
 The prosecutor must incur a legitimacy cost for failing to prosecute 
under the weak liability condition. 
The state official decides 
not to cooperate with the 
prosecutor. 
 The state official must ascribe substantially more value to the 
success of future military operations relative to the value of 
legitimacy; and/or 
 The state official must believe that their cooperation with the 
prosecutor will substantially raise the probability of conviction 
compared with the do-not-cooperate condition. 
The state official decides to 
lobby for a strong liability 
regime for proportionality.  
 The state official must ascribe more value to legitimacy than future 
military success; and/or 
 Exogeneous factors have substantially lowered the suspect 
commander’s probability of conviction.  
Figure 7: Summary of findings 
Conclusions  
As explored in Chapter 2, the logic of the proportionality rule arose as the result 
of a long history of development in LOAC. Moreover, when agreeing upon 
restrictions designed to hold commanders responsible for reckless or 
disproportionate strikes, those who negotiated the grave breaches regime in 
API or the ICC regime in the Rome Statute, structured the law in such a way 
that prosecutors could theoretically hold errant commanders to account. 
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However, in Chapter 3, I examined several substantive and procedural reasons 
for why it might be difficult to prosecute violations of the proportionality rule and 
its associated rule of precautions in attack, including the inherent vagueness of 
the rules, the requirement to prove the commander’s direct intent to commit the 
crime, and the inability for prosecutors to obtain evidence about the 
commander’s mental state. The combined effect of each of these difficulties is 
to lower the commander’s liability for attacks that appear prima facie 
disproportionate. That weaker liability has made prosecutors less likely to take 
up cases of disproportionate attack, since it is unlikely that they will be able to 
secure a conviction for their troubles. The strategic choice perspective offers 
researchers a way to systematically analyse the historical path that the two 
strategic actors have followed in their interaction as well as the other 
counterfactual paths that may arise for different values of the relevant variables. 
After identifying the actors and the relevant variables in Chapter 5, I was able to 
reconstruct the relevant strategic interaction between the prosecutor and the 
state official and, in doing so, I was able to describe how conditions must 
change in order to make the two actors adopt a different strategy. In Chapter 7, 
I will revisit the problems associated with achieving accountability for violations 
of the rules on proportionality and precautions in attack and will consider 
proposed solutions to these problems considering the insights gained from my 
strategic choice analysis in this chapter.   
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Chapter 7 
The Proportionality Rule:  
Effective Accountability Mechanism or Dead Letter Law? 
The desired outcome of good faith compliance with the law is not just for civilian 
casualties to be mitigated, but for them to be limited only to what is necessary to 
achieve a particular military advantage. If the law is too permissive, then it will 
be easy for commanders and state officials to shrug off unnecessary collateral 
damage as an unavoidable consequence of the bloody business of war.696 If it 
is too restrictive, some state and military officials believe that it will hinder the 
military’s ability to conduct operations or that it will mean sacrificing more troops 
to achieve the same military result. Ideally, compliance mechanisms, whether 
they take the form of ex ante standard operating procedures and training or ex 
post accountability regimes, ought to align the conduct of operations in reality 
with this hypothetical goal. If they do not, then the notion of jus in bello 
proportionality is little more than a moral appeal to the belligerents, rather than a 
norm that carries with it the force of law. As the manuals of modern militaries 
reveal, much effort is spent developing procedures which mitigate civilian 
collateral damage,697 and military legal advisors can help to form a ‘compliance 
fence’698 around a military commander’s decision-making process. However, 
not much has been done to address what happens when those procedures 
break down. On the contrary, despite being the subject of numerous reports by 
human rights organisations, domestic judicial organs have often shown a 
reluctance to investigate and hold accountable those individuals and 
organisations which are responsible for planning or launching prima facie 
disproportionate attacks. Furthermore, international courts such as the ICC, 
despite being heralded as the guardians against impunity in the international 
community, have also shown little interest in pursuing unlawful attack cases 
                                            
 
696
 See Ch 1 at note 11. 
697
 As a practical example of a manual that details how to ensure that the commander has good 
information regarding the expected collateral damage see, CJCSI 3160.01a: No-Strike and the Collateral 
Damage Estimation Methodology.   
698
 See Ch 1 at note 40. 
   
 
 
227 
 
 
unless it can be shown that those involved had intended to fire indiscriminately 
at civilians and military objectives.699  
 There are good legalist reasons for why it is difficult to achieve 
accountability for prima facie disproportionate attacks. The law and its 
associated reasonableness tests are vague and require commanders to make 
judgements about values that are inherently difficult to compare.700 However, 
this difficulty should not be used as a pretence for courts to give unlimited 
discretion to commanders’ decisions in combat or for them to ignore the vital 
relationship between the rule of proportionality and the rule of taking all feasible 
precautions in attack. Furthermore, there is some uncertainty about whether 
unintentional excessive damage to civilians or civilian objects ought to be 
criminally prosecuted, punished with administrative disciplinary tools, or made 
the subject of a civil tort against the state.701 This may be a barrier to achieving 
accountability for attacks which violate proportionality, precautions or those 
tricky cases that lie on the boundary between the two, but not one that is 
insurmountable in theory. Finally, if the organisation that is investigating the 
attack only has access to evidence of the effects of an attack, it is 
extraordinarily difficult for them to prove the mens rea of the crime without 
cooperation from the military or other state officials.702 It is technically possible 
for the state to cooperate with a court, particularly a domestic court, in a way 
that allows fact-finders to understand the commander’s decision making 
process without jeopardising the state’s legitimate national security interests.703 
However, given the disparity between the number of attacks in modern armed 
conflicts that observers have flagged as possibly unlawful and the number for 
which there has been any manner of formal accountability,704 I suggest that 
these primarily legalist problems must be viewed through a strategic choice lens 
in order to understand why, despite their seeming tractability, they remain 
unresolved. 
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 The strategic choice perspective has helped researchers to analyse 
other questions relating to the process by which court and state actors interact, 
given the institutional interests of each set of actor and the moves afforded to 
them by the legal or structural environment. The idea that the implementation of 
the law is affected by extra-legal factors is well understood in the legal literature. 
As Andrew Ashworth cautioned, it is not enough to merely accept the provisions 
of the law at face value: ‘we must [also] consider the interaction between the 
law itself and the discretion in the criminal process if we are to understand the 
social reality of the criminal law.’705 However, the strategic choice perspective 
offers a way to explicitly model such interactions to show how the law as it is 
written or as it was envisaged by its drafters might differ from the law as it is 
practiced ‘on the ground’.   
 For this project, I found that the interaction that was of most interest to 
understanding why it is difficult to achieve accountability for violations of the 
proportionality rule (and its associated attack precautions) was a hypothetical 
game between an official who can set state policy on LOAC and a prosecutor. 
One can roughly categorise the reasons for why violations of proportionality 
rarely make it to court into two overarching themes: firstly, there has been a 
concerted effort on the part of certain states to raise the liability needed to 
convict a commander of a violation of the criminal norm vis-à-vis the regulatory 
norm; secondly, prosecutors are wary of pursuing cases where they are unlikely 
to obtain the evidence needed to secure a conviction. Building on these themes, 
I constructed a game of perfect information where the prosecutor’s motivation 
was to maximize their institution’s legitimacy while keeping resource and 
legitimacy costs low and the state official’s motivation was to maximize the 
state’s legitimacy and the value of military success, while keeping legitimacy 
costs to a minimum. The state official could choose how to set the liability 
regime — either strong or weak. The prosecutor could, in turn, choose to either 
indict or not indict a suspect commander and then the state official could 
choose to cooperate with the prosecutor or to not cooperate. This game is 
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merely illustrative of a generalised scenario involving prosecutors and state 
officials and it could prove useful at describing a number of similar interactions. 
For example, the state official could be lobbying for a particular interpretation of 
the law at either an international conference, or before a domestic legislative 
committee and the prosecutor could represent an international prosecutor or a 
domestic prosecutor (although the model does assume the judiciary is 
independent from other branches of government). In the historical path through 
the game, the state official chooses to lobby for a weak liability regime for the 
rules pertaining to proportionality and precautions in attack. The prosecutor, 
realising that it will be too difficult to convict a suspect commander and that 
failing to secure a conviction will come with a legitimacy cost, chooses to not 
issue an indictment.   
 From this model, I found several ways to induce the actors to follow a 
different path through the game, by either changing the actors’ payoffs or 
certain elements of the strategic environment. Firstly, in order to incentivise the 
prosecutor to make more indictments, a third party, such as a donor state, could 
reimburse the prosecutor for the material resources needed to launch an 
investigation into an alleged incident involving disproportionate attack, but even 
then, the prosecutor must already believe the odds of securing a conviction are 
greater than 50:50. Furthermore, a third party, such as a human rights 
organisation, could drum up popular resentment against the court for not issuing 
an indictment, thereby raising the costs for that course of action. Although these 
changes in the prosecutor’s incentives would result in more cases of 
disproportionate attack making it to trial, this does not mean that the conviction 
rate would necessarily change. In fact, it may produce popular resentment 
against the court for appearing to be harassing innocent service members. The 
second way to change the path would be for outside forces to lower the 
likelihood that a commander would be convicted such that the state would feel 
comfortable with a strong liability regime. For example, the regime could be 
tailored to only apply to other states or armed groups. Thirdly, the environment 
might be such that the state official is less concerned with the value of military 
success compared with the value of legitimacy. This is the only condition that is 
   
 
 
230 
 
 
likely to produce both more indictments and more convictions. However, such a 
state is not likely to be involved in military action in the first place (though a 
decision to lobby for a strong liability in peacetime could commit the state to 
such a regime during a future conflict). Finally, although the model suggests 
that state officials have an incentive to work with prosecutors should one of their 
commanders be indicted, they might choose to withhold information from the 
prosecutor if they believe that handing over evidence to the prosecutor will not 
just increase the likelihood of conviction, but substantially so (e.g. they have the 
‘smoking gun’) or if the state official’s value of military success is much greater 
than that of legitimacy. Taken together, these findings can help to predict what 
sort of intervention is likely to improve accountability for the rules on 
proportionality and precautions in attack and which are likely to be ineffective or 
counterproductive.  
Putting Pressure on the Courts 
As it approached its first decade in existence, the ICC began to be accused of 
having an anti-African bias, most notably by the African Union and African 
heads of state.706 It has not escaped the attention of commentators that there 
was a large degree of selectivity, not only in which sorts of crimes were included 
in the Rome Statute,707 but also in the prosecutor’s ability to use their discretion 
to avoid confrontation with major powers:  
Evidence that the court prefers to avoid situations involving major powers has continued 
to mount. The clearest example of this tendency is Afghanistan. The court has broad 
jurisdiction there but has decided not to open a formal investigation despite high levels 
of violence, often involving civilians. Other exercises of the court’s prosecutorial 
discretion also evidence this pattern. The prosecutor declined to conduct a full 
investigation in Iraq. The court has not opened a full investigation in Colombia, a close 
US ally that has hosted US troops and advisers. Even as he opened an investigation in 
Kenya, the prosecutor opted not to pursue a full investigation of the Russia‒Georgia 
conflict. The prosecutor temporized on Palestine’s referral and ultimately decided that 
he did not have the authority to accept the referral. There is no ‘smoking gun’ evidence 
that the prosecutor has made these choices because of perceived major-power 
preferences or out of a desire to avoid entanglement with them. There are plausible 
nonpolitical arguments against investigations in each of these cases… But the overall 
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pattern strongly suggests that the prosecutor’s office has, to this point, used its 
discretion on where to open investigations strategically.
708
 
As the model predicts, one of the ways to encourage more prosecutions for 
violations of the provisions on proportionality would be for IGOs, HROs and 
other state leaders to exact a legitimacy cost from the prosecutor for failing to 
issue an indictment when a credible allegation is raised with them. Although the 
criticism from African leaders is not so targeted that they remark on every 
airstrike that goes awry, a number of African countries have threatened to quit 
the court because of a perception that the prosecutor unfairly targets their 
leaders while ignoring the crimes of leaders from the other parts of the world.709 
In the face of such sustained criticism on this topic, it is somewhat telling that 
Afghanistan has recently been added to the Prosecutor’s docket.710 In an effort 
to show that it is not afraid to prosecute leaders from states that employ air 
power regularly, the prosecutor may even attempt to indict a leader for the 
crime of disproportionate attack. However, this would be a mistake.  
 Just because the prosecutor were to indict more leaders from the Global 
North for allegations of indiscriminate or disproportionate attack, it does not 
necessarily mean that there would be a corresponding increase in the number 
of convictions for this offense. Since the overall strategic environment has 
remained unchanged, the weak liability regime will ensure that prosecutors will 
have great difficulty proving their cases, even if they receive evidentiary support 
from the states under investigation. Without a solid track record of convictions, 
the ICC will likely be perceived as illegitimate by the citizens of the states whose 
commanders have seemingly ended up on trial for no good reason. Moreover, 
the Court will continue to be seen as illegitimate by its critics in the Global 
South, who will see the same pro-Global North bias shift from the Prosecutor’s 
office to the bench.    
 Similarly, the model predicts that completely removing the prosecutor’s 
resource costs will cause them to indict more suspect commanders as a matter 
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of course. At the domestic level, one could draw an analogy between 
reimbursing prosecutors in the model and the provision of legal aid for public 
interest lawyers working on cases of LOAC violations. For example, the 
disbarred UK solicitor, Phil Shiner, used contracts provided by the UK Legal Aid 
Agency to fund litigation into over 1,100 allegations of torture and murder of 
Iraqis by UK forces, many of which were later found to be groundless.711 Again, 
more indictments (or in this case, bringing more allegations forward) will not 
necessarily result in more rulings against suspect commanders or the state, 
since the underlying strategic dynamic has not changed. It is vital for those who 
could not normally afford recourse to the law to have access to legal aid. 
However, without some incentive for public interest lawyers to screen out those 
cases that are unlikely to succeed in court, the docket will quickly fill with cases 
that have little chance of ending in a conviction or civil remedy. This will merely 
sour public opinion toward the concept of seeking accountability for genuine 
cases of wrongdoing in combat,712 thereby causing governments to reconsider 
whether the benefits of being seen to uphold rule of law outweigh the costs of 
allowing spurious cases to proceed to court.  
Weighing Incommensurables versus Assessing Attack Precautions 
One way to improve accountability for unlawful attacks would be to add more 
specificity to the law governing the grey area of proportionality. On its face, a 
more detailed law should help fact finders establish when a critical threshold 
has been breached and the work of LOAC experts has already laid the 
groundwork for what a more detailed interpretation of existing law could look 
like in the HPCR Manual.713 However, as Fellmeth has noted, while it is 
understandable for those looking for greater accountability to demand better 
definition in the law, any change which fundamentally alters the balance 
between humanitarian concerns and military flexibility will not be accepted by 
the states: 
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Without prejudging the effectiveness of the proportionality principle, one might 
hypothesise that the perceived failure of a generally phrased legal principle to achieve 
its policy objective should prompt proposals for the adoption of treaties, regulations, or 
other guidance with clearer or stricter obligations. The intuitive cure for vague law is 
more precise or detailed law. There are, no doubt, improvements to the phrasing of the 
proportionality principle that could render it more effective in protecting civilians, or at 
least make it easier to judge compliance with the principle. In general, however, stricter 
rules are a double-edged sword. If not sufficiently restrained, they could upset the 
balance between military flexibility and humanitarian concerns struck in the framing of 
Additional Protocol I. The proportionality principle was intended specifically to provide a 
certain degree of flexibility to military commanders. An interpretation of the principle that 
hamstrings a state's ability to achieve its critical military objectives would not attract a 
general consensus or serve the international community's interests.
714
 
The other side to this statement is also true: an interpretation of the rule that 
hamstrings the ability for humanitarian and human rights organisations from 
putting pressure on governments will also fail to garner general consensus 
(albeit from different actors) or to serve the international community’s interests. 
Nevertheless, it is states that make international law, so the states need to be 
convinced of the value of further clarity in the law. Some clarification of the sort 
proposed in the HPCR manual may be welcomed by state officials and HROs 
alike, but a bright-line standard could risk the interests of either camp, 
depending on where that line is drawn. As a hypothetical example, if 
commanders needed to use a table to look up acceptable civilian casualty 
figures for the type of military objective they wanted to target, there is no 
guarantee that the outcome of such an explicit version of the proportionality rule 
would actually succeed in bringing about the desired normative outcome — 
civilian casualty mitigation — compared with the rule as it currently stands, 
despite its vagueness. On the contrary, as the model of state-prosecutor 
interaction suggests, it is more likely that the states that use air power regularly 
will lobby for those casualty thresholds to be unacceptably high from the point of 
view of an HRO, leading prosecutors to ignore behaviour which might have 
warranted judicial scrutiny under a less well-defined accountability regime. This 
does not mean that the vagueness in the law as it is written is functional or 
pareto-optimal, just that a bright-line standard could be worse if the underlying 
strategic situation remains unchanged.    
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In Chapter 3, I discussed how vagueness in the law can lead to arbitrary 
enforcement outcomes, but how does arbitrary enforcement affect the 
behaviour of those subjected to it? In their seminal L&E study on how 
vagueness in regulatory regimes affects compliance with the law, Craswell and 
Craffee postulated that when there is a small amount of uncertainty about a 
legal provision, the subjects of the regulation will actually tend to err on the side 
of over-compliance with the law, but when there is a large amount of uncertainty 
in what the law demands, there will be a tendency for them to be under-
complaint (though this effect could be mitigated with high enough penalties for 
successful prosecutions).715 Their model was recently empirically supported by 
Hoeppner and Lyhs who tested participants’ decision-making under a variably 
vague standard716 and they found that as uncertainty increases, there was 
indeed a tendency for participants to err on over-compliance at first and then 
settle into under-compliance as the vagueness in the standard increased.717 
Similarly, because the law does not spell out how to weigh military advantage 
against civilian collateral damage, it could be argued that the proportionality rule 
is an example of a highly vague regulatory provision and therefore its provisions 
will tend to encourage under-compliance on the part of states and their 
commanders.718 It must be noted, however, that there are some differences 
between the application of a vague rule in Hoeppner and Lyhs’s model and the 
application of proportionality. In their model of vagueness, the subject of the 
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regulatory regime is uncertain about whether they will be sanctioned for 
engaging in a particular behaviour. To use a concrete example, different judges 
or juries could choose to interpret the vague statute with varying degrees of 
strictness, or police and prosecutors from different jurisdictions could enforce 
the law differently based on such differences in interpretation. However, 
vagueness in the text of a legal document does not necessarily lead to arbitrary 
enforcement. Indeed, it is possible to have a vague provision in the text of the 
law, but for it to be nevertheless applied in a uniform manner.  
Hoeppner and Lyhs concede that there might be exogenous variables 
which influence how regulatory vagueness affects behaviour in ways that their 
model does not predict: ‘[C]hanges in procedural or evidentiary rules may bias 
the [probability] distribution underlying the legal standard’. 719 Furthermore, they 
were unsure about how the subjects of a regulatory regime might behave if they 
knew the reasons why the law was kept vague: ‘We do not yet understand, 
however, how legal uncertainty impacts individual behavior when persons 
realize that they are exposed to legal uncertainty by design.’720 For instance, if 
the subjects of a regulatory regime discover that the vagueness of the black-
letter text of a legal document was consistently interpreted in their favour (or 
that it was designed that way), it stands to reason that their behaviour will not 
be as constrained by that regime than if they were naïve to how the vagueness 
might be applied in practice. They might even lobby to keep the law vague if 
they believed it suited their purposes. 
 It is safe to assume that the proportionality rule represents a case where 
vagueness in the law has led to regulatory under-compliance, either by design 
or because state officials realise that pre-existing ambiguities in the law will 
always be resolved in their favour.721 However, those who believe that greater 
regulatory definition will lead to more accountability for prima facie 
disproportionate strikes are likely to be disappointed. Rather, as the findings of 
my model would suggest, the outcome of any attempt to ‘pin down’ the law on 
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proportionality might be welcomed if the change decreases the state or 
commander’s liability for collateral damage, but it will likely be rebuffed if the 
clarification increases the liability.722 That is, the level of vagueness in the 
proportionality rule is driven by how it impacts the commander’s liability (at least 
for the criminal norm), not vice versa. Therefore, state officials must first assign 
a higher value to legitimacy than to the value of future military operations before 
they will lobby for a version of the law that clarifies the it in a way that increases 
the commander’s likelihood of being convicted for excessive collateral damage 
beyond 50:50 odds. Similarly, state officials continue to endorse the ‘reasonable 
military commander’ standard because the ambiguity of the standard has 
consistently been resolved in the commander’s favour.  
Rather than merely invoking the standard as a way to signal that the 
commander ought to be given a wide margin of appreciation for decisions taken 
during combat,723 if the standard were operationalised in a robust way, it has 
the potential to clarify the proportionality rule for those who have to judge the 
commander’s decision-making process ex post facto. For example, my 
participants have suggested that this could be done with a battle of experts.724 
Alternatively, the court could have its own in-house military experts725 to consult 
on cases where the proportionality is an issue, but the court lacks the 
competence to assess whether a strike was reasonable under the 
circumstances the accused found themselves. In either case, there is a chance 
that the expert could still lead the court to an improper conclusion (as with the 
Gotovina case726). This could be because the expert is unfamiliar with the 
particular circumstances of the accused. For instance, the expert may have only 
been involved with peacekeeping, not combat; they might have been part of a 
military that was much better resourced; or they might conflate their own 
nation’s standard operating procedures with international practice. All of these 
could affect their assessment of what is reasonable. Nevertheless, the use of 
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court experts has been commonplace in cases involving other high-stress 
professions like medicine and law enforcement,727 and the use of experts had 
become the norm at the ICTY, so there should be a way to operationalise 
expert military testimony for the ICC and for future ad hoc tribunals that 
respects military professional judgement while also exposing glaring deviations 
from commonly accepted practice. The right mix of in-house and litigant-
provided expertise for evaluating battlefield decision making deserves further 
study, particularly to determine what qualifications the court should demand of 
any potential expert.728 Whatever solutions are proposed, however, must 
consider the logic behind the way that the strategic environment is currently 
arranged. Any use of experts that causes more commanders to be tried or 
convicted of unlawful attacks would represent a de facto increase in 
commanders’ liability for collateral damage. If the assumptions of the model are 
true, this would mean that such measures would be a non-starter for state 
officials, unless the value of legitimacy were greater than that of future military 
success.  
This dynamic also affects the way that states are prepared to accept 
accountability for violations of the precautions rule. In theory, it should be easier 
to assess violations of the precautions rule because the obligation to take all 
feasible precautions in attack relies upon more objective criteria than the more 
subjective balancing of incommensurable values of military advantage and 
civilian damage. Moreover, from the case law that does exist on allegations of 
disproportionate attack, in many instances, the case more properly hinged upon 
whether the commander understood what the relative values of military 
advantage or civilian collateral damage were before proceeding with an attack, 
or whether the commander chose the right weapon for the attack, rather than if 
the proportionality calculation had been performed faithfully.729 A commander 
cannot be expected to exhaust all possible sources of intelligence, nor should 
they be expected to know how their weapons will perform in all conditions, but 
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they and their staff should take reasonable measures to maintain situational 
awareness and they should be expected to learn from prior civilian casualty 
incidents. Assessing these concerns relating to precautionary measures ex post 
is more straightforward and involves looking at the practical steps that the 
commander took to ensure compliance with the law and comparing them 
against the tactics, techniques, and procedures of their own armed forces and 
international practices. Grave operational mistakes, such as the Kunduz 
Hospital Bombing, rarely involve just one marginal decision taken in the heat of 
the moment, but are rather the result of a constellation of errors that, when 
taken together, can be used to judge the reasonableness of commanders’ 
precautionary measures. Nevertheless, only violations of the proportionality rule 
have been criminalised under API and the Rome statute and any change in the 
ICL regime to include violations of the precautions rule would be tantamount to 
accepting recklessness as a mode of liability for the crimes of attacking the 
civilian population or firing indiscriminately at them. Although this is possible, 
according to the model, the only way that certain states will agree to lobby for 
such a change is if the legitimacy they receive from appearing to follow the 
regime outweighs the perceived value of future military success. 
Regardless of whether one aims to increase accountability for unlawful 
attacks by introducing measures to make it easier to assess the proportionality 
rule or the rule on precautions in attack, the states that use air power regularly 
are unlikely to adopt such measures if they substantially increase the 
commander’s liability for collateral damage. If HROs or interested third countries 
were to lobby for a less permissive interpretation of proportionality or for a 
greater role for precautions violations in ICL, either way, they will meet stiff 
resistance. Even if they were successful, the states that use air power regularly 
may find another way to introduce ambiguity into the provisions to keep the 
liability for collateral damage as weak as possible. 
Transparency 
If an allegedly disproportionate attack ever made it to trial, the court will likely 
rely on the state to provide evidence of what was going on ‘behind the scenes’ 
in an operation centre or on the battlefield to provide context for the 
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commander’s mental state and the reasonableness of their actions. In his 
recommendations on improving state transparency for probable violations of the 
proportionality rule, Fellmeth proposed that states be required to share:  
 all direct and indirect civilian and combatant casualties;  
 the military’s LOAC training methods;  
 standard operating procedures for civilian casualty mitigation;  
 the outcomes of all investigations into credible allegations of 
disproportionate attacks (with any necessary redactions); and  
 the outcomes of any judicial or administrative proceedings taken against 
those involved with specific incidents.730  
One way he proposes this could be accomplished is through an international 
treaty and associated monitoring body.731 It is certainly not beyond the realm of 
possibility that such a specialist organisation could be developed along the 
same model of the Chemical Weapons Convention and its associated 
Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons.732 This sort of treaty and 
organisation for the mitigation of civilian casualties would likely result in de facto 
state cooperation with prosecutors for crimes involving allegations of 
disproportionate attack because states would be releasing key evidence into the 
public domain, where it could be scrutinised by anyone. As discussed in 
Chapter 3, there are good reasons for states to withhold information from 
investigators and the public.733 Even so, Fellmeth believed that certain 
concessions to state interests could prompt the states to acquiesce to such an 
intrusive regime. Firstly, states would be allowed to redact information they 
believe would compromise national security. Secondly, states would not need to 
disclose incidents immediately and should be given time to prepare their 
assessments, if releasing information about an attack could jeopardise ongoing 
military operations.734 These are entirely reasonable concessions and the detail 
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contained in CENTCOM’s Kunduz Hospital Bombing report735 shows that states 
are capable of volunteering self-critical evidence even when parts of a report 
are redacted. As opposed to other investigatory mechanisms, such as a 
UNHRC fact-finding mission, the advantage of a regime which allows states to 
take the lead on investigating claims of disproportionate attack is that the states 
could receive the legitimacy that comes with appearing to follow the rule of law 
while rebuffing calls for more intrusive international investigations.   
The model presented in this study suggests that Fellmeth’s idea is viable. 
When indicted by a prosecutor, it is usually in the state official’s interest to 
cooperate with the prosecutor unless the value future military action is 
substantially more than the value of legitimacy or the state official believes they 
are handing over the ‘smoking gun’ that would substantially increase the 
commander’s chances of being convicted at a trial. What Fellmeth proposes is 
even less invasive than cooperating with a prosecutor since the state official 
can more effectively control the release of information through this sort of 
information-sharing regime. Therefore, it should be even more accepted by the 
state officials than cooperation with a prosecutor.  
However, as a caveat to this assessment of Fellmeth’s proposal for 
greater accountability through transparency, the efficacy of such a regime 
depends to a large extent on state officials’ willingness to abide by it in good 
faith. There will be a temptation to cheat and withhold information by 
overclassifying it or by selectively releasing damning evidence. Reporting by 
HROs and other third-party sources should help to correct the most egregious 
distortions and any state that repeatedly withholds information by invoking 
security privilege will suffer legitimacy costs as their investigations will no longer 
be seen as credible by other actors.736 There is at least some evidence for this 
effect in the case of Israel’s re-vamped investigatory process as a result of the 
government-sponsored Turkel Report. Whilst to the approval of local HROs, the 
Israeli Government had agreed to implement all the Report’s recommendations, 
its investigatory record during Operation Protective Edge left much to be 
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desired. The government has yet to implement all of the recommendations and 
results of many of the FFA Mechanism’s investigations have been lacking in 
specificity and were dismissed with a few stock phrases.737 Because of these 
shortcomings, the local HROs withdrew their support for the government’s own 
investigatory procedures, casting doubt on their credibility.738 In this case, the 
HROs acted as Fellmeth predicted and the Israeli Government suffered a 
legitimacy cost for failing to live up to the standard set by the Turkel 
Commission.  
Furthermore, it is unlikely that state officials from illiberal or autocratic 
regimes would abide this sort of transparency regime. As my model predicts, 
state officials will not cooperate with prosecutors when the value they assign to 
legitimacy is less than the value they ascribe to future military success times the 
difference in the probability of conviction between the cooperation condition and 
the do-not-cooperate condition. It is quite likely that an illiberal government will 
place a much greater emphasis on maintaining military flexibility than it would to 
the appearance of following the rule of law. Even if such a state did sign on to a 
civilian casualty mitigation treaty, it would be at a higher risk of cheating 
compared to a state that could be held democratically accountable for reneging 
on the agreement. 
Finally, Fellmeth claims that states are more likely to agree to a 
transparency-based civilian casualty mitigation arrangement if they believe that 
their own troops are likely to avoid criminal prosecution:  
Additional Protocol I directly binds state parties, not individuals. It does not specify that 
its provisions must be enforced by criminal prosecution; it simply prohibits specified acts 
and leaves the means of ensuring compliance to state parties. At least in its 
manifestation in Additional Protocol I, then, the proportionality principle imposes an 
obligation on states to deter and punish any kind of excessive attack, but not 
necessarily through criminal penalties. This approach is both appropriate and consistent 
with the policy goals of international humanitarian law. Criminal prosecution is a fortiori 
less appropriate for attacks other than those that threaten civilian lives or property in a 
manner clearly in excess of the direct and concrete military advantage anticipated. In 
such cases, the state satisfies its international legal obligation through measures 
sufficient to deter future disproportionate attacks accompanied by compensation to the 
civilian victims and their families. With criminal penalties off the table for all but the most 
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plainly disproportionate attacks, no serious obstacle to the adoption of a basic 
transparency obligation should remain.
739
   
Whilst the model I used in this study suggests that state officials will cooperate 
with international prosecutors, regardless of whether there is a strong or weak 
liability regime in place for violations, I would agree with Fellmeth that 
meaningful accountability for marginal strikes (which is likely to be the bulk of 
the accusations of disproportionate attack) ought to be handled in a civil regime, 
rather than a criminal one.  
Reconsidering Assumptions Relating to Civilian Casualty Mitigation and Military 
Effectiveness 
Another way to pursue a more effective accountability regime for violations of 
the rules on proportionality and precautions in attack is to directly confront some 
of the long-held shibboleths that state officials have regarding the relationship 
between civilian casualty mitigation measures and military effectiveness. As 
discussed in Chapter 5, one of the reasons that state officials have for 
preferring a weak liability regime for unlawful attacks is that they fear a stricter 
one might cause commanders to hold back when they need to fight the enemy 
aggressively.740 Another is that it by adopting less permissive notions of 
proportionality and precautions in attack, military commanders will be 
incentivising the enemy to integrate as closely as possible with the civilian 
population in order to perfidiously take advantage of their non-combatant 
immunity. This ends up further endangering the civilian population because 
attackers will at some point decide that civilian casualty mitigation is not worth 
the effort and will end up killing more civilians than they would have under a 
more permissive standard for civilian casualty mitigation.741  
 What is missing from this discussion is a robust study of how restrictions 
on the use of air power have affected the civilian casualties, the attacking 
military’s casualties and military success. This is a fiendishly difficult line of 
research where there is not yet a clear consensus on how these variables affect 
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one another, hence it is easy to fall back on appeals to personal anecdotes,742 
or to focus on the best natural experiment we have to date on this topic which 
was McCrystal’s adoption of a zero-civilian-casualty policy for Afghanistan in 
mid-2009. As I mentioned in Chapter 5, Dunlap cited a spike in US military 
casualties and civilian casualties between mid-2009 and mid-2010 as evidence 
that too much emphasis on civilian casualty mitigation could paradoxically end 
up increasing civilian casualties overall and that it puts US forces needlessly at 
risk.743 Crawford also claimed that there was a greater number of ISAF 
casualties during this time, but she reported a decrease in civilian casualties744 
because she and Dunlap were calculating their civilian casualty figures using 
different months before and after the change in policy. Part of the problem with 
using this aggregate data to assess the relationship between civilian casualty 
mitigation efforts and actual casualty reduction (or ‘mission success’ for that 
matter) is that extraneous factors make it difficult to discern trends in the noise: 
The question of whether there was actually a risk-transfer effect—shifting harm from 
civilians to soldiers—is complicated to assess for several reasons. First, at about the 
same time that the United States began to emphasize population protection, it also 
increased the number of troops in Afghanistan. So, both combat and noncombat 
fatalities might have increased simply because more troops were in the war zone... 
Second, in 2010 and 2011, both sides in Afghanistan began to increase the intensity of 
their operations and also promised to ignore the traditional “winter lull” in fighting that 
occurs because the snow makes travel and combat extremely difficult from December 
through March. The US operation in Marjah in February 2010 was an example of winter 
operations. The number of injuries and fatalities would also be expected to increase if 
the soldiers were engaging in more frequent and intense combat, over more months of 
the year. The role of changes in tactics—namely how restraint in the use of air power, 
for example, affects the rate of soldiers’ deaths and injuries—would have to be 
assessed at a micro-level, in part because the “population centric” strategy was applied 
unevenly and the strictness of adherence to it varied over time in Afghanistan.
745
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The difficulty of accounting for these other factors means that one cannot say 
for certain that taking extra care to spare the civilian population actually results 
in higher civilian or military casualties in the long run: 
In sum, aggregate numbers are only a crude indicator of the effect of changing tactics 
on risk and actual harm. The hard questions are about the causal processes at work. 
Specifically, does killing fewer civilians really mean that fewer insurgents are created 
and that ultimately fewer US soldiers die and the war ends more quickly? Absent the 
tactical directives and US restraint in close air support bombings, would both more US 
soldiers and civilians have been killed in Afghanistan? 
746
   
The difficulty of finding an agreed upon definition of what constitutes military 
success further complicates this problem, particularly in long-term stabilisation 
missions such as the one performed by ISAF in Afghanistan. Nevertheless, 
access to better data about the relationship between civilian casualty mitigation 
efforts and how they do or do not contribute to force protection risks could guide 
state official’s willingness to accept greater liability for prima facie excessive 
attacks, when they occur.  
 For my model of state official-prosecutor interaction, I assumed that in 
the state official’s payoffs, the value of military success would be moderated by 
the inverse probability of a suspect commander’s conviction for the crime of 
disproportionate attack. This is because the state official would believe that a 
higher conviction rate would lead to more timidity on the battlefield and 
therefore less chance of military success in the future — (1-p)(m). If civilian 
casualty mitigation efforts do not affect military operations as much as 
commanders and policy makers currently believe, then a higher probability of 
conviction for suspect commanders should not alter the value of that term to the 
same degree. Therefore, one way to convince the state official to lobby for a 
stricter liability regime for proportionality without affecting their relative values of 
legitimacy and military success would be would be to challenge the assumption 
that successful prosecutions will necessarily impede the success of future 
military operations.  
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Civil versus Criminal Accountability 
Another avenue for achieving accountability for unlawful attacks is to situate the 
liability for such strikes at the right level. Modern warfare is a complex 
endeavour and many functions of an attack are distributed across different 
actors. Therefore, it is necessary to distinguish intentionally disproportionate 
strikes from the sort of operational offenses747 that arise from negligent acts or 
omissions from one or more actors in the kill chain.748  
For a practical example, consider three hypothetical strikes that all result 
in extensive collateral damage. The damage in the first attack resulted from a 
commander ordering a strike on a low-ranking enemy leader after 
acknowledging that it was possible that hundreds of civilians could die in the 
process. In contrast, the damage in the second attack was a close call — the 
commander anticipated that the strike might be disproportionate, but it wasn’t 
‘clearly excessive’. The collateral damage caused by the third strike was the 
result of a more complex breakdown in the targeting process. In this case, a 
drone sensor operator could have been using leading language such as ‘a 
group of 10 military aged males are flanking your position’ to describe a group 
of teenage civilians walking around an observation post and although it would 
have been a reasonable precaution for the ground forces commander to use 
binoculars to see if the boys were hostile, he may have decided to accept the 
drone operator’s assessment that the boys were hostile and subsequently 
requested a strike.749 The first strike would be a crime under ICL. The second is 
not solidly a crime under ICL, but is probably a violation of LOAC. The third was 
a violation of the LOAC rule on taking all feasible precautions in attack, but 
likewise does not have a clear basis for criminality under ICL. Ideally, there 
should be some sort of accountability for all of these incidents, but the 
mechanism for each could take different forms. The first strike ought to result in 
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a court-martial or a trial at an international tribunal while the second and third 
might be more appropriately handled by a civil tort case against the state, rather 
than criminal sanctions for the individuals involved. Moreover, the lower liability 
threshold needed to prove wrongdoing in civil law generally will make it easier 
for those seeking redress for errant strikes to actually have success in court. 
For nearly 200 years, civil tort courts worldwide have used some version 
of the ‘reasonable person’ standard to assess liability for accidents750 and the 
concept of ordinary care as defined by the Hand Formula explicitly references 
how much effort a reasonable person should spend on precautions aimed at 
preventing harm to another.751 Furthermore, except in cases of clear 
culpability,752 accountability for professional misconduct has typically been 
addressed in civil rather than criminal courts for other high-stress professions 
like medicine753 and law enforcement.754 Therefore, if one accepts that prima 
facie disproportionate strikes ought to be assessed against the standard of a 
‘reasonable military commander’ who had taken all feasible precautions in 
planning and executing the attack, then it makes sense that, in the absence of 
any evidence of a commander’s culpable mens rea, the state itself should be 
held civilly liable for operational errors. The state could then determine the 
appropriate disciplinary measures for troops who contributed to the violation in 
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order to act as a deterrent against future disproportionate or sloppy attacks and 
to remove certain individuals from having a chance to repeat the error.  
 A stronger civil liability standard for violations of proportionality and 
precautions in attack (and a forum in which such cases could be tried) is also 
important to help the state meet its obligations to pay reparations to the victims 
of LOAC violations. This requirement is listed as Rule 150 in the ICRC’s CIHL 
Study which states simply that: ‘A State responsible for violations of 
international humanitarian law is required to make full reparation for the loss or 
injury caused’.755 The provision applies in both international armed conflict and 
NIAC.756 Furthermore, treaty-based versions of this rule can be found in, inter 
alia,  Article 3 of the 1907 Hague Regulation IV for Land Warfare757 and API 
Article 91.758 Although the obligation for states to pay reparations for their LOAC 
violations has a long history and, indeed, reparations have been made from one 
state to another state in previous conflicts, the idea that individuals have 
standing in legal fora to make claims against states is a relatively new one.759 
While some courts, like the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) have 
allowed individuals to bring claims against states for LOAC violations, such 
courts may be institutionally predisposed to viewing issues pertaining to armed 
conflict through the lens of human rights law. Furthermore, Christine Evans has 
questioned the sustainability of using regional human rights courts as a long-
term solution to achieving accountability for individual LOAC violations: 
While human rights mechanisms have increased their efficiency, expanded their 
jurisprudence in the realm of reparations and sought to undertake measures to monitor 
compliance by states, such mechanisms were not designed to address large numbers 
of victims in conflict situations. This worrisome lacuna needs to be addressed; the 
concept of state responsibility is maturing, alongside a customary right to receive 
reparations, yet it remains all too common that a national legal framework and forum to 
which victims can submit claims is lacking. While the provision of reparations remains 
primarily a state responsibility, the gap between international legal standards and their 
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application represents a challenge to the international legal order and the international 
organisations entrusted with the promotion of human rights.
760
 
This assessment was echoed in my interview with Garraway, who explained 
that one reason victims of LOAC violations have tried to seek redress from the 
ECtHR is because there simply are no other fora that have been willing or able 
to hear their case.761  A more suitable venue for achieving accountability for 
violations of the LOAC provisions pertaining proportionality or precautions in 
attack would likely be in domestic civil courts, even if this would require relaxing 
the state’s civil liability exemption for combat activities.762  
To be sure, others have called for civil processes to have a greater role 
in determining claims involving collateral damage.763 For example, Rebecca 
Crootof has suggested that once attacks become fully automated, criminal 
sanctions based on individual liability will lose their deterrent effect764 since any 
collateral damage caused by autonomous targeting errors could be shrugged 
off by the attacking state as ‘accidents’. Therefore, states ought to be held liable 
for the collateral damage caused by its autonomous weapons systems through 
a civil liability regime: 
Not only do states have a vested interest in creating a tort liability regime, the 
unpredictability and inherently dangerous nature of autonomous weapon systems justify 
treating responsibility for this weapons technology differently. Unlike other weapons, 
autonomous weapon systems are capable of acting independently, breaking the causal 
chain between an individual’s decision to deploy them and the target of these weapons’ 
ultimate use of lethal force. And, unlike other robots, autonomous weapon systems are 
intended to kill people—they just are not supposed to kill the wrong people. The 
combination of these two factors strongly favor imposing strict liability. In contrast, when 
a non-autonomous or nonlethal weapon system malfunctions and causes a serious 
violation of international humanitarian law, a negligence standard may be more 
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appropriate. It is therefore possible to draw a line in the sand and create a limited strict 
liability tort regime governing the actions of autonomous weapon systems. Indeed, it 
may prove a useful test case: if it is a successful counterpart to international criminal 
law, states may consider the utility of further expanding state liability for war torts.
765
 
Nevertheless, some scholars, such as Michael Reisman,  Yaël Ronen, and 
Emily Camins, have argued that it may be better to issue ex gratia payments to 
all civilian victims of attacks, or to hold the state to a strict liability standard for 
collateral damage, regardless of whether it was caused by a careful, 
proportionate attack, a disproportionate attack, a negligent attack, or a genuine 
accident.766 This allows the state to respond to the victim’s need for redress 
without costly judicial proceedings that may or may not be decided in the 
victim’s favour. A strict liability standard or the act of issuing ex gratia payments 
for all civilian victims of airstrikes may be a good policy; however, as a matter of 
accountability, such payments do little to inform military leaders about what 
sorts of actions ‘cross the line’ and they do not necessarily incentivise leaders to 
adopt new weaponry or TTPs which reduce the incidents of collateral damage 
caused by avoidable violations of the rules on proportionality or precautions in 
attack. In this regard, the value of civil court cases is not necessarily in the 
material support it awards victims, but also in the feedback that a body of case 
law could provide to military commanders and their legal advisors regarding the 
practical application of these rules ex ante.767     
Therefore, the advantages of creating a civil mechanism for trying ‘war 
torts’ are manifold. Firstly, from the victims’ perspective, if their case is 
successful,768 they will receive public validation of their suffering and the 
knowledge that the case will likely prompt the state to take actions to avoid 
repeating the mistake in the future (and if the state was following the law, it can 
lift the cloud of doubt over its actions by presenting its case publicly). Secondly, 
the truth-telling function of the suit could also force the state to present its side 
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of the story, so if there is evidence of criminal malfeasance it stands a greater 
chance of actually coming to light. Thirdly, opening the state to civil liability 
would begin to develop the hitherto anaemic case law involving alleged 
violations of the rules on proportionality and precautions in attack. Fourthly, by 
beefing up the case law, a robust civil liability regime could undergird the 
regulatory function of these rules by providing military leaders and legal 
advisors with more actionable feedback about how well their operations have 
lined up with the law and what needs to be done to ensure better compliance in 
the future. Certainly, HROs have provided detailed feedback on the effects of 
military missions, but through the back and forth of a court case, it should be 
possible to match up how particular state actions or omissions led to the 
damage reported by HROs. Moreover, civil sanctions could strengthen the 
regulatory function of the rules on proportionality and precautions in attack by 
demonstrating that their application is not merely a box-ticking exercise, but 
rather, a moral imperative in its own right.769 
By opening itself to vicarious civil liability, the state could reap legitimacy 
benefits from appearing to be pursuing accountability for prima facie excessive 
collateral damage incidents. State officials could also maintain some flexibility to 
deal with those individuals responsible for the attack on the state’s terms, rather 
than on the terms of an independent judiciary, thereby removing the chilling 
effect on future military operations that state officials have cited as a reason for 
why they oppose criminal prosecutions for alleged disproportionate attacks.770 
By disentangling the ‘probability of conviction’771 term from the ‘anticipated 
value of future operations’ term, state officials may be persuaded to adopt a 
stricter liability regime for cases involving proportionality or precautions in attack 
than the one that is currently in place for the criminal version of these rules. 
Moreover, there already seems to be an acceptance from state officials that the 
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state can be held civilly liable for violations of proportionality or precautions in 
attack,772 so the challenge is in translating those views into support for changing 
any combat exemption clauses the state might have in its tort laws, rather than 
encouraging officials to sign on to a radically different notion of state or 
individual responsibility for these sorts of violations. 
To be sure, state officials may still see a robust civil liability regime as a 
threat, especially if policy makers start adopting zero-civilian casualty policies in 
response to civil suits and the inevitable media attention they would garner. As 
with the model of criminal liability used in this study, the state official’s 
willingness to accept a greater degree of civil liability would be a function of how 
they believe successful torts affect the state’s payoffs in terms of legitimacy and 
the value of future military operations. Since a more robust civil liability regime 
is likely to take pressure off the state to pursue military commanders for criminal 
offenses, state officials may have less to worry about from the outcome of 
successful civil cases than criminal ones and they might, therefore, be inclined 
to accept a stricter civil regime than a stricter criminal liability for allegations of 
disproportionate attack.  
A more robust civil liability regime is not without its pitfalls from the 
standpoint of accountability. Since the evidentiary standards in civil suits are 
typically more relaxed than those in criminal trials, there is the possibility that 
the state will be found liable for a strike not because those involved engaged in 
any actual wrongdoing, but because the state did not want to share classified 
material to properly prove their case.  Furthermore, if it became too 
burdensome for the state to prove its cases for other reasons (e.g. the volume 
of cases was more than what government lawyers could reasonably deal with), 
then as with other types of torts, such as medical malpractice, paying out claims 
for errant strikes might come to be seen by the state as the price of doing 
business as is currently the case with ex gratia payments. Similarly, merely 
setting aside funds as a type of military ‘malpractice insurance’ would not 
incentivise the sort of substantive change in behaviour that accountability is 
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meant to realise.773  Therefore, if HROs were to lobby states to remove or 
modify combat exemption clauses from their domestic civil liability laws or to 
create new international fora for hearing these types of cases, they may face 
less resistance from states than if they were to try to shoehorn accountability for 
all LOAC attack violations into a criminal regime. However, such a civil liability 
regime must be designed in such a way as to be strong enough to provide 
effective sanctions774 whilst also encouraging the state to participate in the 
regime in good faith. This can only be accomplished if ‘vexatious’775 cases are 
properly screened out. Of course, any screening mechanism, particularly if it is 
run by the military, could be criticised for weeding out cases for 
political/strategic reasons rather than merit776 so, the fact-finding/screening 
mechanism ought to be run by an independent entity that is disinterested in the 
outcome of a case, rather than the military.  
Contribution to the Strategic-Choice Approach Literature 
As discussed in Chapter 4, the strategic choice perspective has provided useful 
insights into why states follow the provisions of LOAC in the absence of a 
higher authority capable of punishing non-compliance. James Morrow’s seminal 
study on the topic suggested that the key to compliance in most cases 
depended on self-interested reciprocity,777 rather than external actors, such as 
international courts. He predicted that to the extent that such courts could 
induce compliance, they would only be able to prosecute politically-defeated 
autocrats or democrats who found themselves engaged in legally-questionable 
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behaviour.778 The fact that Laurent Gbagbo was taken into ICC custody while 
Omar Al Bashir remains at large779 anecdotally suggests that Morrow was 
correct about the fact that autocrats need to be stripped from power before the 
court can credibly hold them to account. However, his assertion that democrats 
who have committed legally-questionable acts also need to fear ICTs is less 
certain. Proportionality and precautions in attack are just the sort of murky rules 
that seem to vex state officials from democratic countries that regularly employ 
air power in war. Nevertheless, no leader, official, or commander has yet 
appeared before the ICC accused of a violation of proportionality. Neither has a 
leader, official, or commander been convicted780 of a violation of proportionality 
or precautions in attack in any other ICT or domestic court,781 despite the large 
number of questionable strikes that one could choose from to use as a test 
case. There is a growing body of literature that has examined how the existence 
of the ICC affects the behaviour of state actors from a strategic-choice 
perspective. However, the literature to date has focused on how the existence 
of Court affects compliance with ICL and on how the Court is able to enforce its 
arrest warrants.782  Furthermore, Koremenos’ study of vagueness in 
international agreements shows how state officials think strategically about how 
to achieve their preferences when drafting treaties.783 This study fills a gap in 
the literature of international courts from a strategic-choice perspective by 
connecting selectivity in the ICL regime with strategic thinking on the part of 
state officials and prosecutors, casting doubt on Morrow’s claim that ICTs are 
equipped to try the sorts of crimes that might land democratic leaders or 
commanders in the dock.  
Limitations of the Model 
Any model of a complex social interaction will necessarily simplify the 
phenomenon the under investigation. The development of the proportionality 
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rule and its associated rule on attack precautions involved the input of hundreds 
of state and non-state actors and these rules are used by even more actors 
working for state, judicial, and human-rights organisations, just to name a few. 
The sheer number of stakeholders who develop and use these rules means that 
although one can use the model presented in this study to draw some insights 
into how state officials and prosecutors might respond to changes to the 
strategic environment, the application of these insights will depend upon how 
similar the real-life actors are to the fictional ‘state official’ and ‘prosecutor’ used 
in the model and on how closely the real-life scenario adheres to the 
assumptions made in the model.  
 One potential pitfall of the model is that it assumes that the main 
determinant of a commander’s probability of conviction is whether the state 
official lobbied for a strict or weak liability regime for the crime of 
disproportionate attack. In reality, there are any number of exogenous forces 
which could also affect that probability, particularly if the attack under 
investigation were so brutal that it fit one of the classic examples used by LOAC 
scholars (e.g. levelling an entire village to kill a single sniper). Nevertheless, as 
a baseline, I still believe that it is correct for the model to focus on the effects of 
the liability regime and the availability of evidence first, and then bring in other 
variables which might affect this probability, such as the egregiousness of the 
offense, only if the simpler model does not hold up under empirical scrutiny.  
 Another potential shortfall that this model shares with other economic 
models of behaviour is its adherence to the assumption that actors will tend act 
in ways that are motivated by rational self-interest. Arguments about what 
constitutes a war crime or how to best achieve accountability for decisions 
taken under stressful conditions can evoke strong emotions, which could cause 
state officials or prosecutors (or their analogues) to act in ways that are not 
predicted by the model. For example, the state official may care deeply about 
their state’s perceived legitimacy at home and abroad and they may not be 
expecting to go to war soon (so their value of future military success is low), but 
nevertheless they could decide not to cooperate with a prosecutor out of a 
sense of loyalty to a suspect commander.    
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Conclusions 
Without a robust accountability mechanism, the rules on proportionality and 
precautions in attack merely represent a moral appeal to combatants to spare 
the civilian population from the harmful effects of their attacks. The model 
presented in Chapter 6 describes a scenario where state officials weaken the 
liability regime for proportionality to the point where prosecutors choose not to 
enforce it. Therefore, according to the model, the provisions contained in these 
rules have become dead-letter law. However, the value of this model is not 
merely descriptive. One can use its logic to assess what sort of changes would 
need to occur to the strategic environment for the rules to stand a chance of 
being enforced more vigorously.  
  The least effective way to seek greater accountability for violations of the 
rules on proportionality and precautions in attack would be to influence the 
prosecutor’s payoffs. Either reimbursing the prosecutor’s resource costs for 
pursuing a case or inflicting a legitimacy cost for failing to take a case will 
induce the prosecutor to make more indictments. However, without a 
corresponding change to the underlying liability regime, the result will be a 
string of failed prosecutions, which may, in time, erode support for the 
prosecutor’s work.  
 Some may argue that the way to achieve greater accountability for the 
rules on proportionality and precautions in attack would be to use more precise 
language to describe exactly what is required of commanders. While a bright-
line rule would make it easier for a fact-finder to figure out when suspect 
commander’s behaviour has strayed into criminality, without a corresponding 
willingness on the part of the state to accept a stricter liability for civilian 
casualties, it is unlikely that the ambiguity of the text will be resolved in a way 
that suits the interests of those seeking greater civilian causality mitigation.  On 
its face, it would seem that if one were seeking greater protection for civilians 
from the effects of attacks, then it would make sense to lobby for a stricter 
accountability regime to ensure that combatants take all feasible precautions in 
setting up and launching their attacks. However, without a change to the 
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underlying strategic dynamic, there will be no reason for state officials to adopt 
such a regime.  
 The implications for the model are more sanguine about the possibility 
that states will be willing to investigate allegations of disproportionate attacks 
and report the results of those attacks to the public. However, there is a danger 
that the state will try to cheat and reap the legitimacy benefits of appearing to be 
transparent, while using national security privilege to sanitise the most damning 
information from their reports.  
 Ultimately, the change to the status quo that is likely to have the best 
long-term chances of success would be for state officials to believe that 
achieving accountability for violations of proportionality and attack precautions 
will have little practical effect on the efficacy of their military. This would require 
HROs and other interested parties to adopt the state’s own metrics for military 
success and martial empirical evidence to show that there is no discernible 
effect on the state’s chances of success or on force protection. If the data reveal 
that the accountability regime is likely to negatively affect mission success or 
force protection, then the HRO must present an alternative that addresses the 
state’s concerns before it is likely that the regime will work as designed. To this 
end, it may be more helpful to focus on civil accountability mechanisms, rather 
than those based on criminal law. This is because civil tort law more readily 
admits vicarious state liability, allowing victims to achieve a sense of justice 
done without state officials having to fear that the regime will have chilling effect 
on commanders’ decision-making processes. Moreover, the lower evidentiary 
burden for proving civil cases means that the process is not as dependent on 
information provided by the state for the claimant to build a convincing case as 
it would be for a criminal case. A stronger civil accountability mechanism for 
dealing with apparent violations of the jus in bello rules on proportionality and 
precautions in attack could therefore promote civilian protection and justice in a 
way that incentivises state officials to buy-in to the regime. If accountability were 
not seen to be compromising future mission success (either by revealing critical 
intelligence or by sapping commanders’ will to fight) then the legitimacy benefits 
from setting up such a mechanism may outweigh the possible costs borne by 
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state officials for endorsing a stronger liability regime for violations of these 
rules.    
 In the final analysis, as a regulatory prescription, the rules governing 
proportionality and precautions in attack do seem to provide some guidance for 
those planning an attack ex ante. However, as a way to hold cavalier 
commanders or states to account after an attack, they represent little more than 
dead-letter law. This does not necessarily have to be the case, but in order to 
assess if a particular intervention will be successful, one must appreciate the 
underlying strategic dynamic that incentivises the relevant actors to develop and 
apply the law in a certain way. Only with this understanding can one 
successfully match what is desirable from the standpoint of civilian casualty 
mitigation with what is feasible from a political perspective.     
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Chapter 8 
Conclusions 
The prohibition against targeting civilians is a cornerstone of modern LOAC and 
ICL. However, it stands in an uneasy tension with military necessity, particularly 
in modern urban warfare, where the density of civilians and civilian objects 
makes it difficult to hit military objectives without also causing collateral 
damage.784 Three rules flesh out this prohibition. Firstly, combatants must at all 
times distinguish between military objectives and civilians or civilian objects and 
they must only direct their attacks at the former. Secondly, attackers must take 
all feasible precautions to discover if civilians or civilian objects are near military 
targets and they must choose weapons and methods of attack which minimise 
the likelihood of causing collateral damage. Finally, if there are civilians or 
civilian objects near a military target, attackers must refrain from launching 
attacks that they believe will cause collateral damage which would be excessive 
in relation to the military advantage gained from the attack. Whilst there have 
been successful prosecutions of commanders who have launched direct or 
indiscriminate attacks against the civilian population, the jus in bello rules on 
proportionality and precautions in attack have evaded both civil adjudication and 
criminal prosecution in international and domestic law.  
 There are several reasons why accountability is important not just for 
direct or obviously indiscriminate attacks against civilians or civilian objects, but 
also for disproportionate and cavalier attacks. Firstly, without a robust 
accountability mechanism for these types of strikes, those who commit more 
serious violations, such as directly targeting civilians, can possibly shrug off the 
effects of their attacks by pointing to the difficulties inherent in applying the rules 
on precautions and proportionality as a defence.785 Secondly, when 
commanders are held responsible for violations of proportionality or precautions 
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in attack, it enhances the efficacy of their legal training786 and provides a 
backstop against commanders or legal advisors who breach their institutional 
‘compliance fences’.787 Thirdly, accountability for these rules should aid 
peacebuilding by ensuring victims of errant attacks have a sense that justice 
has been served, leaving them less likely to seek vengeance through extra-
judicial means.788 Finally, selective enforcement of certain LOAC violations but 
not others undermines the rule of law.789 But, if the state signals that it is willing 
to enforce the entire corpus of LOAC by issuing criminal or civil sanctions for 
violations of proportionality or precautions in attack, then it should increase faith 
in the rule of law, generally, and LOAC, in particular.790 This has the knock-on 
effect of giving the state greater legitimacy for its operations.791 However, even 
if it is desirable to have a better accountability mechanism for violations of these 
rules, any proposed solution for improving accountability must also take into 
account the strategic logic that has kept one from developing organically in the 
first place. By understanding this logic, one can then figure under what 
conditions a particular solution might be viable (if at all).  
Developing from earlier prohibitions against causing wanton destruction, 
the modern rules on distinction, proportionality, and precautions in attack were 
negotiated at the 1977 CDDH after several conflicts in which the use of air 
power had wrought large-scale destruction of civilian life and property.792 The 
rules, as codified in API to the Geneva Conventions of 1949, would later 
become part of customary LOAC, applicable in both international and non-
international armed conflicts.793  The grave breaches regime for API 
criminalised directly targeting civilians and civilian objects, as well as launching 
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indiscriminate or disproportionate attacks, but the failure to take all feasible 
precautions in attack was not included in this regime. The 1998 Rome Statute, 
also criminalised direct attacks against civilians and civilian objects along with 
indiscriminate and disproportionate attacks. However, by insisting that an attack 
be intentional and clearly excessive in relation to the overall military advantage 
of the target for it to count as a crime, the framers of the Rome Statute 
effectively raised the liability for disproportionate attacks vis-à-vis the version of 
the proportionality rule found in API and customary ICL.794 Although some 
would claim that it is merely a limitation on the ICC as an institution,795 the 
increased liability has nevertheless been cited by prosecutors in other 
jurisdictions, such as in the ICTY’s NATO Bombing Report.796 Therefore, this 
interpretation of what counts as a criminal violation has some traction outside 
the jurisprudence of the ICC. There have been some successful prosecutions of 
commanders for directly targeting civilians or for launching clearly indiscriminate 
attacks, but in the sparse case law that does deal with violations of 
proportionality or precautions in attack, no one has ever been served a criminal 
conviction. Moreover, there have not been any successful civil suits and there 
have been only a handful of publicly-acknowledged examples797 of a state 
taking administrative disciplinary measures in response to a specific strike 
where those involved failed to take all feasible precautions in setting up and 
launching the attack, such as the Kunduz Hospital Bombing.798  
 Even if the law theoretically allows for criminal prosecutions or civil suits 
based on the jus in bello rules on proportionality and precautions in attack, there 
are a number of legal and practical difficulties which have hampered its 
application in practice. Military advantage and civilian collateral damage are two 
values which are not easily compared and the only consistent objective test that 
has been used to determine what constitutes a disproportionate attack or a 
                                            
 
794
 See Ch 2 at note 204 
795
 See Ch 2 at note 213 
796
  Final Report to the Prosecutor by the Committee Established to Review the Nato Bombing Campaign 
against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, para 21. 
797
 In addition to the Kunduz Hospital Bombing case, administrative punishments were issued to those 
accused of attacking the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade during the Kosovo War. Cryer, Prosecuting 
International Crimes: Selectivity and the International Criminal Law Regime, 218. 
798
 See Ch 2 at note 347. 
   
 
 
261 
 
 
precautions violation is the ‘reasonable military commander’ test. However, this 
test has only been invoked by state and court officials in an exculpatory 
manner. Therefore, the ambiguity in both the black-letter text of the rules on 
proportionality or precautions in attack and their associated reasonableness 
tests has been exclusively resolved in favour of the state and its commanders.    
 Moreover, although it is theoretically possible to prosecute commanders 
under international criminal law for precautions violations which lead to 
excessive collateral damage, the result of such cases would be highly 
dependent on how the particular forum decided to interpret the relevant law. If 
the court allowed convictions for either direct attacks against the civilian 
population or disproportionate attacks based on a recklessness liability 
standard, then such a trial could occur. However, even if it is possible, for many 
of the same reasons that they will not convict for proportionality cases, it is not 
likely that judges will convict under a recklessness standard for precautions 
violations. Nevertheless, civil law is well-suited to tackle questions about liability 
for decision-making errors using a reasonable person standard or about what 
constitutes the appropriate degree of precaution that a reasonable person must 
take to guard against causing harm to others. Moreover, historically, LOAC has 
been considered more a body of civil law, than a criminal code. 
 Finally, it is difficult to achieve accountability for proportionality or 
precautions violations because investigators are not always able to visit the 
scene of an errant strike immediately after the event. Furthermore, it is nearly 
impossible for them to obtain access to conversations that occurred in the 
operations room or notes from the war logs unless the state under investigation 
agrees to such an examination of their classified records. When this nearly 
impossible evidentiary burden is combined with the weak liability regime that 
has historically developed for violations of proportionality or precautions in 
attack, the chances of a prosecutor securing a conviction in a criminal trial are 
absurdly low.  
 These problems do not exist in a strategic vacuum. State actors and 
court actors have a set of interests and these interests are reflected in both the 
substance of the law and how it is enforced. Therefore, the strategic-choice 
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perspective may shed light on how these problems contribute to the lack of 
accountability and on how it might be possible to create an effective 
accountability regime in the future. Although strategic-choice analyses tend to 
answer questions which may seem intuitively obvious to seasoned lawyers, 
there is value in making what is implicit, explicit. Moreover, by examining the 
fewest number of actors and variables necessary to tease out the logic behind a 
strategic interaction, researchers who design models using this perspective 
posit parsimonious explanations for phenomena that can be subjected to 
empirical testing. James Morrow has already applied this approach to the study 
of LOAC compliance, but his work emphasised the role that reciprocity plays in 
keeping combatants from violating the law. To the extent that courts would 
prevent violations, he surmised that only deposed autocrats and democrats who 
are accused of marginally unlawful behaviour who would end up in the dock. 
The case law suggests that deposed illiberal leaders do go to trial, but 
democrats do not seem to be ending up in court at all. The large body of 
literature which describes the way in which court and state actors make 
decisions in the US separation of powers system shows that, despite their 
formal independence, judges do consider the likely response of other actors 
when exercising judicial review. In the smaller number of studies which have 
examined how state and international court actors interact with one another, the 
focus has been on how the self-enforcing nature of international criminal justice. 
Furthermore, previous studies have tended to explain how the ICT behaviour 
affects state actors, rather than the other way around. In this study, I decided to 
examine how decisions made one step back in the chain affect the success of 
an accountability regime by considering how state actors are also able to 
influence the prosecutor’s decision-making process. 
 To model the interaction between state officials who can set policy on 
LOAC matters and a prosecutor who has the power to indict commanders for a 
violation of proportionality and its associated attack precautions, I first needed 
to know what motivated each actor. Using my interviews with state and court 
officials along with archival material and a few secondary sources, I postulated 
that state officials are motivations fell into broadly two categories. Firstly, they 
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seemed concerned over any rule or accountability regime that would have a 
chilling effect on the commander’s willingness to fight the state’s adversaries 
aggressively and they were protective of their ability to keep classified 
information secret over fears that it could likewise compromise the success of 
future military operations. Secondly, they were concerned with how other 
audiences would perceive the state’s actions, suggesting that they were also 
concerned with state legitimacy. One could see this dynamic playing out at the 
CDDH and at the Rome Conference where the UK and US delegations wanted 
to include the proportionality rule in these treaties, but they also fought hard to 
word the text in such a way as to make sure that their own commanders would 
not be held liable for collateral damage. Furthermore, even with 20 years 
separating the CDDH and the Rome Conference, the delegations to each of 
these conferences held similar beliefs and motivations, suggesting that their 
positions were not merely the transient preferences of one political party or an 
ideological fad. For their part, prosecutors are also keen to enhance the 
legitimacy of their office and the way they achieve this is by ensuring that the 
cases they bring to trial are solid enough to end with a conviction. Furthermore, 
they are wary of the logistical costs of running an investigation. Because the 
liability regime for cases involving prima facie disproportionate attack is so weak 
and the evidentiary burden is so high, the historical record contains several 
instances where prosecutors have chosen to drop such cases rather than try to 
fight them in court. The most famous example of this was the ICTY prosecutor’s 
decision not to press forward with a formal investigation or trial of NATO’s 
actions during its 1999 war with Serbia, but it is possible that the ICC OTP has 
also decided to forgo cases for this reason as well. 
 After having defined the relevant actors and their motivations, I created a 
three-level game of perfect information to model the possible ways that state 
and court actors can affect one another’s decision-making process as it relates 
to achieving accountability for prima facie disproportionate attacks. The model 
was not meant to depict any particular judicial forum; rather, it sketched out a 
strategic logic that could apply to both domestic and international courts. 
Moreover, although the model is focused on criminal law, its broad-strokes 
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conclusions could also be generalised to civil law courts. In the game, the state 
official moves first and can decide whether to keep the liability regime for 
proportionality offenses strict or weak, which will respectively increase or 
decrease the probability that a suspect commander will be convicted, if tried. If 
one of the commanders from that state is accused of ordering a 
disproportionate attack, then the prosecutor can choose to either issue an 
indictment or not issue an indictment. Finally, the state official can choose to 
either cooperate with the court or to not cooperate, which again will influence 
the suspect commander’s probability of conviction. Historically, state officials 
have chosen to keep the liability regime weak for cases of disproportionate 
attack and prosecutors have therefore decided not to indict commanders for 
charges based on violations of proportionality or precautions in attack.  
In order for the game to settle into a new equilibrium path, certain 
conditions must be present. For example, to get the prosecutor to issue an 
indictment in spite of a strong liability regime being in place, an exogenous 
actor, such as an HRO or a group of ‘like-minded’ countries799 could help defray 
the costs of running the investigation and could pressure the court into taking on 
a case by exacting a legitimacy cost from the prosecutor for dropping 
proportionality-related cases from the docket. This solution would lead to more 
prosecutions, but it would ultimately be a futile effort since the likelihood of 
conviction would remain unchanged.  
Surprisingly, it appears to always be in the state official’s interest to 
cooperate with the prosecutor by providing some access to behind-the-scenes 
information regarding the attack, so long as it doesn’t substantially increase the 
likelihood of conviction for a suspect commander. This is because, in most 
cases, the legitimacy that the state gains for participating in a transparency 
regime should overcome the threat posed by sharing information about any 
particular attack. However, even if state officials agree to cooperate with the 
prosecutor, either directly or through a transparency regime, they will not likely 
hand over the ‘smoking gun’ or any information that substantially increases the 
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commander’s probability of conviction. Furthermore it is unlikely that autocrats 
or particularly bellicose states (i.e. those that value military success 
substantially more than legitimacy) will sign up to such a regime.  
 To get the state official to agree to a stricter liability regime for the rules 
on proportionality and precautions in attack, the state official must ascribe more 
value to state legitimacy than to future military success or they must believe that 
other exogeneous factors will lower the probability of a suspect commander’s 
conviction. Practically, one way to do this is to challenge the state official’s 
belief that limiting collateral damage necessarily puts the success of future 
military operations in danger. By providing the official with empirical evidence 
which shows that the value of future military success is not moderated by the 
likelihood that commanders will be convicted for proportionality offenses, the 
state official may be more likely to endorse a stricter liability regime for the 
proportionality rule.  Otherwise, HROs or other parties interested in 
accountability for cavalier or disproportionate attack could get states to agree to 
a stricter liability regime by lobbying for such attacks to be tried in civil, rather 
than criminal courts. By treating such incidents as civil torts for which the state, 
not the commander, incurs liability, state officials would not have to worry about 
criminal prosecutions having a chilling effect on their commanders’ willingness 
to aggressively pursue the enemy. With the value of future military action no 
longer moderated by the spectre of criminal prosecutions, the state official 
should be more inclined to support a stricter civil liability for the rules on 
proportionality and precautions in attack. At any rate, proportionality offenses 
and precautions failures are well-suited to civil adjudication since their 
associated reasonableness tests should be familiar to any tort lawyer. 
Furthermore, such a regime would incentivise military and civilian leaders to 
take operational offenses more seriously, which should lead to the sort of top-
down structural changes in military’s armoury and TTPs needed to limit 
collateral damage. Additionally, if one commander’s decisions or actions were 
particularly egregious, then the tort could motivate the state to take further 
administrative or criminal action against them, depending on the severity of their 
individual offense.  
   
 
 
266 
 
 
Now that the contours of the model have been defined and its predictions 
have been explored with a few case studies, the next task will be to develop a 
solid empirical basis for its applicability in real-world situations. Going forward, it 
will be important to analyse the future behaviour of the ICC Prosecutor to see if 
they are willing to issue an indictment for a case of disproportionate attack and 
whether state officials will offer their support. Given the number of engagements 
currently involving the use of aerial bombardment, the number of accusations of 
disproportionate attacks is unlikely to fall in the near future. Since few of them 
are likely to fall within the ICC Prosecutor’s remit, because of restrictions on its 
jurisdiction, there will likely be even more cases at the domestic level that will 
wrestle with the thorny issues of proportionality and precautions in attack in the 
years to come. The variation in different national systems of justice should 
produce a natural experiment against which the predictions of this model could 
be assessed empirically.   
 If the jus in bello rules on proportionality and precautions in attack are to 
be more than a moral appeal, then the law must not only be a guide for how 
combatants ought to approach their duties when planning or launching attacks, 
but it should also hold those who fail in this duty to account after the fact, 
whether they be individuals or states. With more civilians living in dense urban 
environments where it is difficult to escape the effects of bombardment with 
heavy weapons, enforcement of these rules is needed to avert humanitarian 
catastrophes. Nevertheless, any proposal to improve accountability for the jus in 
bello rules on proportionality or precautions in attack also must also consider 
how the decision-making processes of state officials and prosecutors have 
caused them to be so weakly enforced in the first place. With a better 
appreciation of this strategic reality it may yet be possible to design an 
accountability regime that will avoid these rules becoming dead letter law.   
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